Effective preparedness, response, and recovery from disasters require a well-planned, integrated effort with experienced professionals who can apply specialized knowledge and skills in critical situations. While some professionals are trained for this, others may lack the critical knowledge and experience needed to effectively perform under stressful disaster conditions. A set of clear, concise, and precise training standards that may be used to ensure workforce competency in such situations has been developed. The competency set has been defined by a broad and diverse set of leaders in the field and like-minded professionals through a series of Web-based surveys and expert working group meetings. The results may provide a useful starting point for delineating expected competency levels of health professionals in disaster medicine and public health.

(Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness. 2012;6:44–52)

Background: In the days following a disaster/public health emergency, there is great effort to ensure that everyone receives appropriate care and lives are saved. However, evacuees following a disaster/public health emergency often lack access to personal health information that is vital to receive or maintain quality care. Delayed treatment and interruptions of medication regimens often contribute to excess morbidity and mortality following a disaster/public health emergency. This study sought to define a set of minimum health information elements that can be maintained in a personal health record (PHR) and given to first responders/receivers within the first 96 hours of a disaster/public health response to improve clinical health outcomes.

Methods: A mixed methods approach of qualitative and quantitative data gathering and analyses was completed. Expert panel members (n = 116) and existing health information elements were sampled for this study; 55% (n = 64) of expert panel members had clinical credentials and determined the health information. From an initial set of six sources, a step-wise process using a Likert scale survey and thematic data analyses, including interrater reliability and validity checks, produced a set of minimum health information elements.

Results: The results identified 30 essential elements from 676 existing health information elements, a reduction of approximately 95%. The elements were grouped into seven domains: identification, emergency contact, health care contact, health profile –past medical history, medication, major allergies/diet restrictions, and family information.

Conclusions: Leading experts in clinical disaster preparedness identified a set of minimum health information elements that first responders/receivers must have to ensure appropriate and timely care. If this set of elements is used as the fundamental information for a PHR, and automatically updated and validated during clinical encounters and medication changes, it is conceivable that following large-scale disasters clinical outcomes may be improved and more lives may be saved.

(Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness. 2012;6:303-310)

Background: On April 16, 2007 a mass shooting occurred on the campus of Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University (Virginia Tech). Due to both distance and weather, air transport of the injured directly to a level 1 trauma center was not possible. The injured received all of their care or were initially stabilized at 3 primary hospitals that either had a level 3 trauma center designation or no trauma center designation.

Methods: This article is a retrospective analysis of the regional health system (prehospital, hospital, regional hospital emergency operations center, and public health local and state) response. Data records from all of the regional responding emergency medical services, hospitals, and coordinating services were reviewed and analyzed. Records for all 26 patients were reviewed and analyzed using triage designations, injury severity scores (ISS), and critical mortality.

Results: Twenty-five of the 26 patients were triaged in the field. Excluding 1 patient (asthma), the average ISS for victims presenting was 8.2. Twelve patients had an ISS of ≥9, and 5 had an ISS score of ≥15. Ten of the 26 patients (38%) required urgent intervention and surgery in the first 24 hours. The overall regional health system mortality of victims received was 3.8% (1 death [excluding 1 dead on arrival {DOA}]/ 26 victims from scene). The regional health system critical mortality rate (excluding 1 victim who was DOA) was 20% (1/5).

Discussion: The outcomes of the Virginia Tech mass casualty incident, as evidenced by the low overall regional health system mortality of victims received at 3.8% (1/26) and low critical mortality rate (excluding 1 victim who was DOA) of 20%, coupled with a need to treat a significant amount of moderately injured victims 46% (12/26 with ISS ≥9) gives credence to the successful response. The successful response occurred as a consequence of regional collaborative planning, training, and exercising, which resulted not only in increased expertise and improved communications but also in essential relationships and a sense of trust forged among all of the responders. (Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness. 2007;1(Suppl 1):S9–S13)

Background: No definitive guidelines have been established in the United States for postexposure immunization and prophylaxis (PEP) to hepatitis B and C viruses (HBV, HCV) and human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) in the event of a traumatic explosive event.

