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As part of the Pathology, Alzheimer’s and Related Dementias Study, we conducted uniform structured interviews with knowledgeable informants (72% children) of 1,493 older (age > 65) Brazilian decedents.
The interview included measures of social isolation (number of family and friends in at least monthly contact with decedent), emotional isolation (short form of UCLA Loneliness Scale), and major depression plus the informant portion of the Clinical Dementia Rating Scale to diagnose dementia and its precursor, mild cognitive impairment (MCI).
Decedents had a median social network size of 8.0 (interquartile range = 9.0) and a median loneliness score of 0.0 (interquartile range = 1.0). On the Clinical Dementia Rating Scale, 947 persons had no cognitive impairment, 122 had MCI, and 424 had dementia. In a logistic regression model adjusted for age, education, sex, and race, both smaller network size (odds ratio [OR] = 0.975; 95% confidence interval [CI]: 0.962, 0.989) and higher loneliness (OR = 1.145; 95% CI: 1.060, 1.237) were associated with higher likelihood of dementia. These associations persisted after controlling for depression (present in 10.4%) and did not vary by race. After controlling for depression, neither network size nor loneliness was related to MCI.
Social and emotional isolation are associated with higher likelihood of dementia in older black and white Brazilians.
To prioritise and refine a set of evidence-informed statements into advice messages to promote vegetable liking in early childhood, and to determine applicability for dissemination of advice to relevant audiences.
A nominal group technique (NGT) workshop and a Delphi survey were conducted to prioritise and achieve consensus (≥70% agreement) on 30 evidence-informed maternal (perinatal and lactation stage), infant (complementary feeding stage) and early years (family diet stage) vegetable-related advice messages. Messages were validated via triangulation analysis against the strength of evidence from an Umbrella review of strategies to increase children’s vegetable liking, and gaps in advice from a Desktop review of vegetable feeding advice.
A purposeful sample of key stakeholders (NGT workshop, n=8 experts; Delphi survey, n=23 end-users).
Participant consensus identified the most highly ranked priority messages associated with the strategies of: ‘in-utero exposure’ (perinatal and lactation, n=56 points); and ‘vegetable variety’ (complementary feeding, n=97 points; family diet, n=139 points). Triangulation revealed two strategies (‘repeated exposure’ and ‘variety’) and their associated advice messages suitable for policy and practice, 12 for research and four for food industry.
Supported by national and state feeding guideline documents and resources, the advice messages relating to ‘repeated exposure’ and ‘variety’ to increase vegetable liking can be communicated to families and caregivers by healthcare practitioners. The food industry provides a vehicle for advice promotion and product development. Further research, where stronger evidence is needed, could further inform strategies for policy and practice, and food industry application.
“…the said Pirates becoming Masters of those seas have one after another Risen up like Mushrooms, under the very noses of our said men of Warr, for near nine years together, and we never heard that they took more then two of them in America, while those Vermine have taken deeproot…”
In April 1722, eight bodies hung in chains on the hills surrounding Cape Coast Castle, the British Royal African Company's chief fortification on the Gold Coast (modern-day Ghana) in West Central Africa. The hanged men were members of Bartholomew Roberts’ pirate crew who had plundered numerous ships throughout the Atlantic Ocean before being captured off the West African coast, tried and sentenced to death. The bodies of eight of the fifty-two men executed were then displayed in locations visible to ships passing by the coast in order to serve as a “terror to future depredators of the same class”. The defeat and capture of Roberts’ crew by Royal Navy Captain Chaloner Ogle was one of the most substantial victories against pirates during the surge of Atlantic piracy that occurred between 1716 and 1726. On his return in 1723, Ogle was knighted for his conduct, becoming the first naval captain to receive a title for triumph over pirates.
Ogle's victory is often retold as evidence of British maritime power overcoming Atlantic piracy in the early eighteenth century. As the opening quotation suggests, however, Roberts’ defeat was one of only a handful of naval victories over pirates during the ten-year surge that occurred after 1716. In 1722, it was the only direct success by the British Royal Navy over Atlantic pirates despite the fact that there was an average of twenty-four naval vessels assigned to protect trading vessels against pirates in the Caribbean, North America, West Africa and the Indian Ocean. That same year also witnessed the furnishing of two local vessels from Rhode Island to chase pirates preying on regional trade, while a small sloop was hired by Jamaican planters as a guardship to protect the island's coastal regions from piratical attacks. These activities in distant waters coincided with new anti-piracy legislation in London as the British Parliament attempted to effect change by introducing further regulations on Atlantic maritime activity.
