Statutory minimum wages have become an important tool for regulating labor markets. One major reason is the decline in collective wage bargaining. But how can minimum wages be justified? We show that their best justification does not lie in their economic effects but in the respect for social contributors that they express. The article takes an innovative interdisciplinary approach, bridging political philosophy and comparative political economy. We first discuss existing justifications in political practice and theory. We then show how a distinctive and robust justification should regard minimum wages as paying necessary respect to those who fulfill their obligation to contribute to social cooperation. Our justification thus suggests a new concept of economic citizenship and advances recognition theory applied to work. We outline further implications of the argument, such as the desirability of setting minimum wages through collective bargaining, and a tentative case for a maximum income.

This contribution starts by presenting the three main approaches that political scientists use to analyze labor market vulnerability. We proceed to discuss various operationalizations of labor market vulnerability. We examine how they relate to the three theoretical approaches and we evaluate the consistency between theory and measurement. Finally, we recommend three measures that political scientists should deploy when analyzing the effect of labor market vulnerability on political preferences. We point out what each of these variables captures and what methodological challenges should be taken into account when using them.

This article discusses recent research on party politics and the welfare state that differs from traditional ‘partisan politics theory’. The traditional approach states that left-wing and right-wing parties hold contrasting positions on welfare issues, depending on the interests of their respective electorates. This view has recently been challenged by three strands of research, which emphasize (1) the effects of electoral change on parties’ policy positions, (2) the role of context, notably electoral institutions, party competition and the configuration of party systems, and (3) the impact of different linkages between parties and electorates (particularistic versus programmatic). The implications of these arguments for the applicability of partisan theory are presented, and theoretical and empirical issues are identified for further research.