A catapult into the world of social media, the title of our paper may be incoherent to some readers. What on earth does POV: me, an empath, sensing the linguistic urge ( . . . ) mean, and when and why would speakers say it? The title contains a jumble of three so-called text-memes – (1) POV, (2) me, an empath, VERB-ing X, and (3) the X urge to Y – all of which will be encountered in this paper. What we are calling ‘text-memes’ are memes that, in fairly neutral terms, have a purely textual form, as opposed to a pictorial one. Similar phenomena, which differ regarding their forms and functions, however, have been labelled ‘snowclones’ or ‘phrasal templates’ (cf. Pullum & Whitman, 2004; Know Your Meme, 2007–).

EPICS is the proposed planet finder for the European Extremely Large Telescope. EPICS is a high contrast imager based on a high performing extreme adaptive optics system, a diffraction suppression module, and two scientific instruments: an Integral Field Spectrograph (IFS) for the near infrared (0.95-1.65 μm), and a differential polarization imager (E-POL). Both these instruments should allow imaging and characterization of planets shining in reflected light, possibly down to Earth-size. A few high interesting science cases are presented.

Background: Only a small number of studies on the natural disease course in behavioral variant frontotemporal dementia (bvFTD) have been conducted. This is surprising because knowledge about the progression of symptoms is a precondition for the design of clinical drug trials.

Methods: The aim of the present study was to examine the cognitive decline of 20 patients with mild bvFTD over one year using the Consortium to Establish a Registry for Alzheimer's Disease – Neuropsychological Assessment Battery (CERAD-NAB).

Results: Within an average follow-up interval of 13 months, patient scores declined significantly in the Mini-mental-State-Examination (MMSE) and the CERAD-NAB subtests of naming, verbal and nonverbal memory. No significant changes were found in the CERAD-NAB subtests of category fluency, recognition, and visuoconstruction. The average annualized decline on the MMSE was 4.0 ± 4.9 points. Ceiling effects were detected in Figures Copy, Word List Recognition and Modified Boston Naming Test. Though the included patient group was rather homogeneous regarding severity of dementia, the cognitive changes were very heterogeneous.

Conclusion: Given the heterogeneity of cognitive decline, the design of a test battery for clinical trials in FTD will be challenging. A cognitive battery should definitely include the MMSE, Word List Learning and Word List Delayed Recall.

Egoism and altruism are unequal contenders in the explanation of human behaviour. While egoism tends to be viewed as natural and unproblematic, altruism has always been treated with suspicion, and it has often been argued that apparent cases of altruistic behaviour might really just be some special form of egoism. The reason for this is that egoism fits into our usual theoretical views of human behaviour in a way that altruism does not. This is true on the biological level, where an evolutionary account seems to favour egoism, as well as on the psychological level, where an account of self-interested motivation is deeply rooted in folk psychology and in the economic model of human behaviour. While altruism has started to receive increasing support in both biological and psychological debates over the last decades, this paper focuses on yet another level, where egoism is still widely taken for granted. Philosophical egoism (Martin Hollis’ term) is the view that, on the ultimate level of intentional explanation, all action is motivated by one of the agent's desires. This view is supported by the standard notion that for a complex of behaviour to be an action, there has to be a way to account for that behaviour in terms of the agent's own pro-attitudes. Psychological altruists, it is claimed, are philosophical egoists in that they are motivated by desires that have the other's benefit rather than the agent's own for its ultimate object (other-directed desires). This paper casts doubt on this thesis, arguing that empathetic agents act on other people's pro-attitudes in very much the same way as agents usually act on their own, and that while other-directed desires do play an important role in many cases of psychologically altruistic action, they are not necessary in explanations of some of the most basic and most pervasive types of human altruistic behaviour. The paper concludes with the claim that philosophical egoism is really a cultural value rather than a conceptual feature of action.

Abnormalities of the autonomic nervous system have been repeatedly shown in hypertension. We studied the associations between being overweight, blood pressure, cardiac vagal tone as measured by variability in heart rate, and well-being in a large cohort of young men. We hypothesised an inverse correlation between body mass index and the variability in heart rate. Further, we assessed systolic and diastolic blood pressure as traditional indicators of cardiovascular risk. Exclusion criteria were the use of drugs or pharmaceuticals. The following data from 786 men with a mean age of 19.4 years (standard deviation = 1.4, with a range from 16 to 24 years) were analysed in a cross-sectional study: body mass index, sleep duration, sporting activities, psychological well-being, blood pressure, heart rate, and variability in heart rate. Despite the young age of the men in this study, increased values for the body mass index were already associated with a shift in sympathovagal balance trending towards sympathetic dominance. There was also a significant positive correlation between body mass index and systolic and diastolic blood pressure. A multiple stepwise regression analysis showed that significant factors, which were associated with variability in heart rate, were body mass index and sporting activities. In addition, sporting activity and sleep duration had a significant positive impact on psychological well-being. Even in young men, being overweight is associated with increased cardiovascular risk, especially an increased sympathetic and/or lowered cardiovascular tone and increased blood pressure. Our study gives additional motivation for the early prevention and treatment of obesity in childhood and adolescence.

In the current debate on economic rationality, Amartya Sen's analysis of the structure of commitment plays a uniquely important role (Weirich 2004: 387ff.). However, Sen is not alone in pitting committed action against the standard model of rational behavior. Before turning to Sen's analysis in section 2 of this paper, I shall start with an observation concerning some of the other relevant accounts.

In his critique of rational choice theory, Amartya Sen claims that committed agents do not (or not exclusively) pursue their own goals. This claim appears to be nonsensical since even strongly heteronomous or altruistic agents cannot pursue other people's goals without making them their own. It seems that self-goal choice is constitutive of any kind of agency.

In this paper, Sen's radical claim is defended. It is argued that the objection raised against Sen's claim holds only with respect to individual goals. Not all goals, however, are individual goals; there are shared goals, too. Shared goals are irreducible to individual goals, as the argument from we-derivativeness and the argument from normativity show. It is further claimed that an adequate account of committed action defies both internalism and externalism about practical reason.