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The new edition of The Cambridge Illustrated History of Warfare, written and updated by a team of nine distinguished military historians, examines how war was waged by Western powers across a sweeping timeframe, beginning with classical Greece and Rome, moving through the Middle Ages and the early modern period, down to the wars of the twenty-first century in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria. The book stresses five essential aspects of the Western way of war: a combination of technology, discipline, and an aggressive military tradition with an extraordinary capacity to respond rapidly to challenges and to use capital rather than manpower to win. Although the focus remains on the West, and on the role of violence in its rise, each chapter also examines the military effectiveness of its adversaries and the regions in which the West's military edge has been - and continues to be - challenged.
The new edition of The Cambridge History of Warfare, written and updated by a team of eight distinguished military historians, examines how war was waged by Western powers across a sweeping timeframe beginning with classical Greece and Rome, moving through the Middle Ages and the early modern period, down to the wars of the twenty-first century in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria. The book stresses five essential aspects of the Western way of war: a combination of technology, discipline, and an aggressive military tradition with an extraordinary capacity to respond rapidly to challenges and to use capital rather than manpower to win. Although the focus remains on the West, and on the role of violence in its rise, each chapter also examines the military effectiveness of its adversaries and the regions in which the West's military edge has been – and continues to be – challenged.
The revolution in fortress design, the greater reliance on firepower in battle, and the increases in army size during the century 1530–1630 (see ) transformed the Western way of war. In particular, hostilities now affected more people (both directly, as the number of soldiers grew, and indirectly, as the impact of war on society augmented); and sieges far outnumbered battles. According to the experienced French soldier Blaise de Monluc, writing in the later sixteenth century, siegecraft constituted ‘the most difficult and the most important’ aspect of warfare, while in the words of Roger Boyle, earl of Orrery, a century later: ‘Battles do not now decide national quarrels, and expose countries to the pillage of the conquerors as formerly. For we make war more like foxes than like lions and you will have twenty sieges for one battle.’
Every culture develops its own way of war. Societies where land is plentiful but manpower is scarce tend to favour a ritualized conflict in which only a few warriors actually fight but their fate decides that of everyone. The ‘flower wars’ of the Aztecs and the ‘amok combats’ of the Indonesian islanders caused relatively little bloodshed because they aimed to seize people rather than territory, to increase each warlord's available manpower rather than waste it in bloody battles. With or without battles, however, as the Prussian officer and military theorist Carl von Clausewitz wrote in the 1820s, war is always ‘an act of force to compel the enemy to do our will’. Many non-Western military traditions have displayed great continuity over time. Even in the 1960s, anthropologists could study the highland peoples of Irian Jaya in Indonesia who still settled their disputes in the same ritualized way as their ancestors; but by then most other military cultures had been transformed by that of Europe and the former European colonies in the Americas. The Western way of war, which also boasts great antiquity, rests upon five principal foundations: technology, discipline, an aggressive military tradition, eclecticism, and finance.
Naval warfare in the West has been dominated for the past three centuries by large warships (‘capital ships’), using heavy artillery as their principal weapon, often drawn up in a single of line of battle so that their big guns could fire broadsides. The rival fleets of steel-clad steam-propelled warships at the battle of Jutland in 1916 deployed in much the same way as the rival fleets of wooden sailing warships in the battles of the Anglo-Dutch Wars, fought in much the same location, in the mid-seventeenth century.
The speed of the Coalition forces’ victory in Operation ‘Desert Storm’ – less than four days of ground combat sufficed to drive the Iraqis into headlong retreat from Kuwait – seems to have taken the American administration by surprise: it had not yet decided when and how to terminate the war. On 27 February 1991 President George H. W. Bush, apparently without directly consulting his theatre commanders, declared that a ceasefire would take effect at midnight – allegedly because the ground war would by then have lasted exactly 100 hours. It proved a catastrophic decision for three reasons. First, contrary to early reports, Coalition forces had not yet sealed the border between Kuwait and Iraq, allowing many of Saddam Hussein's troops to escape; second, the elite Republican Guard units had largely extricated themselves and remained ready and able to protect the regime against domestic opposition; third, although Kuwait was now free, the war had done nothing to improve ‘the security and stability of the Persian Gulf’ – one of the president's stated war aims. In the armistice arranged shortly afterwards, the Americans handed their vanquished adversaries another priceless asset: the continued use of their helicopters. So when the Kurds in the north and the Shi‘a population of southern Iraq, trusting in earlier American promises of support, rebelled against Saddam Hussein, he easily crushed them, using chemical as well as conventional weapons to massacre tens of thousands – some of them before the eyes of outraged American troops.
