We comment on the limits of relying on prior literature when constructing the design space for an integrative experiment; the adaptive nature of social and behavioral phenomena and the implications for the use of theory and modeling when constructing the design space; and on the challenges of measuring random errors and lab-related biases in measurement without replication.

Several studies propose that exemplar retrieval contributes to multi-attribute decisions. The authors have proposed a process theory enabling a priori predictions of what cognitive representations people use as input to their judgment process (Sigma, for “summation”; P. Juslin, L. Karlsson, & H. Olsson, 2008). According to Sigma, exemplar retrieval is a back-up system when the task does not allow for additive and linear abstraction and integration of cue-criterion knowledge (e.g., when the task is non-additive). An important question is to what extent such shifts occur spontaneously as part of automatic procedures, such as error-minimization with the Delta rule, or if they are controlled strategy shifts contingent on the ability to identify a sufficiently successful judgment strategy. In this article data are reviewed that demonstrate a shift between exemplar memory and cue abstraction, as well as data where the expected shift does not occur. In contrast to a common assumption of previous models, these results suggest a controlled and contingent strategy shift.

Using Brunswik’s (1952) lens model framework, Hammond (1965) proposed interpersonal conflict theory to explain the nature, source, and resolution of disagreement or “cognitive conflict” between parties performing judgment tasks. An early review by Brehmer (1976) highlighted the potential of this approach in, for example, understanding the structure of cognitive conflicts, and the effect of task and person variables on judgment policy change and conflict resolution. However, our bibliographic and content reviews from 1976 to the present day demonstrate that research on cognitive conflict using the lens model has declined sharply, while research on “task conflict” has grown dramatically. There has also been a shift to less theoretical precision and methodological rigor. We discuss possible reasons for these developments, and suggest ways in which lens model research on cognitive conflict can be revitalized by borrowing from recent theoretical and methodological advances in the field of judgment and decision making.

A method that enables high precision extraction of transmission electron microscope (TEM) specimens in low contrast materials has been developed. The main idea behind this work is to produce high contrast markers on both sides of and close to the area of interest. The markers are filled during the depositing of the protective layer. The marker material can be of either Pt or C depending on which one gives the highest contrast. It is thereby possible to distinguish the location of the area of interest during focused ion beam (FIB) milling and ensure that the TEM sample is extracted precisely at the desired position. This method is generally applicable and enables FIB/scanning electron microscope users to make high quality TEM specimens from small features and low contrast materials without a need for special holders. We explain the details of this method and illustrate its potential by examples from three different types of materials.

A polypyrrole (PPy) nanocellulose composite was shown to cycle well over 3000 cycles in 2.0 M NaCl electrolyte when used as the active material for both electrodes in an energy storage device. SEM micrographs show a highly porous nature of the conductive paper material and electrochemical charge-discharge measurements, as well as external electrode potential monitoring, confirm the good cycling behavior of the material.

Oaksford & Chater (O&C) argue that a rational analysis is required to explain why a functional process model is successful, and that, when a rational analysis is intractable, the prospects for understanding cognition from a functional perspective are gloomy. We discuss how functional explanations can be arrived at without seeking the optimal response function demanded by a rational analysis, and argue that explaining function does not require optimality.