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12 results

  • Chapter 1 - Sleep medicine and psychiatry: history and significance

  • from Section I - Overview
  • Edited by John W. Winkelman, David T. Plante, University of Wisconsin, Madison
  • Book: Foundations of Psychiatric Sleep Medicine
  • Published online: 01 June 2011
  • Print publication: 23 December 2010, pp 1-12

  • Summary

    Sleep and dream research are truly foundational to psychiatry, and history reflects how psychiatry has struggled to come to terms with mind versus brain dualism. Stimulated by speculative dynamic neurologists like Pierre Janet and Jean-Marie Charcot, Sigmund Freud created psychoanalysis in the same period Kraepelin and Bleuler labored. Of central importance to Freud's theory was his view of dreaming as an unconsciousmental process by which dreamers could bowdlerize unacceptable unconscious wishes that threatened to invade consciousness and awaken them. By preventing subjects from entering REM with enforced awakenings, William Dement and Charles Fisher theorized they could prevent dreaming and thus cause psychological distress in their subjects. By the mid-1970s, experimental dream laboratories were failing, but modern sleep medicine was burgeoning. As the reciprocal interaction and activation-synthesis hypotheses evolved, they metamorphosed into the 'activation level, input source, and mode of processing' (AIM) model based on findings in sleep and dream research. sleep medicine, psychiatry, REM sleep, dream deprivation, AIM model, dream consciousness

  • Chapter 16 - States of consciousness: normal and abnormal variation

  • from Part I - The cognitive science of consciousness
  • Edited by Philip David Zelazo, University of Toronto, Morris Moscovitch, University of Toronto, Evan Thompson, University of York
  • Book: The Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness
  • Published online: 05 June 2012
  • Print publication: 14 May 2007, pp -

  • Summary

    Consciousness is only marginally relevant to artificial intelligence (AI), because to most researchers in the field other problems seem more pressing. The purpose of consciousness, from an evolutionary perspective, is often held to have something to do with the allocation and organization of scarce cognitive resources. This chapter describes Daniel Dennett's idea of the intentional stance, in which an observer explains a system's behavior by invoking such intentional categories as beliefs and goals. The computationalist theory of phenomenal consciousness ends up looking like a spoil-sport's explanation of a magic trick. The chapter focuses on critiques that are specifically directed at computational models of consciousness, as opposed to general critiques of materialist explanation. The contribution of artificial intelligence to consciousness studies has been slender so far, because almost everyone in the field would rather work on better defined, less controversial problems.

  • 1 - Dreaming and the brain: Toward a cognitive neuroscience of conscious states

    • By J. Allan Hobson, Laboratory of Neurophysiology, Department of Psychiatry, Harvard Medical School, Massachusetts Mental Health Center, Boston, MA 02115., Edward F. Pace-Schott, Laboratory of Neurophysiology, Department of Psychiatry, Harvard Medical School, Massachusetts Mental Health Center, Boston, MA 02115., Robert Stickgold, Laboratory of Neurophysiology, Department of Psychiatry, Harvard Medical School, Massachusetts Mental Health Center, Boston, MA 02115.
  • Edited by Edward F. Pace-Schott, Harvard Medical School, Mark Solms, Royal London Hospital, Mark Blagrove, University of Wales, Swansea, Stevan Harnad, University of Southampton
  • Book: Sleep and Dreaming
  • Published online: 11 January 2010
  • Print publication: 27 February 2003, pp 1-50

  • Summary

    Abstract: Sleep researchers in different disciplines disagree about how fully dreaming can be explained in terms of brain physiology. Debate has focused on whether REM sleep dreaming is qualitatively different from nonREM (NREM) sleep and waking. A review of psychophysiological studies shows clear quantitative differences between REM and NREM mentation and between REM and waking mentation. Recent neuroimaging and neurophysiological studies also differentiate REM, NREM, and waking in features with phenomenological implications. Both evidence and theory suggest that there are isomorphisms between the phenomenology and the physiology of dreams. We present a three-dimensional model with specific examples from normally and abnormally changing conscious states.

    Keywords: consciousness, dreaming, neuroimaging, neuromodulation, NREM, phenomenology, qualia, REM, sleep

    Introduction

    Dreaming is a universal human experience that offers a unique view of consciousness and cognition. It has been studied from the vantage points of philosophy (e.g., Flanagan 1997), psychiatry (e.g., Freud 1900), psychology (e.g., Foulkes 1985), artificial intelligence (e.g., Crick 1994), neural network modeling (Antrobus 1991; 1993b; Fookson & Antrobus 1992), psychophysiology (e.g., Dement & Kleitman 1957b), neurobiology (e.g., Jouvet 1962) and even clinical medicine (e.g., Mahowald & Schenck 1999; Mahowald et al. 1998; Schenck et al. 1993). Because of its broad reach, dream research offers the possibility of bridging the gaps in these fields.

    We strongly believe that advances in all these domains make this a propitious time to review and further develop these bridges. It is our goal in this target article to do so.

  • The ghost of Sigmund Freud haunts Mark Solms's dream theory

  • J. Allan Hobson
  • Journal: Behavioral and Brain Sciences / Volume 23 / Issue 6 / December 2000
  • Published online by Cambridge University Press: 21 September 2001, pp. 951-952

  • Recent neuropsychological data indicating that an absence of dreaming follows lesions of frontal subcortical white matter have been interpreted by Solms as supportive of Freud's wish-fulfillment, disguise-censorship dream theory. The purpose of this commentary is to call attention to Solms's commitment to Freud and to challenge and contrast his specific arguments with the simpler and more complete tenets of the activation-synthesis hypothesis.

    [Hobson et al.; Nielsen; Solms]

  • Dreaming and the brain: Toward a cognitive neuroscience of conscious states

  • J. Allan Hobson, Edward F. Pace-Schott, Robert Stickgold
  • Journal: Behavioral and Brain Sciences / Volume 23 / Issue 6 / December 2000
  • Published online by Cambridge University Press: 21 September 2001, pp. 793-842

  • Sleep researchers in different disciplines disagree about how fully dreaming can be explained in terms of brain physiology. Debate has focused on whether REM sleep dreaming is qualitatively different from nonREM (NREM) sleep and waking. A review of psychophysiological studies shows clear quantitative differences between REM and NREM mentation and between REM and waking mentation. Recent neuroimaging and neurophysiological studies also differentiate REM, NREM, and waking in features with phenomenological implications. Both evidence and theory suggest that there are isomorphisms between the phenomenology and the physiology of dreams. We present a three-dimensional model with specific examples from normally and abnormally changing conscious states.