The current contribution will elaborate on the manner in which the Declaration of the International Labour Organization (ILO) on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work (hereinafter the 1998 Declaration) functions as an instrument of governance for the purpose of promotion and persuasion. The purpose of this activity is to improve the observance by States of certain principles contained in the 1998 Declaration. At the outset one should stress that this governance technique is a trade mark of the ILO as a whole and not only of the 1998 Declaration. The basic premise of the ILO is to rely on cooperation and dialogue rather than sanctions in its efforts to realize its goals.

The current contribution focuses on the oversight over international institutions, which is used as a synonym for the accountability of such entities. It departs from the principle that all entities exercising public authority have to account for the exercise thereof. The growing power of international institutions in areas that were formerly regulated domestically, along with the growing impact of their conduct on (the rights of) States and non-State actors alike, has thus far not been matched by a shift in accountability relationships beyond those applicable within the confines of the territorial State. Understandably therefore the calls for the accountability of international institutions have increased in recent years, as it is seen as essential for ensuring their credibility and for securing control over public power.

The right to self-defence in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter is increasingly being invoked in response to armed attacks conducted by armed groups located in a territory of another state, with or without the (direct) assistance of such a state. This article examines the implications of the invocation of the right to self-defence under these circumstances for the principles of attribution within the jus ad bellum paradigm. First, it illuminates how the threshold requirements for indirect armed attacks (that is, the state acting through a private actor) have been lowered since the 1986 Nicaragua decision of the International Court of Justice. In so doing, the article suggests that in order to prevent a complete erosion of the benchmarks of an indirect armed attack, the notions of ‘substantial involvement’ in an armed attack, ‘harbouring’, and ‘unwillingness’ should be interpreted as manifestations of due diligence. Thereafter, the article illustrates that there is also an increasing attribution of armed attacks directly to non-state actors, notably those located in areas over which territorial states have lost control. Such states could be depicted as being ‘unable’ to counter the activities of non-state actors. The article further submits that particularly in these instances, the principle of necessity within the self-defence paradigm can play an important role in curbing the potential for abuse inherent in the vague notion of ‘inability’, if interpreted in light of Article 25 of the Articles on State Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts.

This contribution explores the implications of United Nations Security Council (UNSC) referrals under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations to the International Criminal Court (ICC) for the immunity ratione personae of officials of states that are not party to the ICC Statute. While Article 13(b) of the ICC Statute allows the ICC to receive referrals of situations by the UNSC, disagreement remains among authors as to when such a referral removes the customary immunity attached to a head of state of a nonstate party to the ICC Statute. In particular, it remains disputed whether the broad obligation placed on Sudan by UNSC Resolution 1593 (2005) had the implicit effect of doing so. In referring the situation in Darfur (Sudan) to the ICC under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the UNSC determined that “the government of Sudan, and all other parties to the conflict in Darfur, shall cooperate fully with and provide any necessary assistance to the Court and the prosecutor pursuant to this resolution.”

This article examines whether general international law supports the claim that direct military assistance by one State to another State upon the latter's request is prohibited where the inviting State is implicated in (gross) violations of international humanitarian and/or human rights law. It approaches the question from the perspective of State responsibility, analysing the threshold requirements of Article 16 of the Articles on State Responsibility (ASR),1 which represents the customary international law standard for responsibility for aiding or assisting wrongful conduct by another State. In so doing, the article illuminates how factual uncertainties complicate the triggering of the responsibility of the intervening (assisting) State for any violations of international humanitarian and/or human rights law by the territorial (recipient) State. Thereafter, the article questions whether, in the event that the responsibility of the intervening State is triggered, it would in consequence have to withdraw its troops and/or military air power from the territorial State.

This essay describes tensions that arise between two types of public goods enshrined in the United Nations Charter—the right to self-determination of people(s) within a territorial state and peace and security—in situations in which recognized governments in conflict-torn countries request military assistance from third states against opposition groups. It illuminates legal challenges in reconciling these public goods in practice, at a time when collective peacekeeping mechanisms appear unable to prevent or terminate civil conflicts and their destabilizing regional impact.

In June 2014, the African Union adopted a treaty (referred to as the Malabo Protocol) that would establish the first regional court with jurisdiction over human rights, general matters, and criminal matters. Its substantive jurisdiction included international and transnational crimes, as well as corporate criminal liability. This development sparked a debate as to whether other regions (notably Latin America) should also adopt a regional criminal court to prosecute transnational organized crime in Latin America. Moreover, the adoption of the Malabo Protocol raised questions concerning the relationship between regional criminal courts, national (domestic) courts, and the International Criminal Court (ICC) in the enforcement of international criminal law.

