The accelerating mobilization of Chile's working class from 1965 onward appears to support Huntington's cautious evaluation of the effects of that process rather than Deutsch's more optimistic one. Instead of resulting in more massive support for Dr. Allende's minority-based UP government (which, needing support, stimulated even further a process that had been noticeable from at least 1965), increased mobilization resulted in (a) heightened but unattainable economic demands; (b) increased support for the extreme left (a severe threat to the regime's policies and even existence, as Allende recognized); (c) increased support for the opposition Christian Democrats; (d) a general de-authorization of all institutions, including those tailored specifically to working-class needs. In some situations, mobilization may sweep away the remnants of an old regime. But where that is not possible or not the real issue, it may overwhelm rather than aid an already weak government, even if it is change-oriented.