At Cape Coast Castle on the Gold Coast (modern-day Ghana), the Royal African Company's headquarters in West Africa, the captured crew of Bartholomew Roberts’ were tried for piracy in nineteen separate trials occurring between 29 March and 19 April 1722. Of the 243 men captured, 168 faced trial. Seventy-seven were acquitted by evidence that suggested they had been forced on board while fifty-two were hanged. A further twenty were condemned to seven years’ servitude in the Royal African Company's African mines, seventeen were transferred to Marshalsea prison in London and two were respited for additional consideration. The remaining seventy-five captured men – described only as “black men” – were sold into slavery without trial. Roberts and his crew had committed numerous depredations in the Caribbean, Newfoundland, Brazil and Africa, before being defeated near Cape Lopez – in modern-day Gabon – by Captain Chaloner Ogle and the crew of the Royal Navy warship Swallow. This proved to be the most substantial naval victory over pirates between 1716 and 1726, which was emphasised by the knighthood granted to Ogle who became the first naval captain to receive a title for triumph over pirates. While the defeat of Roberts, who died during the engagement, and the capture of his crew is often related as one of the most significant events in the suppression of piracy in the early eighteenth century, the role of the British slave trading lobby in facilitating this victory is less understood.
Although historians have acknowledged that pirates’ impact on slave trading capital prompted their “extermination” in the early eighteenth century, these assertions make it appear that influential merchants lobbied and the government responded with naval support. As has been discussed in the preceding chapters, government responses to mercantile petitions were much more complex than this. With multiple groups vying for the same finite naval resources, the government had to make decisions about where and when the Royal Navy was present in extra-European waters. Before 1719, naval vessels were not assigned to protect British trade in West Africa during peacetime and this only changed as pirates attacked British slaving vessels along the coast. The subsequent lobbying by competing groups of London-based slavers offers a revealing perspective into the mechanisms surrounding mercantile petitioning and its influence on the nature of British naval power in extra-European waters.
In 1726, an anonymous pamphlet published in London lamented the impact of Spanish maritime predation on Jamaican trade following the cessation of arms between Britain and Spain in 1712, which preceded the close of the War of the Spanish Succession (1702–13) one year later. In this pamphlet, the writer – identified only as “a person who resided several years at Jamaica” – described the predatory activities of Spanish guardacostas (coastguards) who were commissioned to suppress contraband trade on Spanish coasts, but who were accused of indefensible and violent assaults on British shipping throughout the Caribbean, particularly along the sea routes leading to and from Jamaica. According to the author, it was the immediate post-war actions of the guardacosta that “occassion[e]d the Rise of the English Pyrates, and laid the Foundation of all the Mischiefs which have happened by their Means”. By this account, the surge of piracy that occurred after 1716 was attributed to the geopolitical disputes that arose between British and Spanish subjects in the peacetime Caribbean concerning freedom of navigation and contraband trade.
Although recognised by contemporaries, the impact of Anglo-Spanish disputes in the peacetime Caribbean has not received attention within current understandings of early eighteenth-century piracy. Instead, there are two existing explanations for this surge. The first focuses on the centrality of privateering commissions issued by Archibald Hamilton, governor of Jamaica from 1710 to 1716, following the shipwreck of a Spanish flotilla in July 1715. After receiving their commissions, two Jamaican privateers sailed directly to the site of the wrecks and raided a Spanish salvaging camp that had been established on the adjacent shore. According to contemporary accounts, this raid netted the privateers 120,000 pieces of eight, which they carried back to Jamaica in January 1716. This then created a treasure-hunting sensation, which encouraged further voyages of British colonial vessels to the wrecks. In May, Hamilton's governorship was annulled and Jamaican privateers, as well as non-commissioned treasure hunters from Jamaica and elsewhere, were recalled to their respective ports and prohibited from salvaging the Spanish wrecks. Rather than return to colonial ports and face the potential loss of their accumulated plunder, these displaced mariners instead gathered at the Bahamas and turned to piracy.
In October 1717, Governor Walter Hamilton of the Leeward Islands reported to the Board of Trade that pirates who had formerly been impacting Caribbean trade had “all gon[e] to north america, or to some other parts”. This report coincided with the peak of pirate activity in North America, when pirates voyaged from New Providence and the Caribbean to the North American coast. Arriving in the summer and autumn months of 1717 and 1718, pirates targeted capes near to colonial ports for a short period, intercepting vessels before moving northward to the next chokepoint. They then returned to the Caribbean at the end of autumn to avoid the winter storms, before returning in spring. Throughout 1717 and 1718, there were frequent complaints of pirates operating in the capes and inlets off South Carolina, North Carolina, Virginia, Pennsylvania, New York, Rhode Island and Massachusetts, with attacks reported as far as Cape Sables in Newfoundland. While the number of vessels plundered by pirates in North America was relatively small over the duration of these two years, the short-term concentration of piratical attacks within colonial capes had an intermittent yet significant impact on regional trade. This, in turn, encouraged a number of local initiatives intended to chase pirates from nearby waters.
