In many advanced democracies, mainstream political parties have been disrupted either by the rise of new (populist) parties or by hostile takeovers. In this article we argue that immigration attitudes have had a powerful impact on the strategic environment of political parties and leaders. We show, based on evidence from a comparative study conducted by YouGov in spring of 2015, that immigration attitudes had, by that time, driven a wedge between mainstream parties – those that regularly play a role in government – and their partisans. This ‘immigration gap’ opened up enormous space for new political movements to form, either inside existing parties or outside. Furthermore, we show that the representation gap on immigration issues is a relevant predictor of vote choice, so that parties are particularly likely to lose votes when they are more distant from their supporters on immigration.

In President Obama's words, the Democratic Party experienced a “shellacking” in the 2010 elections. In particular, the net loss of 63 House seats was the biggest midterm loss suffered by a party since 1938—the largest in the lifetimes of approximately 93% of the American population.

In this article, we report results from a new study that surveyed a large, national sample of American adults about their willingness to pay for health reform. As in previous work, we find that self-identified Republicans, older Americans, and high-income Americans are less supportive of reform. However, these basic findings mask three important features of public opinion. First, income has a substantial effect on support for reform, even holding political affiliation constant. Indeed, income is the most important determinant of support for reform. Second, the negative effects of income on support for reform begin early in the income distribution, at annual family income levels of $25,000 to $50,000. Third, although older Americans have a less favorable view of reform than the young, much of their opposition is due to dislike of large policy changes than to reform per se.

Although a rich body of research has explored the sources of party polarization in the US House of Representatives, it has focused primarily on the House since the late 1970s. Drawing on a dataset of historical election outcomes, legislative voting and survey data, this article takes an alternative approach that examines both the US Senate and the House in their broader historical contexts. It is argued that the unusually bipartisan era of the 1950s created a set of circumstances that enabled congressional parties to remain relatively unpolarized throughout the 1960s and early 1970s. Although the national parties became more ideologically distinct in the mid-1960s, congressional parties lagged behind. As a result, a group of moderate legislators emerged who were cross-pressured between their national parties and their constituencies. Only when natural patterns of electoral loss and retirement replaced these legislators did congressional party polarization re-emerge.

Spirituality is an undeniable human need and is thus the subject of increasing interest among management scholars and practitioners. In this article, we propose using archetypal psychology as a framework for understanding the human need for spirituality more clearly because it provides important insights into spirituality and organizational life. Because most spiritual needs reside in the deepest aspects of the self, an archetypal approach helps us recognize not only that we have spiritual needs but also why we have them. We present three common archetypes and their implications in a management context. That is followed by an application of the archetypal approach to some of the more spiritually corrosive aspects of organizational life and a discussion of the implications of archetypes as a source of motivation.

Does a typical House member need to worry about the electoral ramifications of his roll-call decisions? We investigate the relationship between incumbents' electoral performance and roll-call support for their party—controlling for district ideology, challenger quality, and campaign spending, among other factors—through a series of tests of the 1956–1996 elections. The tests produce three key findings indicating that members are indeed accountable for their legislative voting. First, in each election, an incumbent receives a lower vote share the more he supports his party. Second, this effect is comparable in size to that of other widely recognized electoral determinants. Third, a member's probability of retaining office decreases as he offers increased support for his party, and this relationship holds for not only marginal, but also safe members.

In this Note we challenge the claim asserted in a 1984 Wall Street Journal editorial that partisan gerrymandering by Democratic-controlled state legislatures is the principal reason for the inability of Republicans to translate their national share of votes proportionally into seats in the US House of Representatives. In contrast to previous work, we show the critical importance of sectional (South/non-South) differences for understanding the dynamics of electoral change at the congressional level. We argue that the inability of Republicans to translate votes effectively into congressional seats is largely a product of wasted Republican votes in the South, although we recognize that a handful of states (e.g., California) are significantly gerrymandered against Republicans, and we also recognize that part of the reason for the present-day Democratic advantage in the House is an incumbency advantage that benefits the party that controls most seats.

This article reevaluates American realignment literature based on Clubb, Flanigan, and Zingale's (1980) admonition to focus on control of government and political leadership rather than electoral results. I put forward a theory of policy change in the House of Representatives which shows, like Sinclair (1977), that the effect of electoral realignments is to create a strong and unified majority party in the Congress. However, unlike other work that focuses on electoral courses, I show that structural features of elections created the new majority party in both the Civil War and the 1890s realignments. Specifically, I argue that in these two realignments a strong regional seats-to-votes distortion created the Republican majorities that enacted the policy changes associated with these realignments.

With the exception of 1976, all national elections since 1964 have generated commentary among both media analysts and political scientists about the possibility of realignment. Reports have varied from the straightforward—yes or no—to the contrived—realignment has been realized at the presidential but not the congressional level. In this essay, we outline our view of those factors that are necessary for a realignment, and we evaluate the 1984 elections with respect to those factors. Our focus in this analysis is on the tripartite structure of American party systems: party in the electorate, party in government, and party as organization. In addition, we discuss the policy consequences associated with realignments.

Theories of Realignments

Schlesinger (1984: 371) reminds us that “[the parts of parties] are treated as though each leads a life of its own with little attention to what if anything holds them together.” This admonition also holds for students of realignments. One school of thought, centering around the University of Michigan's Survey Research Center, focuses attention on party in the electorate. In this view, a realigning election is one in which the normal party vote shifts from one party to another, and because of the influence of individual partisan identification on electoral outcome, this new majority party dominates elections for a generation or more. This emphasis on the distribution of party identification in the electorate is beneficial in that it gives us an operational definition of realignment and allows us to assess both critical and secular (gradual) realignments.

This article assesses the status of diachronic research on the United States Congress. A literature review reveals a lack of truly diachronic studies, but a wealth of insightful and useful historical and contemporary studies. Drawing on organization theory, a research approach designed to facilitate and improve diachronic analysis is put forward. A major focus of the approach is on the ways in which environmental factors—both fixed and variable—shape the operations and performance of Congress. In addition, problems and strategies in analyzing the impacts of Congress on the wider political system are examined. The concluding section presents a research agenda for political scientists interested in applying diachronic analysis to the study of Congress.

This article deals with the transition in House leadership from Cannon to Rayburn. The transition involved moving from a hierarchical pattern of leadership to a bargaining pattern. In accounting for this transition, we argue that it is the institutional context of the House that determines leadership power and style. Moreover, we argue that there is no straightforward relationship between leadership style and effectiveness; rather, style and effectiveness are contingent or situational. We conclude that the impact of institutional context on leadership behavior is itself primarily determined by party strength. When party strength is high, power is concentrated and leaders are task- or goal-oriented, whereas when party strength is low, power is dispersed and leaders will be oriented to bargaining and maintaining relationships.

Profound changes in American public policy have occurred only rarely and have been associated with ‘critical’ or ‘realigning’ elections in which ‘more or less profound readjustments occur in the relations of power within the community’. Since the appearance of V. O. Key's seminal articles on critical elections, an increasing number of political scientists have attributed great importance to such elections. Schatt-schneider views the structure of politics brought into being by critical elections as systems of action. Thus, during realignments, not only voting behavior but institutional roles and policy outputs undergo substantial change. Burnham, perhaps the most important analyst of realignment patterns, alleges the existence of an intimate relationship between realigning elections and ‘transformations in large clusters of policy’.