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A spoofing attack on a global navigation satellite system (GNSS) receiver is a threat to a significant community of GNSS users due to the high stakes involved. This paper investigates the use of slope based metrics for the detection of spoofing. The formulation of slope based metrics involves monitoring correlators along with tracking correlators in the receiver's channel, which are slaved to the prompt tracking correlator. In this study, using some candidate metrics, detectors have been formed through the analysis of simulated spoofing attacks. A theoretical variance of each metric has also been calculated as a reference for the threshold. A threshold is estimated using the measured variance from the clean signals, for specific false alarm rate. By using the measured threshold, detectors are formed based on slope metrics. These detectors have been tested using TEXBAT data. The results show that the differential slope metrics have good performance. The results have also been compared with some other techniques of spoofing detection.
This chapter has two objectives. First, I define and describe the spatial and temporal variation in international capital and authoritarian politics. The former comprises the book’s key independent variable, while the latter is the book’s main dependent variable. Second, I illustrate the existence of an association between international capital and political survival in autocracies in the raw data. Such an examination is useful as it illustrates the book’s central empirical prediction without having to “finesse” the data to establish a statistical relationship between international capital and authoritarian politics. These associations provide motivation for further theoretical and empirical inquiry. To be clear, I do not claim a causal relationship between international capital and authoritarian politics in this chapter. Causal evaluations are the focus of Chapters 4 to 6.
Throughout history a strong executive with limited constraints on his or her political authority has been a prerequisite for dictatorship. Of course, the ability of autocrats to enjoy these low constraints on their rule requires sufficient revenues to repress and buy loyalty via patronage.
This chapter presents cross-national evidence that remittances can finance authoritarian politics, by lowering the constraints dictators face and extending their time in power. Endogeneity, however, plagues efforts to test whether a causal relationship exists between remittance income and authoritarian politics. To overcome this empirical challenge, I leverage a quasi-natural experiment of oil price–driven remittance flows emanating from the Persian Gulf to non–oil-producing Muslim countries in North Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia.
For many dictators, their longevity and legitimacy depend on their ability to financially support regime supporters and deliver broad-based economic growth, for when this financial capital and growth disappears (or their prospects), so do most of the reasons for allies to remain loyal. For countries determined to industrialize, such as those in Latin America and East and Southeast Asia, attracting sufficient foreign capital has been instrumental in economic development and legitimizing the state’s authoritarian rule.
This chapter presents cross-national evidence that foreign direct investment (FDI), particularly in high fixed cost industries (e.g., oil exploration, petrochemicals), can create rents that an autocrat can use to fund the military. In doing so, these governments are able to retain the loyalty of a key domestic ally. Moreover, for many countries attracting foreign capital is part of a broader strategy of fostering economic growth.
The trends in Chapter 2 provide preliminary evidence of a positive association between international capital inflows and leader survival in less democratic polities. But why should inflows of foreign aid, remittances, and foreign direct investment (FDI) affect the fate of leaders, and do so more in nondemocratic regimes? After all, these capital inflows are received by various actors within an economy and do not all necessarily accrue directly to governments. This chapter develops a theory that explains how governments can use capital inflows to fund strategies of political survival. In particular, international capital can embody nontax properties that enable leaders to finance repression and accumulate loyalty.
A central argument in Chapter 3 is the proposition that autocrats can use nontax income to finance a combination of repression and patronage as a means of extending their tenure in office. While various scholars have investigated the relationship between foreign aid and patronage, there is surprisingly less scholarship evaluating the impact of aid on repression. With this in mind, this chapter presents robust evidence that foreign aid from the world’s largest bilateral – the United States – can harm political rights, expand the powers of dictators, and entrench nondemocratic institutions in recipient states. As this chapter describes in greater detail, one such example is General Siad Barre’s use of US aid to finance his repressive dictatorial rule.
Cross-border flows of foreign aid, foreign direct investment (FDI), and remittances are salient features of the global economy. These transfers involve different actors – firms, governments, and households – in almost every country. For many countries, these capital flows account for a significant share of national income that can potentially affect politics. This raises an important question: can governments harness these foreign capital flows to their political advantage? And if this is the case, how might governments do so? These are the central questions addressed by this book.
Attracting financial capital is essential for economic growth in developing countries, but tragically can often foster nondemocratic politics. Consider, for example, the impact of foreign aid. Since 2008 Ethiopia has been one of the largest recipients of US aid in Africa, averaging around $80 million per year. While the aid is intended to foster economic development, practitioners are growing increasingly wary of its political ramifications. Before the Ethiopian national election in 2010, foreign donors were charged with “subsidizing a regime that is rapidly becoming one of the most repressive and dictatorial on the continent.” Western aid officials “seem reluctant to admit that there are two Prime Minister Meles Zenawis. One is a clubbable, charming African who gives moving speeches at Davos and other elite forums about fighting poverty and terrorism. The other is a dictator whose totalitarianism dates backs to Cold War days.”
Can foreign capital empower dictatorship? This groundbreaking book develops a unified theory that links three prominent forms of international capital to the endurance of dictatorships. International capital empowers governments to finance two key instruments of non-democratic politics: repression and patronage. The Perils of International Capital uses theory, case studies, and cross-national statistical evidence to demonstrate causal effects between foreign capital and authoritarian politics. These finding are crucial to scholars and policymakers alike, as they call for a recalibration of the welfare effects associated with greater financial globalization. Ahmed reveals that, while foreign capital may improve economic development, it can tragically hinder democratic governance in the process.
This review aims to consolidate scarce literature on the use of modern nanomechanical testing technique like instrumented nanoindentation in the field of archaeometry materials research. The review showcase on how can the nanoindentation tests provide valuable data about mechanical properties which, in turn, relate to the evolution of ancient biomaterials as well as human history and production methods. This is particularly useful when the testing is limited by confined volumes and small material samples (since the contact size is in the order of few microns). As an emerging novel application, some special considerations are warranted for characterization of archaeometry materials. In this review, potential research areas relating to how nanoindentation is expected to benefit and help improve existing practices in archaeometry are identified. It is expected that these insights will raise awareness for use of nanoindentation at various world heritage sites as well as various museums.