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This chapter considers the function of consent in respect of the international laws on force and intervention, specifically in relation to so-called solicited actions undertaken by so-called third states. How ‘consent’ is implicated in the normative design of both force and intervention is explored by means of an historical assessment that takes on the cognate ideas of coercion and dictatorial interference. The chapter then moves to unpack the ambitions of and limitations for consent set forth more broadly within public international law, principally by analysing three resolutions of the Institut de droit international (IDI): on insurrection, on civil war, and on military assistance. The chapter also undertakes a detailed examination of the significance and mechanics of the operation of consent in other laws of the ius ad bellum (collective self-defence, counter-intervention, pro-democratic intervention, UN Security Council authorisation), quite apart from its role in governing the lawfulness of the practice of solicited action itself.
In the past decade, numerous military operations by outside states have relied on the real or alleged 'invitation' of one of the parties. In this book, three experts examine the relevant legal issues, from sovereignty to the scope and relevance of consent, the use of force to the role of the Security of Council. Using critical historical analysis, qualitative case studies and large-N empirics, these topics are debated and addressed in a unique trialogue format. Accommodating the pluralism of the field, the trialogical setting highlights the divergences and commonalities of each of the three approaches. Benefiting from an in-depth analysis of recent cases of armed intervention and the diversity of the authors' perspectives, this collection is key to developing a richer understanding of the law of military intervention. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.
We have been invited to consider the memory and significance of the October Revolution on this, its centennial, anniversary, and have been asked to do so alongside the surprise, colour and ineffable promise of Konstantin Yuon’s resplendent New Planet, which can be read ‘either as a will for change or as a fear of what is to come’.1 The year 1917 also saw the adoption of the Mexican Constitution, which had ‘legitimate pride in showing the world that it is the first to consign in a constitution the sacred rights of the workers’,2 and that had occurred in February of that tumultuous year,3 well before the Constitution of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic of July 1918 delivered its ‘declaration of rights of the labouring and exploited people’.4
Edited by
Matthew Craven, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London,Sundhya Pahuja, University of Melbourne,Gerry Simpson, London School of Economics and Political Science
Focusing upon the more-or-less contemporaneous Korean war, and the agreement ending the war at Panmunjom in 1953, this chapter focuses upon the way in which the Cold War is evoked, not in terms of a singular event with a singular beginning and a singular ending but, rather, as a series of events with multiple points of beginning and even multiple endings – an ‘end’ that does not occur all at once but is delivered in a series of instalments through time. In light of that analysis the question is raised whether the announcement that the Cold War is over is not merely a way of keeping it alive, preserving its historical valence in the present through its repression. What this brings into view, it is suggested, is the idea that the Cold War was not simply a titanic contest between self-styled hegemons, but rather a headlong struggle for the supreme model of political organisation in which command over history itself is one of the necessary objectives.