INTRODUCTION

The results of Malaysia's 14th General Elections (GE-14) held in May 2018 were unexpected and transformative. Against conventional wisdom, the newly reconfigured opposition grouping Pakatan Harapan (PH) decisively defeated the incumbent Barisan Nasional (BN), ending six decades of uninterrupted dominant one-party rule.

Despite a long-running financial scandal dogging the ruling coalition, an opposition victory had been all but discarded due to: the advantages of incumbency; fissures amongst opposition ranks well into 2018; and a favourable economic outlook. Indeed, prominent pollsters and commentators predicted a solid BN victory or, at least, a narrow parliamentary majority.

Yet, on the day, deeply rooted political dynamics and influential actors came together, sweeping aside many prevailing assumptions and reconfiguring the country's political reality in the process. Voter turnout was significant, economic handouts were disregarded, and the effects of the redelineation of parliamentary and state constituencies were limited.

Beyond consolidating their support in ethnically mixed, urban areas, PH took most semi-urban areas and made important incursions into rural constituencies in the Peninsula's south and west. In addition to losing their parliamentary majority, BN's seemingly impregnable hold on many state governments was breached, and its East Malaysian fortresses capitulated. In addition, against all predictions, Parti Islam se Malaysia (PAS) thrived, retaining Kelantan, toppling Terengganu and making important inroads in Pahang and Kedah.

Due to its long tenure in power, up until 2018, BN was the only government most Malaysians have ever known. It is formally a parliamentary democracy, but has been variously labelled a semi-democracy (Case 2002), pseudo-democracy (Case 2004) or an electoral authoritarian regime (Ufen 2009). Mostly recently, Lopez and Welsh (2018) labelled it a “resilient regime”, implying one that is strong—though not invincible.

The Alliance-BN's hold on power for more than six decades was aided by massive structural advantages, including deployment of public resources for partisan campaigning, control over mainstream media, and a compliant electoral commission able and willing to tilt the playing field in their favour (Weiss 2014; Ostwald 2017).

These incumbent advantages were demonstrated in the 2013 elections, when expectations of change were dashed and BN held on—despite winning fewer votes than the opposition. These systemic factors, and perhaps recent electoral history, led many commentators to be overly conservative in their analyses of Malaysia's 14th general election (GE-14).

INTRODUCTION

In the titanic theatre of Malaysia's GE-14, Selangor did not quite shake the foundations on 9 May 2018, but still served up big surprises. Against widely held expectations of modest results, Pakatan Harapan retained the Selangor state government by a landslide, and wrested a pair of federal parliament seats from its already dominant position (Lee 2018). Moreover, the fledgling coalition secured yawning margins, obliterating the notion that multicornered contests might yield narrow wins. Emphatically, Pakatan Harapan (PH) reaped the advantages of its incumbency and popular administration, while Barisan Nasional's (BN) tactics rang hollow and could not redeem a damaged brand, and Parti Islam SeMalaysia's (PAS) core remained loyal, but its ethnically homogeneous base and parochial platform consigned it to a near wipe-out.

Selangor was a prized trophy heading into GE-14. It is the most populous, prosperous and urbanized state in Malaysia, accounting for 19 per cent of the national population, and together with Kuala Lumpur where millions of Selangorians work, generates 38 per cent of the national GDP. The state's median household income of RM7,225 per month is also 38 per cent above the national median (Department of Statistics 2017). Governing Selangor grants levers to showcase prestige and progress, distribute patronage, determine land use, and oversee state government-linked companies and state-owned entities. Two million registered voters, of which 50.2 per cent identify as Malay, 34.0 per cent as Chinese, 14.5 per cent as Indian, and 1.3 per cent as Others, would decide the winners and losers in the contest for fifty-six state assembly seats and twenty-two federal parliament seats.

It was crucial for PH to retain the state, to shore up its popularity and relevance— and morale, in the event of losses elsewhere. BN declared retaking Selangor as a top priority, and directed the federal government machinery, particularly the Election Commission (EC), towards engineering more favourable conditions. The situation in Selangor was also complicated by PH's continual relationship with PAS, despite the cessation of the Pakatan Rakyat coalition at the federal level. Chief Minister Azmin Ali's calculated truce with PAS until February 2018 seemingly stemmed from fear of a backlash in the Malay electorate should PAS be alienated. Concerns over how Malay votes would be split were coupled with considerations that non- Malay voters might be disillusioned about regime change, and lulled into a lower voter turnout.

For most Malaysian watchers, 9 May 2018 will go down as one of the most remarkable days in the country's history. For the first time ever, an opposition alliance succeeded in deposing the predominant Barisan Nasional (BN) coalition in a general election. The transition, characterized by a delayed swearing-in ceremony of the new prime minister, was peaceful if somewhat grudging. The losers were clearly shocked by their overwhelming defeat, but no less than the winners’ surprise at their victory. After an initial spell of apprehension, a sense of buoyant optimism and idealism infected the mood of the country, though it would ultimately prove unsustainable after the real task of governing began.