Methods: The American Medical Association’s Center for Public Health Preparedness and Disaster Response assembled a US-Israeli panel of experts, including representatives from disaster medicine, trauma surgery, occupational health, and infectious disease to determine guidelines for adult and pediatric victims following a traumatic explosive event. The panel reviewed the existing Israeli and United Kingdom protocols, previously published Centers for Disease Control and Prevention guidance on occupational and nonoccupational exposures to HBV, HCV, and HIV, before reaching consensus on preliminary guidelines for the United States.

Results: These guidelines recommend an age-appropriate dose and schedule for HBV PEP for individuals presenting from the scene with nonintact skin or mucous membrane exposure, and they also consider HCV and HIV testing in individuals presenting with possible nonintact skin or mucous membrane exposure. The guidelines do not recommend PEP for individuals presenting from the scene with possible superficial skin exposure.

Conclusions: These recommendations offer PEP guidance for bloodborne pathogens and are limited in scope. These recommendations do not address general wound PEP such as tetanus or the need for antibiotics. It is hoped that these guidelines will fill an urgent gap in preparedness until definitive, comprehensive guidelines from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention are published. (Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness. 2007;1:106–109)

Background: On June 8 and 9, 2008, more than 4 inches of rain fell in the Iowa-Cedars River Basin causing widespread flooding along the Cedar River in Benton, Linn, Johnson, and Cedar Counties. As a result of the flooding, there were 18 deaths, 106 injuries, and over 38 000 people displaced from their homes; this made it necessary for the Iowa Department of Health to conduct a rapid needs assessment to quantify the scope and effect of the floods on human health.

Methods: In response, the Iowa Department of Public Health mobilized interview teams to conduct rapid needs assessments using Geographic Information Systems (GIS)-based cluster sampling techniques. The information gathered was subsequently employed to estimate the public health impact and significant human needs that resulted from the flooding.

Results: While these assessments did not reveal significant levels of acute injuries resulting from the flood, they did show that many households had been temporarily displaced and that future health risks may emerge as the result of inadequate access to prescription medications or the presence of environmental health hazards.

Conclusions: This exercise highlights the need for improved risk communication measures and ongoing surveillance and relief measures. It also demonstrates the utility of rapid needs assessment survey tools and suggests that increasing use of such surveys can have significant public health benefits.

(Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness. 2011;5:287–292)

Objectives: Hospital surge capacity in multiple casualty events (MCE) is the core of hospital medical response, and an integral part of the total medical capacity of the community affected. To date, however, there has been no consensus regarding the definition or quantification of hospital surge capacity. The first objective of this study was to quantitatively benchmark the various components of hospital surge capacity pertaining to the care of critically and moderately injured patients in trauma-related MCE. The second objective was to illustrate the applications of those quantitative parameters in local, regional, national, and international disaster planning; in the distribution of patients to various hospitals by prehospital medical services; and in the decision-making process for ambulance diversion.

Methods: A 2-step approach was adopted in the methodology of this study. First, an extensive literature search was performed, followed by mathematical modeling. Quantitative studies on hospital surge capacity for trauma injuries were used as the framework for our model. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization triage categories (T1-T4) were used in the modeling process for simplicity purposes.

Results: Hospital Acute Care Surge Capacity (HACSC) was defined as the maximum number of critical (T1) and moderate (T2) casualties a hospital can adequately care for per hour, after recruiting all possible additional medical assets. HACSC was modeled to be equal to the number of emergency department beds (#EDB), divided by the emergency department time (EDT); HACSC = #EDB/EDT. In trauma-related MCE, the EDT was quantitatively benchmarked to be 2.5 (hours). Because most of the critical and moderate casualties arrive at hospitals within a 6-hour period requiring admission (by definition), the hospital bed surge capacity must match the HACSC at 6 hours to ensure coordinated care, and it was mathematically benchmarked to be 18% of the staffed hospital bed capacity.

Conclusions: Defining and quantitatively benchmarking the different components of hospital surge capacity is vital to hospital preparedness in MCE. Prospective studies of our mathematical model are needed to verify its applicability, generalizability, and validity.

(Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness. 2011;5:117–124)

Background: On May 4, 2007 an EF5 tornado hit the rural community of Greensburg, KS, destroying 95% of the town and resulting in 12 fatalities.