The success of British anti-piracy expeditions in North America in 1718, particularly against Edward Thache in North Carolina and Stede Bonnet in South Carolina, has ensured their inclusion in most studies of Atlantic piracy. Yet, these discussions provide little consideration of the organisation, funding and motivations behind these voyages, and do not consider what they suggest about the state of maritime defence in early eighteenth-century British North America. Instead, these expeditions are viewed as a turning point in a unified imperial project to curtail piracy throughout the British Atlantic. This aligns to the wider historiography of the British Atlantic, in which colonial maritime defence – including that provided by the Royal Navy – has received little focus beyond wartime privateering or naval assaults. Unlike British Caribbean colonies, which had largely been absorbed into royal control, British colonies settled along the eastern coast of North America continued to be made up of an assortment of royal and private colonies.
In July 1716, Alexander Spotswood, lieutenant-governor of Virginia from 1710 to 1722, wrote to the Board of Trade that a “nest of pirates” endeavoured to “establish themselves at [New] Providence”, warning that these would prove “dangerous to British commerce, if not timely suppressed”. Two years earlier, Henry Pulleine, governor of Bermuda from 1713 to 1718, had warned of pirates operating from New Providence, but the imperial administration had yet to act on the news. Several similar reports by British governors were prompted by the rapid increase of New Providence-based pirates from 1716 onwards and their transition from attacking Spanish vessels in the waters surrounding the Bahamas to indiscriminate attacks on colonial shipping throughout the Caribbean and North America. Despite these reports, the imperial administration only began to gradually respond to pirates from 1717 onwards after England-based mercantile groups complained about the impact of piracy on British transatlantic shipping. Consequently, the immediate responses to piracy in the Caribbean Sea before 1717 relied on the fragmented efforts of naval captains and colonial governments acting against pirates operating in waters near to their respective posts. When such undertakings occurred, they proved extremely limited and produced little change throughout the Caribbean. Similarly, when the British government responded in 1717, the measures imposed were obstructed by the lack of resources available to enact them. The result was that between 1714 and 1718 piracy was left largely unchecked in the Caribbean. This enabled pirates to not only accumulate plunder but also recruit additional crewmembers, capture larger vessels and outfit them with superior firepower in order to facilitate voyages against richer prizes further afield.
The lack of success against pirates prior to 1718 offers the opportunity to explore the factors that dictated the strength of imperial maritime power in extra-European spaces. As has been discussed in previous studies of the eighteenth-century Royal Navy, naval vessels stationed in extra-European spaces during peacetime were primarily instructed to provide for the protection of trade by convoying merchant shipping; the vessels were too few and too scattered to achieve anything beyond this. However, the operational difficulties that naval captains faced when they arrived in the Americas, due to obstructive legislation and environmental conditions, inhibited their ability to carry out these instructions effectively.
In June 1723, Barrow Harris, commander-in-chief of the naval vessels stationed in Jamaica, reported to the Admiralty that “We have had little or no damage done for some time in these parts by Pirates, only by some Spaniards that call themselves Guarda Coasts.” Echoing Harris, historians have generally agreed that a decline in piracy had occurred not just in the waters surrounding Jamaica but throughout the Atlantic Ocean by 1726. This, they argue, was the result of either military–legal campaigns, declining markets for plunder, the increased availability of marine insurance, or the changing perceptions of piracy in the colonial theatre. These studies offer important perspectives on crucial factors that helped bring about a stark decline in piracy by 1726, but they also conflate or simplify the events occurring throughout the ten-year surge in piracy to emphasise the importance of one group over another – whether naval captains, lawyers, merchants, journalists, or insurers. In contrast, this book has charted the fragmented efforts to curtail piracy as Atlantic pirates spread from the Bahamas and Florida to the Greater Caribbean, North America, West Africa and the Indian Ocean, and has established that various groups reacted to the impact of piracy in these waters and played a role in the successes and failures of British anti-piracy campaigns. This process continued after 1722 when the remaining active Atlantic pirates concentrated their attacks in the locales of the Caribbean Sea and North American coastline where a high volume of shipping trafficked but where there was little naval or colonial maritime protection.