The events of GE-14 are all the more remarkable because of how unlikely they seemed just a few years earlier. The opposition was in disarray after an earlier coalition fell apart when the Islamic Party broke off ties with another member party. Mahathir was still a highly distrusted figure by many key opposition stalwarts, not least because of what he had done to them in his previous stint as Prime Minister. Anwar Ibrahim, the most effective campaigner in the opposition, was in prison again and unable to run or campaign. Anwar and Mahathir were estranged, and the depth of disdain that they had for each other since the former's dismissal from the post of Deputy Prime Minister, his assault in custody and subsequent trial on questionable charges was seen as unbridgeable. Even the economy, while not performing at full potential, was still chugging along.

The only thing that the Pakatan Harapan had going for it was the simmering unhappiness over the 1MDB scandal. This undercurrent was strong enough to cause turbulence even within the dominant Malay party, UMNO, itself, and accounted for its incumbent Deputy President being dropped from his post and later stripped of his membership.

However, even with this, it took a combination of many factors for the upset of GE-14 to occur. It was aided by the ubiquity of social media that allowed the government-controlled media to be by-passed. There was also the political statesmanship displayed in the coming together of Mahathir, Anwar and Lim Kit Siang, among others, to form a political alliance.

INTRODUCTION

Chinese support for Pakatan Harapan (PH) not only remained strong in Malaysia's 14th General Elections (GE-14), consistent with voting trends of the 12th and the 13th General Elections, but was also decisive in rejecting Barisan Nasional's (BN) Chinese-based parties of Peninsular Malaysia and East Malaysia. To understand this momentous swing in Chinese support for the former opposition coalition since 2008, we need to look beyond the election issues and campaign strategies of political parties running up to GE-14. This chapter contends that structural shifts in Malaysia's Chinese society—reflected in the profile and influence of civil society organizations and gravitation away from old, predominantly race-based political vehicles—have moved voters in general towards PH, and that allowed for the realignment of elections that took place in 2008 and 2013.

This chapter is comprised of four sections. After this introduction, the second section reviews the general trends of Chinese votes during general elections from 1959 to 2013 with a focus on the gains and losses of Chinese-based political parties in each election and scholarly interpretations of the results. The third section takes a close look at GE-14 by examining the key issues discussed among civil society groups and the campaign issues and strategies adopted mainly by the candidates belonging to the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA), the Democratic Action Party (DAP) and the Sarawak United People's Party (SUPP). The fourth and final section of the discussion looks at social changes within Malaysia's Chinese society.

TRENDS IN CHINESE VOTES (1959–2013)

1959–69: Flux and Contestation

In the years after Malaysia attained independence, political groupings of the Chinese were largely organized along ethnic and ideological lines and divided into MCA, pro-left parties and the underground Communist Party. The pro-left parties were mainly active in the states of Penang, Selangor and Perak where one finds large and concentrated populations of Chinese people (Lee and Heng 2000, pp. 206–7). DAP came onto the scene only after Singapore's People's Action Party (PAP) was compelled to leave Malaysia in 1965.

The 1950s through the 1960s was a period during which Chinese votes were highly fragmented and distributed among national parties such as MCA, DAP, proleft parties and regional-based parties across the country. The 1969 general election was a watershed event which resulted in the suspension of local elections, banning pro-left parties and enacting several laws that curtailed the freedom of speech.

INTRODUCTION

Regardless of events in years to come, 9 May 2018 will be regarded as a crucial juncture in Malaysia's history, as the 14th General Elections (GE-14) reconfigured the country's political context in many and far-reaching ways. What from afar looks like a binary preference between Barisan Nasional (BN) and Pakatan Harapan (PH) is actually a mosaic of changes in the country's increasingly diverse electorate. From their base in urban areas in Peninsular Malaysia, PH expanded into semi-urban areas at the expense of the United Malays National Organization (UMNO) and, particularly, smaller BN component parties. Support for Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS) spread outwards from Kelantan into Terengganu, as well as parts of Pahang and Kedah. In East Malaysia, the newcomer Warisan made substantial inroads into BN heartlands in Sabah. And, Sarawak, while not experiencing the same local-level swing against the incumbent, was nonetheless carried along by the momentum.

Through a multipronged approach to GE-14, this book has sought to shed light on the various factors behind these shifts in voter sentiment. It has done this by, first, looking at the context within which voters act, in terms of: the institutional rules of the game; the wider economic environment; and the availability of financial inducements. From there, it explored the perspectives of different interest groups, seeking to identify key issues facing them and the means used by the competing coalitions to attract their support. This was then complemented by an analysis of political issues and trends in key states, including three on the Peninsula (Selangor, Johor and Kelantan), and the two East Malaysian states of Sabah and Sarawak. Lastly, essays from a selection of “players” in the election provided personal perspectives on the lead-up to the election and its immediate aftermath.

In addition to seeking to deepen our understanding of GE-14 through these four approaches, this book has also sought to explore the question of whether the generalized surprise at the results was due to: signs being overlooked or misread; or the result of a late surge in support for PH and PAS at the expense of BN. While important for guiding the research carried out for this book, the question is not actually binary. Indeed, the answers that have emerged from the preceding chapters indicate a complicated and changing reality with elements of both.