Methods: Data was requested from the emergency medical services units that initially responded and the regional hospitals that received people injured in the tornado within 24 hours following the tornado. Requested data included patient age and sex, and injury severity score or ICD-9 codes. Critical mortality, or the number of deaths of critically injured patients, was also calculated.

Results: The extensive damage caused by the tornado effectively destroyed the infrastructure of the community and created enormous challenges for emergency medical services responders, who were unable to record any triage data. Area hospitals treated 90 patients, who had an average injury severity score of 6.4. Age was found to be related to injury severity, but no relationship between sex and injury severity was found. Critical mortality was found to be 18% for this event.

Conclusions: Injury severity score has seldom been used to analyze natural disasters, especially tornadoes, although such analysis is helpful for understanding the magnitude of the disaster, comparing to other disasters, and preparing for future incidents. Advanced warning and personal preparedness are important factors in reducing tornado-related injuries and deaths. (Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness. 2007;1:90–95)

Background: Various organizations and universities have developed competencies for health professionals and other emergency responders. Little effort has been devoted to the integration of these competencies across health specialties and professions. The American Medical Association Center for Public Health Preparedness and Disaster Response convened an expert working group (EWG) to review extant competencies and achieve consensus on an educational framework and competency set from which educators could devise learning objectives and curricula tailored to fit the needs of all health professionals in a disaster.

Methods: The EWG conducted a systematic review of peer-reviewed and non–peer reviewed published literature. In addition, after-action reports from Hurricane Katrina and relevant publications recommended by EWG members and other subject matter experts were reviewed for congruencies and gaps. Consensus was ensured through a 3-stage Delphi process.

Results: The EWG process developed a new educational framework for disaster medicine and public health preparedness based on consensus identification of 7 core learning domains, 19 core competencies, and 73 specific competencies targeted at 3 broad health personnel categories.

Conclusions: The competencies can be applied to a wide range of health professionals who are expected to perform at different levels (informed worker/student, practitioner, leader) according to experience, professional role, level of education, or job function. Although these competencies strongly reflect lessons learned following the health system response to Hurricane Katrina, it must be understood that preparedness is a process, and that these competencies must be reviewed continually and refined over time. (Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness. 2008;2:57–68)

Eighteen national organizations, representing medicine, dentistry, nursing, hospital systems, public health, and emergency medical services, have worked together to create a framework for a national and regional disaster response health system that is scalable, multidisciplinary, and seamless, and based on an all-hazards approach. In July 2005 and June 2006 the American Medical Association (AMA) and the American Public Health Association (APHA) convened the AMA/APHA Linkages Leadership Summit, with funding from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention under the Terrorism Injuries: Information Dissemination and Exchange (TIIDE) program. As cofacilitators, James J. James, MD, DrPH, MHA, director of the AMA Center for Public Health Preparedness and Disaster Response, and Georges Benjamin, MD, FACP, FACEP(E), APHA executive director, met with leaders from 16 national medical, dental, hospital, nursing, hospital systems, public health, and emergency medical services organizations in Chicago (2005) and New Orleans (2006) to deliberate the deficiencies in the medical and public health disaster response system and the lack of necessary linkages between key components of this system: the health care, emergency medical services, and public health sectors. The goal was to reach consensus on a set of overarching recommendations to improve and sustain health system preparedness and to combine each organization's advocacy expertise and experience to promote a shared policy agenda. The full summit report contains 53 consensus-based recommendations, which will serve as the framework for a coordinated national agenda for strengthening health system preparedness for terrorism and other disasters. The 9 most overarching critical recommendations from the report are highlighted here. Although the summit report presents important perspectives on the subject of preparedness for public health emergencies, we must understand that preparedness is a process and that these recommendations must be reviewed and refined continually over time. (Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness. 2007;1(Suppl 1):S51–S54)

Large-scale catastrophic events typically result in a scarcity of essential medical resources and accordingly necessitate the implementation of triage management policies to minimize preventable morbidity and mortality. Accomplishing this goal requires a reconceptualization of triage as a population-based systemic process that integrates care at all points of interaction between patients and the health care system. This system identifies at minimum 4 orders of contact: first order, the community; second order, prehospital; third order, facility; and fourth order, regional level. Adopting this approach will ensure that disaster response activities will occur in a comprehensive fashion that minimizes the patient care burden at each subsequent order of intervention and reduces the overall need to ration care. The seamless integration of all orders of intervention within this systems-based model of disaster-specific triage, coordinated through health emergency operations centers, can ensure that disaster response measures are undertaken in a manner that is effective, just, and equitable. (Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness. 2008;2(Suppl 1):S35–S39)

