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The complementary modes of action of 4-hydroxyphenylpyruvate dioxygenase (HPPD)- and photosystem II (PSII)-inhibitors have been credited for the synergistic weed control improvement of several species. Recent research discovered that reactive oxygen species (ROS) generation and subsequent lipid peroxidation is the cause of cell death by the glutamine synthetase-inhibitor glufosinate. Therefore, a basis for synergy exists between glufosinate and HPPD-inhibitors, but the interaction has not been well reported. Four field experiments were conducted in Ontario, Canada in 2020 and 2021 to determine the interaction between HPPD-inhibiting (mesotrione and tolpyralate) and ROS-generating (atrazine, bromoxynil, bentazon, and glufosinate) herbicides on annual weed species control in corn (Zea mays L.). The ROS-generators were synergistic with the HPPD-inhibitors and provided ≥95% control of velvetleaf (Abutilon theophrasti Medik.), except for tolpyralate + glufosinate which was additive 8 weeks after application (WAA) and control was 87%. Tank-mixes of HPPD-inhibitors plus ROS-generators were synergistic for the control of common ragweed (Ambrosia artemisiifolia L.) except for tolpyralate + glufosinate which was antagonistic 8 WAA. Tolpyralate + glufosinate was antagonistic for the control of barnyardgrass [Echinochloa crus-galli (L.) P. Beauv.] and Setaria spp. 8 WAA. Common lambsquarters (Chenopodium album L.) control 8 WAA was synergistic and ≥95% with mesotrione plus atrazine, bromoxynil, or glufosinate and with tolpyralate plus bromoxynil or bentazon. Herbicide tank-mixes were generally additive for the control of wild mustard (Sinapis arvensis L.) 8 WAA except for the synergistic tank-mixes of tolpyralate plus atrazine or bromoxynil; however, each tank-mix provided 97-100% control of S. arvensis. Results from this study demonstrate that co-application of ROS-generators with mesotrione or tolpyralate controlled all broadleaf weed species >90% at 8 WAA with the exceptions of A. artemisiifolia and C. album control with tolpyralate + glufosinate. Mesotrione plus PSII-inhibitors controlled E. crus-galli and Setaria spp. 48-68 percentage points less than tolpyralate plus the respective PSII-inhibitor at 8 WAA; however, mesotrione + glufosinate and tolpyralate + glufosinate controlled the grass weed species similarly.
Common bean and azuki bean are poor competitors with weeds and demonstrate sensitivity to herbicides used for weed control in soybean. S-metolachlor, flufenacet, and acetochlor belong to the Group 15 herbicides and provide control of multiple annual grass weeds and select small-seeded broadleaf weeds. The tolerance of four dry mean market classes (azuki, kidney, small red, and white bean) was evaluated by way of field trials near Exeter and Ridgetown, ON in 2019, 2020, and 2021 to 1X established label rates and 2X rates of S-metolachlor (1,600 and 3,200 g ai ha−1), and possible 1X and 2X rates of flufenacet (750 and 1,500 g ai ha−1) and acetochlor (1,700 and 3,400 g ai ha−1) applied preplant incorporated (PPI). Injury was evaluated by symptom, density, shoot biomass, height, seed moisture content, and seed yield. Azuki bean was more sensitive to the Group 15 herbicides than other dry bean market classes; the Group 15 herbicides caused a 12% reduction in azuki bean growth at 2 weeks after emergence; growth reduction was ≤2% in the common bean classes. Flufenacet (2X rate) was the most injurious treatment causing a 27% reduction in azuki bean yield. This study concludes that kidney, small red, and white bean have a sufficient margin of crop safety to flufenacet, acetochlor, and S-metolachlor applied PPI. Azuki bean was sensitive to flufenacet; additional research is needed to investigate azuki bean tolerance to acetochlor and S-metolachlor applied PPI.
Focusing on the deployment of Goryeo troops to China in 1354, this chapter begins by tracing contemporary developments within the Yuan, which shaped the broader geopolitical environment in which the Goryeo regime operated. It then examines the choices Wang Gi and his court made when confronted with the largest military mobilization in East Asia in decades. The chapter concludes with a discussion of what the Yuan dynasty’s southern campaign likely revealed to Wang Gi and his advisers about military and political dynamics within the Great Khan’s realm and what they meant for the Goryeo court. This chapter’s narrative details convey a sense of dynamics within the Great Khan’s regime, which in turn sheds light on the Goryeo–Yuan alliance and Wang Gi’s place in the world.
