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This chapter consists of three sections. I begin with a brief general outline of the eruption of the Second Intifada, and the reestablishment of PIJ’s military wing, the al-Quds Brigades. I then proceed to analyze the distribution and longevity of PIJ cells in the West Bank in this period. Last, I end this chapter by discussing why PIJ was able to return with such force once the Second Intifada erupted.
If the difference between PIJ and Hamas disappeared once the latter took up arms, why did PIJ survive as a separate organization with a justification for existence? I proceed through four sections in this chapter. First, I present the historical argument, which elaborates on the historical causes for the emergence of PIJ and why it did not merge with Hamas subsequently once the latter was founded. I then proceed to present the ideological argument in the second section. The third assesses the socio-geographical argument, in which I discuss whether PIJ has a distinct class character and geographical distribution that sets the movement apart from Hamas. I conclude this chapter by outlining the implications and limitations of this study, in addition to suggestions for future research on PIJ.
This chapter consists of four sections. In the first, I analyze al-Shiqaqi’s view of history and the cause of the Palestinians’ problem, the historical dimension. In the second, I explore al-Shiqaqi’s religious argument for the centrality of the Palestinian cause, its Qur’anic dimension. By looking at the totality of dimensions pertaining to the Palestinian cause, I discuss “deeper awareness” (waʿy) in the third part as a concept in al-Shiqaqi’s thinking. Lastly, I conclude with a discussion of potential theoretical influences on al-Shiqaqi and how to categorize his thinking.
In 1981, the young Palestinian preacher ʿAbd al-ʿAziz ʿAwda gave a sermon in the White Mosque of Beach camp, Gaza. There, he spoke about the necessity of violently fighting the Israeli occupation, of liberating the entirety of Palestine, and about the duty of the Islamic movement to lead the armed struggle. The slogan he proposed to his followers was “Islam, jihad, and Palestine”: Islam as the starting point, jihad as the means, and the liberation of Palestine as the goal.
This chapter consists of three sections. First, I analyze PIJ’s view of the state as outlined in its political philosophy with the perceived need to control it. I then proceed to analyze the constituents of the state, the political and democratic processes as outlined by PIJ, and the framework in which these processes take place. We see that there are inherent democratic deficiencies and limitations to its outline of a just society. The future society of PIJ can, at best, be described as one that is non-liberal, yet rights based. Third, after assessing the conception of a just society, I conclude this chapter by arguing that PIJ’s desire to return to a perceived ideal past is reflected in its analysis of violence, which is of a conservative nature.
This chapter consists of four sections. First, I assess the disputes of the PIJ nucleus and the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood once the former returned to the Gaza Strip. I proceed to analyze how the PIJ nucleus recruited new members from the mosques and universities of Gaza after seceding from the Brotherhood, and how it established itself firmly in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. As the PIJ nucleus recruited a number of secular-nationalist militants in Israeli prisons, I go on to analyze how it did so and what this transition from the PLO to PIJ signified. Last, I assess how PIJ managed to spread from the Gaza Strip to the West Bank.
In this chapter, I analyze the ideological affinity between PIJ and Iran. I do so by first analyzing al-Shiqaqi’s view on the Shiites, and then investigating PIJ’s support for the Iranian Revolution. We see that the Iranian issue cannot be understood without relating the Iranian Revolution to the leitmotif of al-Shiqaqi: anti-colonialism. Consequently, we see that theological Shiite influence on PIJ is exaggerated. Second, as we assessed the ideological influences on al-Shiqaqi in , we here add to this analysis by comparing the thought of al-Shiqaqi with that of Ali Shariati and Ruhollah Khomeini. In the last section, the analysis is extended to include PIJ’s pragmatic stance in internal Palestinian politics. We see that while the Iranian Revolution embodies the need for regional unity, between Sunnis and Shiites, the resistance against the State of Israel embodies the need for local Palestinian unity.
This chapter consists of five sections. The first assesses al-Shiqaqi’s teenage years and his turn from Nasserism to Islamism. I then proceed to see how the PIJ founders met in the Egyptian university system, how they organized study circles, and their interaction with, and growing animosity toward, the Muslim Brotherhood. Third, I analyze the importance of the study circles for the emergence of PIJ. I then discuss the Palestinians’ contact with the Egyptian radical groups and the latter’s potential influence on the Palestinian students. Last, I analyze the importance of the Palestinian political landscape and whether changes in its structure (or the lack thereof) contributed to PIJ emerging as it did.
This chapter consists of three sections. I begin by analyzing how PIJ navigated once strife erupted between Fatah and Hamas in 2007, and how the movement resorted to dialogue and negotiations in attempts to de-escalate the conflict. I proceed in the second section to see how these attempts to preserve unity were abandoned on the ground once Hamas attempted to establish law and order in Gaza, which led to violent clashes between it and PIJ. I discuss in the last section how PIJ navigated regionally with the eruption of the Arab Spring. We see that although PIJ is ideologically resistant to the Arab regimes and a supporter of the Arab Spring, the necessity of not alienating its patrons overrides this principle in practice.
This chapter consists of three sections. I first turn to the disputes that transpired in the diaspora leadership and the PIJ shura council in the early 1990s. I engage with the contradictory claims about what happened in order to discuss the bureaucratization of PIJ and its repercussions. I then proceed to the mid-1990s in the second section, where I analyze Shallah’s rise as the new secretary-general. Last, I assess PIJ in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, showing that the movement was nearly absent from the Palestinian armed struggle until the eruption of the Second Intifada.
This chapter consists of three sections. I begin by analyzing the importance of the former secular-nationalist militants for PIJ’s transformation into an armed movement. I then proceed by assessing the type of violence the movement carried out in this period, and what this means for our understanding of PIJ’s organizational structure. Finally, I conclude this chapter by analyzing the relationship between PIJ and the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood after the latter transformed into Hamas.