The filing of criminal charges against a group of clinicians in New Orleans for failure to meet expected standards of care following the hurricanes of 2005 made the growing concern among health professionals about care provided during extreme emergencies or disasters all too real. Questions about what may lead to censure, penalties from licensing boards, or lawsuits have come from nurses, physicians, and many other licensed health professionals. A panel convened by the American Nurses Association that included representatives of medical, public health, hospital, and government agencies considered the ethical, professional, and practical aspects of meeting standards of care in such circumstances. Clinicians are reminded that in emergencies, it is only the circumstances that change (perhaps radically); neither the individual’s professional competency nor the basic professional standard of care is different. In making prioritized decisions under such circumstances, the individual’s ethical framework is utilitarian, and there are 3 areas for action, even when some routine tasks are set aside: maintain worker and patient safety; maintain airway, breathing, and circulation; and establish or maintain infection control. Policy recommendations such as state legislation for the adoption of comprehensive immunity for volunteer health care workers, and the establishment of a medical review panel as arbitration board are also suggested. The resulting white paper summarizes the issues and provides guidance to individual professionals, institutions in which they work, and emergency planners. (Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness. 2009;3:111–116)

Background: Although the training of future physicians in disaster preparedness and public health issues has been recognized as an important component of graduate medical education, medical students receive relatively limited exposure to these topics. Recommendations have been made to incorporate disaster medicine and public health preparedness into medical school curricula. To date, the perspectives of future physicians on disaster medicine and public health preparedness issues have not been described.

Methods: A Web-based survey was disseminated to US medical students. Frequencies, proportions, and odds ratios were calculated to assess perceptions and self-described likelihood to respond to disaster and public health scenarios.

Results: Of the 523 medical students who completed the survey, 17.2% believed that they were receiving adequate education and training for natural disasters, 26.2% for pandemic influenza, and 13.4% for radiological events, respectively; 51.6% felt they were sufficiently skilled to respond to a natural disaster, 53.2% for pandemic influenza, and 30.8% for radiological events. Although 96.0% reported willingness to respond to a natural disaster, 93.7% for pandemic influenza, and 83.8% for a radiological event, the majority of respondents did not know to whom they would report in such an event.

Conclusions: Despite future physicians' willingness to respond, education and training in disaster medicine and public health preparedness offered in US medical schools is inadequate. Equipping medical students with knowledge, skills, direction, and linkages with volunteer organizations may help build a capable and sustainable auxiliary workforce. (Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness. 2009;3:210–216)

Objectives: The November 26-29, 2008, terrorist attacks on Mumbai were unique in its international media attention, multiple strategies of attack, and the disproportionate national fear they triggered. Everyone was a target: random members of the general population, iconic targets, and foreigners alike were under attack by the terrorists.

Methods: A retrospective, descriptive study of the distribution of terror victims to various city hospitals, critical radius, surge capacity, and the nature of specialized medical interventions was gathered through police, legal reports, and interviews with key informants.

Results: Among the 172 killed and 304 injured people, about four-fifths were men (average age, 33 years) and 12% were foreign nationals. The case-fatality ratio for this event was 2.75:1, and the mortality rate among those who were critically injured was 12%. A total of 38.5% of patients arriving at the hospitals required major surgical intervention. Emergency surgical operations were mainly orthopedic (external fixation for compound fractures) and general surgical interventions (abdominal explorations for penetrating bullet/shrapnel injuries).

Conclusions: The use of heavy-duty automatic weapons, explosives, hostages, and arson in these terrorist attacks alerts us to new challenges to medical counterterrorism response. The need for building central medical control for a coordinated response and for strengthening public hospital capacity are lessons learned for future attacks. These particular terrorist attacks had global consequences, in terms of increased security checks and alerts for and fears of further similar “Mumbai-style” attacks. The resilience of the citizens of Mumbai is a critical measure of the long-term effects of terror attacks.

(Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness. 2011;5:273–279)