As a boy, what was Wang Gi's experience of the Mongol empire? How did he and the people around him understand the ties between his family and the Chinggisids, between the Goryeo and Yuan polities? Wang Gi left no memoir of his childhood, and detailed – in fact any – accounts of his first years are vanishingly rare. What follows is a reconstruction of some key structural elements that would shape Wang Gi’s life – his family’s relationship with the Chinggisid ruling house, the broad network of personal relationships between the Goryeo and Mongol courts, and the place of the Goryeo dynasty in the wider Mongol empire.
This chapter is organized into four sections. The first traces Zhu Yuanzhang’s rise, including his consolidation of power over regional polities and his military campaigns against the Yuan court. The second section examines Wang Gi’s relationship with the new master of China, and the third section explores Wang Gi’s ties to the Yuan court after its relocation to the steppe. The final section considers Wang Gi’s 1370 military strikes into Liaodong, a region strategically vital to the Yuan, Ming, and Goryeo courts, in a time of rapidly shifting alliances.
The Chinggisids’ retreat northward from Daidu in 1368, the loss of nearly all their Chinese territory, and Zhu Yuanzhang’s rise to dominance posed monumental choices for Wang Gi. What would he do about his family’s century-old alliance with the Chinggisid ruling house? If Wang Gi remained true to Toghan-Temür, what – if any – alterations would he make to the Goryeo–Yuan alliance? If he abandoned his family’s long-standing ally and lord, how would he justify his action at home and abroad? If he offered his allegiance to Zhu Yuanzhang’s fledgling Ming dynasty, what would be the terms of the relationship?
This chapter looks at the Yuan dynasty in a time of growing chaos. It undertook distant military campaigns, major relief efforts, ambitious river projects, a new legal code, and massive dynastic historical compilations. Envoys like Marignolli came to the Yuan court from the other side of world, a clear reminder of the Great Yuan’s international standing and ties to other lands. If all this evidenced formidable state capacity, Korean observers also saw acute problems: widespread drought and flooding that led to famine and occasionally even cannibalism, virulent banditry that blurred readily into revolt, and court intrigue that shook vast political patronage networks and threw dynastic policy into tumult.
In times of crisis and change, what becomes of the vast and complex network of alliances that undergird all empires? Rather than focus on the major powers or “Great States,” the most common way to think about the rise and fall of empires, here is the story of “the little guy” or the lesser power, the experiences of the Wang Gi and his court as ally first to the Mongols and later to the Ming dynasty of China. The unsettled times threw up both danger and opportunity, and far from passively reacting to the actions of the Great Khan and the Ming emperor, Wang Gi and his advisers actively pursued their interests through diplomacy, military action, and domestic reform. Their efforts failed as often as they succeeded, and if their story reveals the underappreciated initiative and influence of alliances’ junior partners, it also makes clear that stark imbalances of power cannot be waved away by invoking the agency of lesser states.
This chapter analyzes political developments at the Goryeo court during the 1340s, the decade before Wang Gi took the throne. It pays particular attention to how connections to the Yuan dynasty figured in Goryeo politial dynamics and how the young Wang Gi may have understood contemporary events.
This chapter revisits Wang Gi’s measures in the summer of 1356 with attention to two points. First, what do they reveal about the Goryeo–Yuan alliance? Second, and inversely, how does attention to the broader developments of Chinggisid rule in East Asia offer insight into Wang Gi’s actions? As was true in previous chapters, this chapter argues that only through close attention to developments in the Yuan dynasty is it possible to fully appreciate the perceptions, motivations, and strategies of Wang Gi and Toghan-Temür. For this reason, the chapter includes more detail of local events in Yuan territories than is commonly found in histories of Goryeo–Yuan relations.
In the decade from 1357 to 1367, the Goryeo–Yuan alliance reached an inflection point, as mounting instability in the Yuan dynasty meant both steepening costs and broadening opportunities for the Goryeo dynasty. This chapter traces three developments: (a) the Red Turban invasions of Goryeo from 1359 to 1362, (b) the Yuan court’s abortive effort in 1362–1363 to depose Wang Gi, and (c) the rapid expansion of relations between Wang Gi’s court and regional powerholders emerging out of the tottering Yuan realm.
This chapter looks at the earliest years of Wang Gi’s rule, circa 1351–1353, and pursues two interrelated questions. First, what was Wang Gi’s experience as a Yuan ally in a time of increasing chaos? Second, how did Wang Gi’s place in the empire influence his rule at home? These two questions in fact run through the next several chapters. Rather than attempt an exhaustive account of the 1351–1353 period, this chapter focuses on two moments. The first is Wang Gi’s first year on the throne, when the fledgling king strove to eliminate potential rivals and secure legitimacy within Goryeo. The second is a puzzling, abortive coup in 1352 by one of Wang Gi’s close advisers who had attended him in Daidu.