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A scientific claim is a generalization based on a reported statistically significant effect. The reproducibility of that claim is its scientific meaning. Anything not explicitly mentioned in a scientific claim as a limitation of the claim's scope means that it implicitly generalizes over these unmentioned aspects. Hence, so-called “conceptual” replications that differ in these unmentioned aspects from the original study are legitimate, and necessary to test the generalization implied by the original study's claim.
Structural priming is a sufficient but not a necessary condition for proving the existence of representations. Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence. Cognitive science relies on the legitimacy of positing representations and processes without “proving” every component. Also, psycholinguistics relies on other methods, including acceptability judgments, to find the materials for priming experiments in the first place.
We encourage Pickering & Garrod (P&G) to implement this promising theory in a computational model. The proposed theory crucially relies on having an efficient and reliable mechanism for early intention recognition. Furthermore, the generation of impoverished predictions is incompatible with a number of key phenomena that motivated P&G's theory. Explaining these phenomena requires fully specified perceptual predictions in both comprehension and production.
The view that questions are 'requests for missing information' is too simple when language use is considered. Formally, utterances are questions when they are syntactically marked as such, or by prosodic marking. Functionally, questions request that certain information is made available in the next conversational turn. But functional and formal questionhood are independent: what is formally a question can be functionally something else, for instance, a statement, a complaint or a request. Conversely, what is functionally a question is often expressed as a statement. Also, verbal signals such as eye-gaze, head-nods or even practical actions can serve information-seeking functions that are very similar to the function of linguistic questions. With original cross-cultural and multidisciplinary contributions from linguists, anthropologists, psychologists and conversation analysts, this book asks what questions do and how a question can shape the answer it evokes.