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5 results

  • Natural Goals of Actions in Aristotle
  • HENDRIK LORENZ
  • Journal: Journal of the American Philosophical Association / Volume 1 / Issue 4 / Winter 2015
  • Published online by Cambridge University Press: 29 December 2015, pp. 583-600
  • View abstract

    I argue that there are, according to Aristotle, two importantly different kinds of goals or ends in the domain of human agency and that one of these two kinds has been frequently, though not universally, overlooked. Apart from psychological goals, goals that agents adopt as their purposes, there are also, I submit, goals that actions have by being the kinds of actions they are and, in some cases, by occurring in the circumstances in which they do. These latter goals belong to suitable actions whether or not agents adopt them as purposes and whether or not agents are aware of them. There is evidence both in Aristotle's ethical writings and in his discussion of chance and luck in Physics II.4–6 that he recognizes goals of this latter kind.

  • 10 - The cognition of appetite in Plato's Timaeus
  • from Part III - After the Republic
  • Edited by Rachel Barney, University of Toronto, Tad Brennan, Cornell University, New York, Charles Brittain, Cornell University, New York
  • Book: Plato and the Divided Self
  • Published online: 05 March 2012
  • Print publication: 16 February 2012, pp 238-258
  • View extract

    Summary

    This chapter describes some of the cognitive accomplishments with which appetite in the Timaeus is credited. It addresses the question how the Timaeus can account for those accomplishments in terms of the cognitive resources that it ascribes to the mortal soul-parts. There is good reason to think that the Timaeus' version of tripartition allows and indeed requires communication between reason and the non-rational parts: reason can share information with spirit, and it can issue directives to both of the non-rational parts, which they may or may not obey. Plato can have the Philebus' images in the soul and the Timaeus' images on the liver's surface. The psychological theory that emerges takes reason and appetite to be closely integrated with one another. The thought processes of reason, the theory holds, tend to be accompanied by exercises of the sensory imagination which illustrate reason's accounts, assertions, and denials in a sensory mode.