When Ernst Jünger looked back on his experience as a young infantry lieutenant on the Western Front during the bloody summer of 1918, he combined the entries in his war diary with broader reflections. Not surprisingly, he contemplated the rise and fall of nations throughout history, a particularly pressing topic for him given that his beloved Germany stood at the precipice
In Robert Barret's military treatise of 1598, The Theory and Practice of Modern Wars, ‘a gentleman’ pointed out to ‘a captain’ that Englishmen in the past had performed wonders with longbows rather than firearms; to which the captain witheringly replied, ‘Sir, then was then, and now is now. The wars are much altered since the fiery weapons first came up.’ Most professional soldiers of the day agreed. According to Sir Roger Williams, another English veteran writing in 1590: ‘We must confess Alexander, Caesar, Scipio and Hannibal, to be the worthiest and most famous warriors that ever were; notwithstanding, assure yourself … they would never have … conquered countries so easily, had they been fortified as Germany, France, and the Low Countries, with others, have been since their days.’
Rayleigh–Bénard convection is one of the most well-studied models in fluid mechanics. Atmospheric convection, one of the most important components of the climate system, is by comparison complicated and poorly understood. A key attribute of atmospheric convection is the buoyancy source provided by the condensation of water vapour, but the presence of radiation, compressibility, liquid water and ice further complicate the system and our understanding of it. In this paper we present an idealized model of moist convection by taking the Boussinesq limit of the ideal-gas equations and adding a condensate that obeys a simplified Clausius–Clapeyron relation. The system allows moist convection to be explored at a fundamental level and reduces to the classical Rayleigh–Bénard model if the latent heat of condensation is taken to be zero. The model has an exact, Rayleigh-number-independent ‘drizzle’ solution in which the diffusion of water vapour from a saturated lower surface is balanced by condensation, with the temperature field (and so the saturation value of the moisture) determined self-consistently by the heat released in the condensation. This state is the moist analogue of the conductive solution in the classical problem. We numerically determine the linear stability properties of this solution as a function of Rayleigh number and a non-dimensional latent-heat parameter. We also present some two-dimensional, time-dependent, nonlinear solutions at various values of Rayleigh number and the non-dimensional condensational parameters. At sufficiently low Rayleigh number the system converges to the drizzle solution, and we find no evidence that two-dimensional self-sustained convection can occur when that solution is stable. The flow transitions from steady to turbulent as the Rayleigh number or the effects of condensation are increased, with plumes triggered by gravity waves emanating from other plumes. The interior dries as the level of turbulence increases, because the plumes entrain more dry air and because the saturated boundary layer at the top becomes thinner. The flow develops a broad relative humidity minimum in the domain interior, only weakly dependent on Rayleigh number when that is high.
Children with CHD and acquired heart disease have unique, high-risk physiology. They may have a higher risk of adverse tracheal-intubation-associated events, as compared with children with non-cardiac disease.
Materials and methods
We sought to evaluate the occurrence of adverse tracheal-intubation-associated events in children with cardiac disease compared to children with non-cardiac disease. A retrospective analysis of tracheal intubations from 38 international paediatric ICUs was performed using the National Emergency Airway Registry for Children (NEAR4KIDS) quality improvement registry. The primary outcome was the occurrence of any tracheal-intubation-associated event. Secondary outcomes included the occurrence of severe tracheal-intubation-associated events, multiple intubation attempts, and oxygen desaturation.
A total of 8851 intubations were reported between July, 2012 and March, 2016. Cardiac patients were younger, more likely to have haemodynamic instability, and less likely to have respiratory failure as an indication. The overall frequency of tracheal-intubation-associated events was not different (cardiac: 17% versus non-cardiac: 16%, p=0.13), nor was the rate of severe tracheal-intubation-associated events (cardiac: 7% versus non-cardiac: 6%, p=0.11). Tracheal-intubation-associated cardiac arrest occurred more often in cardiac patients (2.80 versus 1.28%; p<0.001), even after adjusting for patient and provider differences (adjusted odds ratio 1.79; p=0.03). Multiple intubation attempts occurred less often in cardiac patients (p=0.04), and oxygen desaturations occurred more often, even after excluding patients with cyanotic heart disease.
The overall incidence of adverse tracheal-intubation-associated events in cardiac patients was not different from that in non-cardiac patients. However, the presence of a cardiac diagnosis was associated with a higher occurrence of both tracheal-intubation-associated cardiac arrest and oxygen desaturation.