This article examines the evolution of military operations by the Economic Community of Western African States (ECOWAS) and the South African Development Community (SADC) over the last three decades. By looking at constitutional (treaty) developments and organizational practice, it questions whether these sub-regional organizations have displaced the primacy of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in matters pertaining to international peace and security, as foreseen in Articles 24(1) and 103 of the United Nations Charter (the UN Charter). The relevance of this question is underscored by the fact that ECOWAS and SADC have engaged in various peace operations since the 1990s. The article concludes that, since all the interventions under discussion were underpinned by the consent of the recognized government, it would be premature to suggest that the practice of African sub-regional organizations amounts to the emergence of a new customary right to engage in ‘first-instance enforcement action’.

This article gives an overview of two competing paradigms in the practice of judicial organs for the resolution of norm conflicts, namely the paradigm of a human rights based hierarchy versus the paradigm of systemic integration or conflict avoidance. Judicial practice indicates that norm conflicts typically manifest themselves between human rights obligations on the one hand and other categories of international obligations on the other. Do judicial organs resolve such norm conflicts in a manner that favours human rights obligations? If so, this would support the view in the literature that the international legal order is increasingly operating within a paradigm of hierarchy, with human rights at its apex. The article addresses this question based on the results of a study conducted by 10 authors who have analysed the practice of domestic, regional, supranational and international courts in dealing with norm conflicts between human rights, on the one hand and the other sub-regimes of public international law mentioned above, on the other (de Wet and Vidmar 2011). The article argues that judicial practice reveals no clear or consistent patterns of a human rights based hierarchy in international law can currently be induced from the manner in which courts resolve norm conflicts in international law. Instead, courts avoid resolving norm conflicts within a paradigm of hierarchy and instead remain within a paradigm of systemic integration that is aimed at maximizing the accommodation of competing sub-regimes of public international law.

Constitutionalism – Kadi ruling of EU Court of First Instance – Erosion of ‘total’ constitutional order by reallocation of public power – Constitutional vision challenge of networks approach – Emerging human rights hierarchy – Rudimentary international value system – Ius cogens and erga omnes – Barcelona Traction – Core human rights elements – Enforcement through regional and domestic courts – Review of Security Council resolutions

On February 4,2008, shortly before Kosovo's controversial unilateral secession from Serbia on February 17 of that year, the Council of the European Union (EU) adopted a Joint Action creating the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo/EULEX (hereinafter EULEX), the largest and most important mission thus far undertaken within the common European foreign and defense policy. Although EULEX is first and foremost a European undertaking, it is also strongly backed by the United States, which agreed to shoulder 25 percent of the operating costs while the remaining costs would be shared by European and other states. In October 2008, the U.S. Department of State further agreed to provide EULEX with eighty police officers and up to eight judges and prosecutors.

This article explores the composition of the emerging international value system, including its hierarchical components. It also contrasts this fragile international value system with the more strongly developed European value system (European public order), as concretized by the European Convention on Human Rights and the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights. It first argues that international human rights norms constitute the ‘core content’ of a constantly evolving and layered international value system. Within this value system, a special but fragile hierarchical status is granted to those human rights norms that qualify as jus cogens and/or erga omnes norms. Thereafter it explores the manner in which the European Court of Human Rights has concretized the normative superiority of obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights for member states vis-à-vis other norms of public international law, to the extent that a conflict between these norms arises. It concludes by examining whether these developments could also strengthen the international value system through a spill-over effect via the work of international human rights bodies and national courts. This, in turn, would strengthen the ability of the international value system to determine the outcome of conflicts between international obligations stemming from different international regimes.

Constitutionalism is a deeply contested but indispensable symbolic and normative frame for thinking about the problems of viable and legitimate regulation of the complexily overlapping political communities of a post-Westphalian world.1

This article questions the legality of the extent of the Iraqi sanctions regime, due to its severe impact on human rights such as the right to life and the right to health. After examining whether the Security Council is bound by human rights, the article examines if and to what extent the Security Council may limit human rights norms when imposing economic sanctions. In the process it distinguishes between non-derogable and derogable human rights. With respect to the latter, it supports limitation in accordance with a proportionality principle that protects the core of the rights involved, while at the same time allows the Security Council the flexibility required by its unique role in the maintenance of international peace and security.

The purpose of the present article is to examine whether judicial review, meaning the reviewing of the legality of decisions of political organs by an independent judicial organ, can be regarded as a general principle of law of civilised nations in terms of Article 38(1)(c) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (hereinafter ICJ). This question gains significance in the light of the fact that the United Nations Charter (hereinafter the Charter) is unclear on whether the ICJ has the right to review resolutions of the organisation's political organs, notably the Security Council.