Although there was a drop in piratical activity in the Americas between 1719 and 1721, coinciding with a number of pirate crews voyaging to Africa, Brazil and the East Indies, there continued to be reports of piracy in the Caribbean and North America. Despite this sustained presence, pirates do not appear to have significantly obstructed regional trade during these years and there were no anti-piracy expeditions in the Caribbean or North America by either naval warships or private vessels outfitted by colonial governments. This changed in 1722 when significantly more piracies were reported in North America and the Caribbean. Compared to piratical activity between 1716 and 1721, the numbers of Atlantic pirates operating after 1722 had significantly diminished and attacks came to be concentrated in regions that received no or only intermittent protection by naval and colonial guardships.
There was no coordinated war on piracy in the early eighteenth century. While piracy was consistently seen as a significant enough problem – sometimes real and sometimes imagined – to prompt regular government responses and even crown intervention, there was no organised imperial campaign against pirates operating in the Atlantic and Indian Oceans. There simply was not the capacity for such a campaign, especially as piracy was a periodic rather than continuous threat across the regions that pirates targeted. While the popula-tion of pirates operating in the early eighteenth century was substantial (at least between 1716 and 1722), they were not a substantial enough population to be able to impact all regions at all times. Instead, pirates voyaged from place to place, sometimes in search of richer or more vulnerable prizes and sometimes chased by naval warships or colonial guardships. This meant that piracy was an episodic problem in different waters at different times, prompting intermittent responses within these regions by colonial bodies, mercantile groups, naval officers and London-based government agencies. Just as pirates reacted to the contexts that they faced in the distinctive regions that they targeted, those impacted by and seeking to suppress pirates reacted to their arrival using the varied marine resources and legal instruments at their disposal.
Following the sequential movements and impacts of pirates between 1716 and 1726 exposes the ways in which piracy became entangled with cognate issues surrounding commercial politics, maritime endeavour, naval power and sovereignty on the seas in the Atlantic and Indian Oceans. For each theatre that pirates impacted, it was merchants and companies involved in profitable long-distance trades that prompted the British government and Admiralty to act. Piratical attacks highlighted the vulnerable nature of these regions during peacetime and, in response, British merchant groups mobilised to lobby for naval protection over the maritime spaces where their trade was conducted. This then played a central role in influencing and guiding state responses to commercial threats in extra-European waters and directly contributed to the sporadic projection of British imperial power over sea spaces. This contradicts the idea that the decline of piracy was effected by Royal Navy warships that were dispatched to hunt and exterminate pirates.
After his vessel was seized by pirates at Ouidah in June 1719, Richard Blincko reported that the three pirate captains – Oliver La Buse, Thomas Cocklyn and Richard Taylor – had declared their intent to proceed to Brazil before settling at Mauritius in the Indian Ocean. After receiving Blincko's account in November 1719, the British East India Company began lobbying for naval support against Atlantic pirates. This resulted in the dispatch of four Royal Navy vessels to the Indian Ocean under the command of a commodore whose primary instruction was to suppress piracy. Operating in the Indian Ocean for three years from 1721 to 1724, this squadron constituted the most substantial naval force to be assigned with the specific directive to suppress pirates after the surge in Atlantic piracy in 1716. Yet, this squadron was assigned to the Indian Ocean before any reports were received that Atlantic pirates had committed depredations there and even before any verification that Atlantic pirates had voyaged around the Cape of Good Hope.
At least four pirate crews made their way from the West African coast to the Indian Ocean in 1720. These were Christopher Condent's crew as well as members of Oliver La Buse, Thomas Cocklyn and Edward England's crews who coordinated under the changing leadership of La Buse, Jasper Seager and Richard Taylor. Between 1720 and 1722, these crews committed a handful of depredations. The most significant of these were the captures of the Faza Ramance – a rich Arab trader travelling from Jeddah – by Condent and the Nossa Senhora do Cabo – a large Portuguese vessel carrying the Viceroy of Goa and a large quantity of treasure back to Portugal – by Richard Taylor and La Buse. The British East India Company suffered only one significant depredation by these crews when England and Taylor captured the Cassandra – a Company vessel – off the island of Anjouan in August 1720. The Company reported that this loss cost them approximately £40,000. The loss occurred nine months after the Company first began lobbying George I to send naval ships against pirates in the Indian Ocean.
A note on the following tables: These have been compiled using the Admiralty List Books covering the years 1714 to 1726. The numbers listed are based on the average number of vessels and men assigned to naval service and particular regions each year. It is important to note that while vessels were assigned to different squadrons and regions, these were not necessarily present in that region for the entire time that they were assigned there. Some had yet to depart and some had left their stations to return to England. When relevant, I have provided information of the specific locations of naval vessels within each chapter.