The role of courts has been rather significant in the COVID-19 pandemic, weakening the theory that the judiciary is not equipped to contribute to governing crisis management. Although differences exist across countries, depending on institutional varieties and political contexts, the analysis shows that, even in times of emergency, courts can provide the necessary balance to the power shift towards the executives. Both action and inaction affecting fundamental rights have been scrutinised, taking into account fundamental freedoms and the rule of law. Deference to political decision-making has varied across jurisdictions and across the multiple phases of the health crisis. Differences in the balancing have emerged compared to during ordinary times. Uncertainty has played a major role, calling for new strategies in regulatory, administrative and judicial decision-making and new balances between precaution and evidence-based approaches. The role of scientific evidence has been at the core of judicial review to ensure transparency and procedural accountability. Proportionality and reasonableness with multiple conceptual variants across countries have been used to scrutinise the legality of measures. Courts are likely to continue playing a significant but different role in the years to come, when liability issues and recovery measures will likely become the core of litigation.

In this paper, we examine consultation procedures in the light of behavioural sciences. We feature consultation as a dialogue between the administration and the participants in the form of a public good game with one or more tournaments. Our focus is on the architecture of the dialogue and its design. We propose three models characterised by the varying degrees of the interaction among participants, and between participants and the administration, occurring during the consultation process. We suggest that mapping stakeholders according to homogeneity of interest influences the structure and affects the dialogue taking place during the consultation process. We then examine the levels of efforts parties would engage in, defining models that maximise efforts and adjust for different cognitive stakeholders’ capabilities, advocating an empirical approach. The paper concludes with policy recommendations on how to improve the current consultation design deployed at EU and national level.

Private regulation has become a highly debated phenomenon. Previous research has focused mostly on the effectiveness, legitimacy, and governance structure of private regulators at the global level. Few existing analyses have focused on private regulation at the European level, where only questions of interest representation have attracted attention. Analyses of the contribution of private regulation to the process of European legal integration, in particular, are lacking. We seek to fill this gap. From private rules for product safety and for financial markets, such as the Single Euro Payments Area standards, to private rules governing the professions, we observe that private regulation has facilitated and accelerated European legal integration. We argue that in some cases this effect was anticipated, especially by the European Commission, and in those cases the intended effect on European legal integration at least partly explains the rise of private regulation. I other cases, it was an incidental by-product of attempts to address market failures or achieve network legitimacy. In the conclusion, we turn to questions of accountability and legitimacy raised by the increasing importance of private regulators in the Common Market of the EU. Although the EU lacks a body of rules that imposes democratic controls on private regulators, we identify components of European law that can be used as control mechanisms.