This article examines the anti-Lukashenka protest movement in Belarus by comparing it to the Solidarity movement in Poland. We organize our analysis around the concept of four stages identifiable in the development of social movements: emergence, coalescence, bureaucratization, and decline. We argue that protests in Belarus reached the bureaucratization stage, but their transformation into a more durable movement was slowed down by the brutal repressions unleashed by the Lukashenka regime propped up by Putin’s Russia. However, the spectacular changes in people’s conceptions of national identity built around symbols different from those associated with the officialdom may sustain emotional mobilization necessary for formation of higher levels of organizations in the oppressive context of today’s Belarus. The contours of this process are brought into sharp relief when compared with the long, cumulative trajectory of the 1956-89 anti-authoritarian Polish revolts. This opens the way for cautious prognostication.

Although glacial landscapes have previously been used for the reconstruction of late Quaternary glaciations in the Central Andes, only few data exist for the Eastern Cordillera in Bolivia. Here, we present results from detailed morphostratigraphic mapping and new data of surface exposure dating (SED), optically stimulated luminescence (OSL), and radiocarbon dating (14C) from the Huara Loma Valley, Cordillera de Cochabamba (Bolivia). Discrepancies between individual dating methods could be addressed within the context of a solid geomorphic framework. We identified two major glaciations. The older is not well constrained by the available data, whereas the younger glaciation is subdivided into at least four major glacial stages. Regarding the latter, a first advance dated to ~ 29–25 ka occurred roughly contemporaneous with the onset of the global last glacial maximum (LGM) and was followed by a less extensive (re-)advance around 20–18 ka. The local last glacial maximum (LLGM) in the Huara Loma Valley took place during the humid lateglacial ~17–16 ka, followed by several smaller readvances until ~10–11 ka, and complete deglaciation at the end of the Early Holocene.

The most challenging task in today's comparative politics is crafting a fruitful combination of a general theory of political behavior with a nontrivial and sufficiently rich portrayal of that behavior's social, cultural, and historical context. At the same time, a consensus is emerging that holism is out, individualism is in, and the discipline's intellectual effort should be primarily focused on the reconstruction of the rules (mechanisms) governing the strategizing behavior of individuals in various social and cultural contexts. Macro-historical-structural explanations are largely out of favor. Given this intellectual climate, the premium is placed on studies that employ rational choice/game theoretical framework and test its applicability and limitations in the study of non-Western political systems. Such tests of applicability inevitably involve a confrontation between slim and parsimonious game-theoretic models and detail-rich ethnographic or historical reconstructions. Sometimes such confrontations end up in fruitless, mutual acrimony; recently, however, they have led to many instances of cross-fertilization and productive revisions of both sides' analytical assumptions.

The article reconstructs and explains the patterns of collective protest in four Central European countries: former East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia during the early phases of democratic consolidation (1989–93). The method of event analysis of protest behavior is employed. Content analysis of six major newspapers in each country provides empirical evidence. The examination of data reveals striking contrasts in the magnitude and forms of protests. In each country the policies of the new democratic regimes were contested by different groups and organizations, employing different repertoires of contention. The authors consider propositions derived from four theoretical traditions—relative deprivation, instrumental institutionalism, historical- cultural institutionalism, and resource mobilization theory—to determine which provides the best explanation for the patterns observed in the data set. Three main conclusions are reached. First, the levels of "objective" or "subjective" deprivation are unrelated to the magnitude and various features of protest, which are best explained by a combination of institutional and resource mobilization theories. Second, democratic consolidation is not necessarily threatened by a high magnitude of protest, since the two seem to be unrelated. Third, if the demands of collective protest are moderate and the methods routinized, then protest may contribute to the robustness of a new democracy.