So, a lot of my information doesn’t come from the news. It comes from what I see on the Internet.

In Designers Guild Ltd v. Russell Williams (Textiles) Ltd,2 the House of Lords held that the Court of Appeal had erred by assessing anew the decision of the trial judge as to the substantiality of the defendant’s copying of the plaintiff’s fabric and wallpaper designs. As Lord Hoffmann explained, because that decision involved “the application of a not altogether precise legal standard to a combination of features of varying importance,” analysis of substantial copying “falls within the class of case in which an appellate court should not reverse a judge’s decision unless [the judge] has erred in principle.”3 Their Lordships agreed that there had been no such error. The New Zealand Supreme Court endorsed this approach in 2006. Citing Designers Guild, it said: “[I]t is appropriate for appellate Courts to give the trial judge’s assessment the degree of latitude that conventionally applies to appellate review of a discretion.”4

Ordinary trademarks promise consistent quality. This promise is the quid pro quo for the trademark proprietor’s right to control the goodwill symbolized by the mark. Subject to external regulatory controls (safety standards, truth in labeling laws, etc.), it is largely up to the trademark proprietor to set its own standards. If a firm wants to attach its brand to a chocolate product containing low levels of cocoa butter, that is its prerogative.1 It will be motivated to do so if consumers signal their approval with purchases. In these days of incessant licensing of trademarks, consumer confidence is grounded as much in the ability of trademark proprietors to control quality as in any obligation imposed on trademark proprietors to exercise quality control.2 In theory, consumer responses will provide the necessary incentive for trademark proprietors to police supply chains and licensees, so as to ensure that products and services bearing the mark live up to the relevant standards. In other words, insofar as trademark law is concerned, market responses largely dictate the level of trademark proprietors’ investment in standards, not external controls.

This collection of essays, by leading scholars and practitioners from a range of countries, pays homage to a pre-eminent figure in the field of intellectual property: Sam Ricketson. Inspired by the breadth of Ricketson’s work, the contributions explore issues from a perspective that looks across the field – in particular, across the regimes, jurisdictions, disciplines and professions of IP. Topics explored across the regimes include the nature of IP subject matter, overlaps in protection, historical connections between copyright and patents and the transplantation of civil law moral rights to common law copyright. In across jurisdictions, chapters address, inter alia, the application of private international law to cross-border IP disputes, the Berne Convention and AI-authored works, how countries might exit the Berne Convention and dispute settlement under TRIPS. The intersection of copyright and privacy laws, the relationship between privacy, personality and trade mark laws, the teaching of IP and human rights and the conduct of empirical and historical research in IP are among the matters considered across disciplines. Contributions across professions include the participation of scholars in IP policy making, the IP textbook in legal practice, and the role of expert evidence in IP litigation.

The relationship between human rights and intellectual property has attracted the attention of policy makers, international agencies, scholars, and activists. Courses exploring the connections between the two areas of law are also finding their way into law school curricula. Drawing on the author’s experience teaching and designing the syllabus for a very early courses in this field, this chapter explores how courses exploring the IP/human rights interface can enrich law students’ understanding of both areas.