This is a period of revaluations. The crucial tests that have been imposed within the last year upon so many nations by the stress of war have probably led most of us to question and perhaps to doubt old, and as we had believed, firmly, rooted tenets and dogmas. It is true that political science has long since abandoned the eighteenth century confidence in general theories and deductions; but there were many who had cherished at least a loyalty to certain fundamental political ideals: individualism, self-government, democracy; and even these are challenged by newly emphasized factors of strength and weakness that seem to determine the fate of nations. It behooves us now to be cautious in drawing premature conclusions from abnormal conditions, and to retain some faith in principles that have not been demonstrated to be unsound.

Amidst the confusion of political values we have all been impressed with the importance and with the achievements of technique, and we may be tempted to insist upon high technical standards in government as an undisputable political ideal.

The course of recent legislation for the regulation of commerce, trade and industry has created the impression that there exists a tendency in our law to transfer powers of determination from the courts which act according to fixed principles to administrative commissions or officials vested with large discretionary powers.

Considering that normally the progress of law should be away from discretion toward definite rule, such a tendency should receive the most careful examination. The first inquiry should however be whether and to what extent the impression is substantiated by facts.

The advent of the new administrative power is in the public mind associated chiefly with public utility and industrial commissions first created for the control of railroads, for the earlier powers over banks and insurance companies, as well as those of medical and other licensing boards, attracted relatively little attention or comment.

The larger aspects of the legislature and of its functions: the question of the right principle of representation, of the frequency of legislative sessions, of popular control and cooperation through the referendum and the initiative, have their bearing upon the quality of legislation, but they are essentially political questions, and beyond the range of the present discussion. This discussion is to confine itself to a problem of narrower scope, and somewhat technical in its nature, which may be stated as follows:

Given a legislature of average ability, fairly representative in character, not exempt from political bias or popular prejudice, but willing on the whole to act according to the best of its lights, such a legislature as we now have, and shall have for many years to come: how can it be enabled to perform its task most creditably and most efficiently?