Qualitative and quantitative performance on the Halstead Finger Tapping test may help differentiate brain dysfunctional patients from normal controls. “Normal” and “abnormal” finger tapping patterns during this task have been characterized and illustrated pictorially. Data from 65 patients with traumatic brain injury (TBI) and 15 normal controls support the dual proposition that (1) abnormal finger tapping patterns are more commonly observed in TBI patients than in controls and (2) the frequency of abnormal finger movements may relate to the severity of TBI during the acute stages after trauma. Future prospective studies are needed to replicate these findings. (JINS, 2003, 9, 128–133.)

Objective: Patients with Parkinson’s disease (PD) can show impaired self-awareness of motor deficits (ISAm). We developed a new scale that measures ISAm severity of hyper- and hypokinetic movements in PD during medication on state and defined its psychometric criteria. Method: Included were 104 right-handed, non-depressed, non-demented patients. Concerning ISAm, 38 motor symptoms were assessed using seven tasks, which were performed and self-rated concerning presence of deficit (yes/no) by all patients. The whole procedure was videotaped. Motor symptoms were then evaluated by two independent experts, blinded for patient’s ratings, concerning presence, awareness of deficit, and severity. Exploratory principal component analysis (promax rotation) was applied to reduce items. Principal axis factoring was conducted to extract factors. Reliability was examined regarding internal consistency, split-half reliability, and interrater reliability. Validity was verified by applying two additional measures of ISAm. Results: Of the initial 38 symptoms, 15 remained, assessed in five motor tasks and merged to a total severity score. Factor analysis resulted in a four factor solution (dyskinesia, resting tremor right hand, resting tremor left hand, bradykinesia). For all subscales and the total score, measures of reliability (values 0.64–0.89) and validity (effect sizes>0.3) were satisfactory. Descriptive results showed that 66% of patients had signs of ISAm (median 2, range 0–15), with ISAm being most distinct for dyskinesia. Conclusions: We provide the first validation of a test for ISAm in PD. Using this instrument, future studies can further analyze the pathophysiology of ISAm, the psychosocial sequelae, therapeutic strategies and compliance with therapy. (JINS, 2015, 21, 1–10)

Two hundred-thirteen children in grades 1 through 8 were asked to rapidly generate as many names of animals as they could in 60 seconds. These children were age appropriate for their grade level in school, did not receive any form of special education services, and as a group showed (estimated) average intellectual ability. They were primarily from minority (particularly Hispanic) backgrounds and came from families with low socioeconomic status. Normative data are presented. Hierarchical multiple regression analysis revealed that the age range/grade level score accounted for 21.5% of the variability in fluency scores and the Vocabulary level of the child accounted for an additional 5.7%. Level of performance on this animal fluency task was not lower than what has been reported in primarily white children from middle socioeconomic backgrounds. (JINS, 2008, 14, 143–147.)

Inner Presence: Consciousness as a Biological Phenomenon, by Antti Revonsuo. 2006. Cambridge, Massachusetts, MIT Press, 473 pp., $55.00 (HB).

In his Prologue, Antti Revonsuo describes the main task of his book: “To depict a biological research program on consciousness.” (pg. xviii). He is interested in drawing upon proven research strategies to describe how we can study consciousness from a biological perspective that would allow us to ultimately answer the question: “What the place of the subjective psychological reality is in the physical universe?” (pg. xvi). In short, why has consciousness as a biological reality emerged to aid the process of evolution?

Barbara A. Wilson's article in this issue is a thoughtful and scholarly commentary on the present state of cognitive rehabilitation. Her review of the meaning of the term “rehabilitation,” and her reminder that we are better at treating disabilities than impairments after brain damage, set the background for her four major points. First, there are currently four basic approaches to cognitive rehabilitation. Second, two of these approaches are of little help to patients. Third, combining learning theory, cognitive psychology, and neuropsychology is helpful in dealing with the “everyday problems of brain-injured people.” Finally, this latter approach combined with the holistic approach is promising, especially given that patients' personality disturbances must be considered if neuropsychological rehabilitation is to be effective.