Rules of Origin (RoO) are critical components of Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs). They are designed to stop products coming into a PTA through the partner that applies the lowest tariff – a phenomenon known as trade deflection. While RoO are necessary, complex RoO may undo the benefits of trade agreements. Using a novel database of RoO, this paper evaluates the incidence and restrictiveness of different types of Product-Specific Rules of Origin (PSRs) across 128 reciprocal PTAs for the period 1990–2015. Results, based on a structural gravity model controlling for confounding factors, display wide heterogeneity across different categories of PSRs attached to preferential margins, with more flexible PSRs associated with a significantly stronger trade effect compared to more restrictive ones where exporters do not have a choice among PSRs or have to satisfy multiple PSRs. A simulation exercise reveals that a radical simplification reform leading to the adoption of flexible PSRs providing alternative choices to prove origin would have increased global trade under PTAs on average by between 2.7 and 4% during the sample period.

The value of preferential market access schemes has fallen sharply. Drawing on a relaxation announcement of July 2016 simplifying origin requirements for access to the EU that should help improve market access, thereby contributing to alleviate the refugee crisis in Jordan, this paper argues that a simplification of origin requirements is a straightforward way to enhance preferential market access. Yet, the EU decision limits the beneficiaries who must be located in designated special economic zones, which limits preferential market access. The paper compares the performance of Jordanian exports to the EU and the US under their respective FTAs. It shows that Jordanian exports to the US have grown more rapidly than exports to the EU over the last 15 years. The study documents lower utilisation of preferences in the EU than in the US, especially in Textiles and Apparel (T&A) in spite of non-negligible preferences. Three contributing factors are identified: (i) higher adjusted preferences for apparel in the US than in the EU; (ii) greater competition from other suppliers (mostly from LDCs) in the EU market than in the US market; (iii) simpler origin requirements in the case of the Jordan–US FTA. Comparative evidence from the two FTAs and econometric estimates suggest that this should help restore market access for Jordanian exports to the EU. These estimates provide additional evidence that origin requirements suppress market access. Other pathways to simplify origin requirements are offered in the conclusion.

In July 2014 a group of 14 countries (the ‘Davos Group’) launched negotiations on liberalizing trade in ‘green goods’ (also known as environmental goods – EGs), focusing on the elimination of tariffs for a list of 54 products. With an average tariff of 1.8 per cent, this group has little to offer even if the list were extended to the 411 products on the ‘WTO list’. Taking into account tariff dispersion, their tariff structure on EGs would be equivalent to a uniform tariff of 3.4 per cent, about half the uniform tariff-equivalent for non EGs products. Enlarging the number of participants to low-income countries might be possible as, on average, their imports would not increase by more than 8 per cent. Because of the strong complementarities between trade in EGs and trade in environmental services, these should also be brought into the negotiation in spite of the likely difficulties in reaching agreement on their scope.

This paper reviews the extent of reductions in tariffs on environmental goods (EGs) by country participation in the negotiations mandated by a Doha Ministerial Decision in November 2001. Symptomatic of the cleavages across countries throughout the Round, little progress was achieved during the negotiations in defining an approach to a multilateral reduction in protection of EGs. Conflicting interests and differing perceptions of the benefits from increased trade in EGs was reflected in the different approaches proposed by members (request and offer, integrated project, list approach, hybrid approach), and for the few countries (13) that adopted a list approach, there was little overlap across submissions. For all income groups, on average, EGs are less protected than other goods and countries reduced protection by about 50% from initial levels in 1996 leaving little room for further exchange of market access. Difficulties in applying the two complementary conceptions of EGs: (i) ‘goods for environmental management’, and (ii) ‘environmentally preferable products' are reviewed and mentioned as reasons for the lack of progress during the negotiations. Inspection of the submission lists against a ‘core list’ of 26 EGs drawn up by the WTO shows that this ‘core list’ was mostly made up of products in which developed countries had a comparative advantage, and that countries that submitted lists generally avoided including on their lists the most highly protected goods.

Building on earlier work by Estevadeordal (2000), we construct a synthetic index (R-index) intending to capture the restrictiveness of rules of origin in preferential trading agreements. The R-index is applied to NAFTA and the Single List of the EU's PANEURO system covering all of the EU's preferential trade agreements. The R-index highlights how a common set of rules of origin can affect countries differently depending on their export structures, and how their complexity varies across sectors. Having controlled for the extent of tariff preference at the tariff-line level, the R-index contributes to explain differences in the rate at which preferences are used. Finally, we compute estimates of the compliance costs associated with rules of origin under NAFTA and under PANEURO and find them to be between 6.8% of good value (NAFTA) and 8% (PANEURO).