The presence of monitoring institutions affects quality and effort of leaders. We investigate the effect of intensified monitoring on the ability and effort of leaders for a sample of forest user groups in Ethiopia, and find experimental and non-experimental evidence of an important trade-off: monitoring increases leaders' effort but lowers their quality in terms of education and experience. This effort–ability trade-off only occurs in the presence of alternative income opportunities (affecting the opportunity cost of time) and only among a subsample of leaders with low prosocial motivation. For our context, we document that the net effect of monitoring on economic outcomes is positive.

Empirical evidence suggests that close to 100 million women are “missing” worldwide. We revisit the empirical evidence for China, the country with the most missing women. Nearly ten million girls born in the 1980s and 1990s who were “missing” according to earlier census data can be found again in the 2010 population census. We discuss two possible explanations for the re-emergence of these formerly missing girls: the delayed registration of girls owing to economic reasons, and the response to amendments to the Chinese Statistics Law in 2009 and policy changes in the 2010 population census. Using the most recent statistics, we document patterns of the underreporting of women over time and across regions as well as explore the basic determinants of underreporting of women. Important policy challenges remain. For the unregistered children, the lack of access to public services will increase their vulnerability and adversely affect their quality of life.

We analyze development trajectories of early civilizations where population size and technology are endogenous, and derive conditions under which such societies optimally ‘switch’ from anarchy to hierarchy – when it is optimal to elect and support a ruler. The ruler provides an efficient level of law and order, but creams off part of society's surplus for his own consumption. Switching to hierarchy occurs if the state of technology exceeds a threshold value, but societies may also be ‘trapped’ at lower levels of technology, perpetuating conditions of anarchy. We present empirical evidence based on the Standard Cross Cultural Sample that support the model's main predictions.

To protect the elephant, trade in ivory has been banned since 1990. In this paper, we demonstrate that this ban's effect on elephant populations is ambiguous. Depending on the discount rate, among other things, the trade ban can either increase or decrease optimal population size. If the decision-maker's discount rate exceeds a certain threshold, the optimum stock of elephants is greater with a trade ban. Since the threshold is in the range of possible social discount rates, the success of the trade ban in promoting elephant conservation will vary spatially and temporally, depending on the characteristics and level of development of countries with significant elephant populations.

International transfers to developing countries are sometimes advocated on the ground that they contribute to tropical forest conservation. Here we demonstrate that the effectiveness (and attractiveness) of this instrument is reduced if the restrictive assumption of deterministic prices is relaxed. With stochastic prices, the steady-state forest stock in the absence of transfers is greater, implying that the marginal benefit of additional hectares conserved is less. In addition, the ‘wealth effect’ of transfers counteracts the ‘freeing-up effect’, which implies that per unit of subsidy fewer hectares of tropical forest are protected. Both effects reduce the attractiveness of transfers as a policy instrument for Western governments to combat tropical deforestation.

Paying for the provision of environmental services is a recent policy innovation attracting much attention in both developed and developing countries. This innovation, referred to as ‘payments for ecosystem services’ (when the emphasis is on enhancing ‘nature’ services) or ‘payments for environmental services’ (when amenities provided by the built environment are also included) is referred to here as PES. PES programs aim to harness market forces to obtain more efficient environmental outcomes. Since so many opportunities for PES programs could involve farmers in poor regions, international aid agencies and private donors, looking for a double dividend, increasingly consider using PES programs as a potential way of meeting both social and environmental objectives.

Traditional grazing grounds near Amboseli National Park (Kenya) are being rapidly converted to cropland – a process that closes important wildlife corridors. We use a spatially explicit simulation model that integrates ecosystem dynamics and pastoral decision-making to explore the scope for introducing a ‘payments for ecosystem services’ scheme to compensate pastoralists for spillover benefits associated with forms of land use that are compatible with wildlife conservation. Our break-even cost analysis suggests that the benefits of such a scheme likely exceed its costs for a large part of the study area, but that ‘leakage effects’ through excessive stocking rates warrant close scrutiny.

We analyse the effects of technological change in agriculture on forest clearing by households in developing countries. The possible effects are found to be many and diverse, depending on the type of change and the institutional context. We conclude that agricultural intensification is certainly not the panacea that some believe it to be.

On the shoulders of some ecologists and conservation biologists rests the responsibility for guarding environmental systems from excessive abuse by humans. To this end, policy makers may be advised to introduce restrictions on behaviour of individuals and firms alike. Needless to say, such proposals often receive a hostile welcome, especially amongst private industries, where it is sometimes felt that ecologists overstate the importance of their case, proposing too stringent regulation too early and thereby causing excessive costs. Early signalling of resource depletion may be a rational (and indeed necessary) response by ecologists to the vagaries of policy making.

Green income accounting models are designed to appropriately value changes in a country's natural resource (natural capital) base. However, green NNP is useful as a guide for domestic and international policy only to the extent that it accurately reflects the economic goals and policy options of policy makers. For example, international policy designed to slow natural capital depletion in a developing country is more effective if policy makers recognize the developing country's perceived income effects of the policy. Traditional green accounting models do not satisfy this criterion because they are based on the assumption that policy makers are either not concerned with the distributional consequences of policies, and/or are not limited in the instruments available to them. We present an alternative green NNP measure that reflects distributional goals and policy implementation. Using this measure, the depletion (accumulation) of natural capital stocks in excess of economically efficient rates may increase income.