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146 results

Page 1 of 8

  • NATURALISM

  • Graham Oppy
  • Journal:
    Think / Volume 19 / Issue 56 / Autumn 2020
    Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    06 October 2020, pp. 7-20
    Print publication:
    Autumn 2020

  • I offer a minimal characterization of naturalism, with ontological, epistemological, psychological and evaluative dimensions. I explain why naturalism is attractive. I note that naturalists disagree among themselves about, among other things, the nature of values, beliefs, and abstractions. I close by responding to some standard objections to naturalism.

  • ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENTS

  • Graham Oppy
  • Journal:
    Think / Volume 19 / Issue 55 / Summer 2020
    Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    01 April 2020, pp. 11-21
    Print publication:
    Summer 2020
    • Article
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  • This is a short introduction to ontological arguments. It begins with a brief characterization of ontological arguments that proceeds mainly by way of example. The rest of the discussion is given over to consideration of what looks like a very simple ontological argument. This consideration turns up many of the issues that arise when more complex ontological arguments are examined.

  • On stage one of Feser's ‘Aristotelian proof’

  • GRAHAM OPPY
  • Journal:
    Religious Studies / Volume 57 / Issue 3 / September 2021
    Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    30 October 2019, pp. 491-502
    Print publication:
    September 2021

  • This article is a response to Ed Feser's claim that his ‘Aristotelian proof’ establishes that atheists have no part in ‘the real debate’. I argue that Feser (2017) nowhere establishes that Premises 4 and 7 in his ‘Aristotelian proof’ are anything more than claims about which he and his opponents – including atheists like me – disagree. In particular, I suggest that it is neither mysterious nor surprising that, by their own lights, atheists have more than sufficient reason to reject premises 4 and 7. Given this, it is clear that Feser's ‘Aristotelian proof’ is not able to do what Feser claims that it does.

    Feser (2017) presents and defends five proofs of the existence of God. Each proof is in two stages: the first stage proves the existence of something which, in the second stage, is shown to possess an appropriate range of divine attributes. Each proof is given two presentations, one informal and one formal. Here, I propose to discuss just the first stage of one of Feser's five proofs. In particular, I propose to focus on just two of the premises in the chosen first stage proof.

  • Introduction: Ontological Arguments in Focus

  • Edited by Graham Oppy, Monash University, Victoria
  • Book:
    Ontological Arguments
    Published online:
    01 November 2018
    Print publication:
    08 November 2018, pp 1-18

  • Summary

    I begin with a quick review of the history of ontological arguments and the major topics taken up in the discussion of these arguments; this review justifies the choice and arrangements of chapters in the book. I then turn to a discussion of three topics that run through the book, but that are not foregrounded anywhere in the discussion: the issue of exactly what it is for something to be an ontological argument; the prospects for fully general refutations of the whole class of ontological arguments; and the vexed question of exactly what it is that would make for a successful ontological argument.

Ontological Arguments
  • Edited by Graham Oppy
  • Published online:
    01 November 2018
    Print publication:
    08 November 2018
  • Ontological arguments are one of the main classes of arguments for the existence of God, and have been influential from the Middle Ages right up until the present time. This accessible volume offers a comprehensive survey and assessment of them, starting with a sequence of chapters charting their history - from Anselm and Aquinas, via Descartes, Leibniz, Kant and Hegel, to Gödel, Plantinga, Lewis and Tichý. This is followed by chapters on the most important topics to have emerged in the discussion of ontological arguments: the relationship between conceivability and possibility, the charge that ontological arguments beg the question, and the nature of existence. The volume as a whole shows clearly how these arguments emerged and developed, how we should think about them, and why they remain important today.

  • 13 - Infinity in Pascal’s Wager

  • from Part III - Extensions
  • Edited by Paul Bartha, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Lawrence Pasternack, Oklahoma State University
  • Book:
    Pascal's Wager
    Published online:
    28 September 2018
    Print publication:
    18 October 2018, pp 260-277

  • Summary

    In chapter 13, Graham Oppy takes on the challenge of making sense of the infinite utility that plays a central role in the canonical version of Pascal’s Wager. Oppy runs through a catalogue of difficulties. Can humans meaningfully assign infinite utility as the outcome of wagering for God? Can naïve infinite decision theory overcome the mixed-strategies objection? Oppy then turns to non-standard mathematical representations of infinity in the Wager, such as offered by Alan Hájek. He argues that since these approaches countenance infinite utilities, they should also permit infinitesimal probabilities. The decision about whether to wager then turns on the precise combination of the probability and utility values. The last part of Oppy’s chapter is a critique of the approach taken by Paul Bartha. Bartha’s “relative utilities” avoid many of the problems that plague naïve infinite decision theory. However, Oppy observes that Bartha’s approach canvasses too limited a range of possible deities, requires a strong equilibrium requirement that has no independent justification, and cannot handle infinitesimal probabilities. He concludes that there is as yet no satisfactory treatment of infinite utility.
Atheism and Agnosticism

Atheism and Agnosticism
  • Graham Oppy
  • Published online:
    31 May 2018
    Print publication:
    17 May 2018
  • This Element is an elementary introduction to atheism and agnosticism. It begins with a careful characterisation of atheism and agnosticism, distinguishing them from many other things with which they are often conflated. After a brief discussion of the theoretical framework within which atheism and agnosticism are properly evaluated, it then turns to the sketching of cases for atheism and agnosticism. In both cases, the aim is not conviction, but rather advancement of understanding: the point of the cases is to make it intelligible why some take themselves to have compelling reason to adopt atheism or agnosticism.

  • What derivations cannot do

  • GRAHAM OPPY
  • Journal:
    Religious Studies / Volume 51 / Issue 3 / September 2015
    Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    14 August 2015, pp. 323-333
    Print publication:
    September 2015

  • I think that there is much about contemporary philosophy of religion that should change. Most importantly, philosophy of religion should be philosophy of religion, not merely philosophy of theism, or philosophy of Christianity, or philosophy of certain denominations of Christianity, or the like. Here, however, I shall complain about one fairly narrow aspect of contemporary philosophy of religion that really irks me: its obsession with derivations that have as their conclusion either the claim that God exists or the claim that God does not exist. I shall work myself up by degrees.

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