English law has become a commodity for developing, resource-rich economies desirous of diversifying their economies. A small number of special economic zones, chiefly in the Gulf, but also elsewhere, have set up entire legal systems predicated to a large or smaller degree on English law. This transplantation is based on three distinct models, namely: (a) wholesale incorporation of statutes; (b) general reference to English law as residual law and; (c) implicitly, on the basis of the common law origin of judges appointed to the courts of special economic zones. The expectation in all these models is that the specialised courts and other stakeholders (eg, legal professionals) will apply English statutory and common law in conformity with other laws applicable in the special economic zones. Ultimately, the practice of the courts and other participants will give rise to a sui generis common law jurisdiction that is in dialogue with the courts and institutions of England and Wales. The article argues that this has already been achieved in the majority of the special economic zones examined here.

A state should be deemed to be enjoying fiscal sovereignty where it is effectively empowered, without pressure or coercion, to make all policy decisions required to run the state machinery and satisfy the fundamental needs of its people (at the very least), both individual and collective. A state’s effective policy and decision-making power is effectively curtailed where: (1) it has been substituted in these functions by a third state or an organ of that state; (2) it is prevented from taking a particular action, such as unilateral default; (3) it is forced to violate fundamental domestic laws, including its constitution or the result of a referendum; or (4) external pressure is exerted against its government and institutions, with the aim of creating volatility and uncertainty concerning its finances so it succumbs to such pressure.

Despite significant progress in business and human rights (BHR) discourse and the practices of multinational corporations (MNCs), persons with disabilities and disability rights are absent from both the key instruments and practice of BHR. This lacuna exists despite the near-universal ratification of the United Nations (UN) Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, as well as the fact that disabled persons constitute over 15 per cent of the global population and MNC operations impact them greatly and disproportionately. We argue that MNCs have a central role, responsibility and opportunity to foment change globally in fulfilling the human rights of persons with disabilities through their employment practices and by leveraging their economic power to fulfil other aspects of disability-based human rights. Doing so requires the development and self-enforcement of disability-specific human rights due diligence (HRDD) processes, and creating a general culture of diversity, equity and inclusion that encompasses disability.

This short paper intends to set out a general theory underpinning the process of contractualisation of public international law. In doing so, it explains that this has chiefly been engineered through the establishment of a third sphere of regulation – in addition to the spheres of domestic law(s) and international law – namely transnational law. Both private actors and states operate through this sphere, chiefly because of its flexibility, decreased transaction costs and access to capital (which is scarce in the other two spheres). These benefits of transacting in the transnational-law sphere and the contractualisation of pertinent relationships come at a cost. Such a cost, from the perspective of human rights and parliamentary sovereignty, is explored by reference to two case-studies. The second of these, on the outsourcing of indigenous land rights, is predicated on the research and observations offered by Bhatt (2020).

Although fair trial guarantees have always been recognised as constituting an integral aspect of international arbitral proceedings, this has largely been viewed through the lens of civil procedure rather than as a matter of public law and human rights. This state of affairs has further been compounded by the confidential nature of arbitration and the relative scarcity of set aside (annulment) proceedings before the courts of the seat of arbitration on the grounds of unequal treatment, and before human rights bodies such as the European Court of Human Rights. Moreover, it has always been difficult to reconcile contractual freedom and the advantages offered by arbitration with equal treatment and fair trial claims. This article demonstrates the existence of a set of general principles concerning the meaning and content of equal treatment, which are consistent with its commercial (and civil procedure) and human rights dimensions. The basis of this conclusion is Article 18 of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, as consistently interpreted and adapted by local laws and judgments, arbitral statutes and determinations by the European Court of Human Rights.