The chapter deals with the role of the ICJ in the development of international law from both a doctrinal and a practical perspective. It considers concrete examples of the way in which the Court’s judgments and opinions have had an influence on the development of international law, and it concludes that the Court has in practice had a significant impact on the development of international law, even though that goes beyond its core mandate.

Poverty is a scourge affecting billions of people throughout the world. It is unsurprising that the international community has declared a fight against poverty. Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 1, No Poverty, provides the clearest reflection of that declaration against poverty. This chapter assesses the contribution that SDG 1 can make to international law in pursuit of a world free of poverty. The assessment is made through the prism of ambition and solidarity – that is, whether the SDGs’ commitment to the fight against poverty reflects a sufficient level of ambition and solidarity. The chapter’s point of departure is that international law has paid lip service to the notion of solidarity. Through a survey of the areas of international law that are most relevant to poverty eradication – international human rights law and international economic law – this chapter assesses international law’s potential to be a vehicle for the fight against poverty in line with the aspirations of SDG 1.

In relation to foreign relations, South African courts have traditionally tended not to interfere with the executive. In the time before the democratic constitutional dispensation, foreign affairs was regarded as a prerogative of the executive on which the judiciary could not adjudicate. In the post-democratic dispensation, courts have held all exercise of public power, including in foreign relations, to be subject to judicial scrutiny. Yet, even then, a wide margin of discretion has been extended foreign affairs. In more recent years courts appear to be pulling back on the margin of discretion. This chapters reviews the recent jurisprudence of the South African Constitutional Court in matters relating to foreign relations and assesses the erosion of the discretion of the executive in foreign relations and whether this means the emergence of the judiciary in foreign relations.

The period leading up to the fiftieth anniversary of the Declaration on the Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States was characterised by numerous claims of intervention by one State levelled against another State or group of States. The case of alleged Russian involvement in the presidential elections of the United States, the decision by some States to recognise a rival government in Venezuela, the provision of arms to fighting groups in Saudi Arabia in the conflict in the Yemen are but some recent examples. These claims raise the question of the scope, content and status of the duty of non-intervention in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of any State.

This Trialogue concerns the use of force in self-defence against non-State actors in the territory of third States under international law. International law relating to the use of force, in particular international law on the rules of self-defence, is immensely important. It is immensely important because one of the most fundamental objectives of modern international law, and an overriding objective of the UN Charter, is the prevention of war.1 International law on the use of force provides the framework within which the objective recited in the preamble of the UN Charter to ‘save succeeding generations from the scourge of war’ is pursued by the United Nations. Having clear and precise scope and limits of this law is necessary to achieving this lofty objective. Yet the importance of the international law on the use of force is matched by the controversy surrounding the very scope and limits of the law on the use of force.