It is now well established that algorithms are transforming our economy, institutions, social relations and ultimately our society. This paper explores the question – what is the role of law in the algorithmic society? We draw on the law-jobs theory of Karl Llewellyn and on William's Twining refinement of Llewellyn's work through the perspective of a thin functionalism to have a better understanding of what law does in this new context. We highlight the emergence of an algorithmic law, as law performs jobs such as the disposition of trouble-cases, the preventive channelling and reorientation of conduct and expectations, and the allocation of authority in the face of algorithmic systems. We conclude that the law-jobs theory remains relevant to understanding the role of law in the algorithmic society, but it is also challenged by how algorithms redefine who does or should do what law-jobs, and how they are done.

In this editorial article, we aim to map out the central features of algorithmic regulation and its conceptual basis – seeking to bring together different strands of the literature relating to the topic that have often remained apart. We then reflect on the ways through which algorithmic law could evolve to address the challenges of artificial intelligence in the legal domain, particularly by examining the potential of applying a “prudential” test in order to determine whether automated decision-making systems are suitable to adequately support legal decision-making.

This paper investigates the data life-cycle of contact-tracing apps (CTAs) in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. It highlights the socio-legal implications resulting from the design and technology choices that software developers inevitably make. These choices are often neglected by policy-makers due to the inherent technical complexity of algorithmic decision systems and to certain naive belief in technological solutionism. In particular, this paper shows, first, that technology-harvested data do not reflect an objective representation of reality, and therefore require a context within which to be understood and interpreted for policy and legal purposes; and, second, that the use of data analytics to extract insights from these data enables the production of computational indicators. By looking at how CTAs are used to implement pandemic-mitigation restrictions such as lockdowns, quarantines, social distancing and testing, the paper ultimately brings forth the ways in which technologies – and thus their bias and ways of framing social reality – become embedded in the law.

The decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union in Slovak Republic v Achmea dealt a major blow to the predictability of the legal regime for the protection of foreign investments, whilst failing to offer a realistic, clear and sustainable solution for the protection of investments within the European single market. Commentators have mainly considered its implications from the perspective of the European Union or International Investment Law, and the potential conflict of regimes. This article offers a different approach, arguing that a reading of Achmea based on a moderate version of legal pluralism could adequately respond to the legitimate concerns about the case from both international and European legal perspectives. It is argued that the imprecision of the decision is in fact constructive ambiguity, allowing a sufficient margin of appreciation for all stakeholders and avoiding direct confrontation between the European and international legal orders. Recent developments, such as the innovative EU agreement for the termination of intra-EU BITs, point to new opportunities for ordering pluralism in the Achmea saga.

Managerial devices are rapidly developing as a means for driving the legal performance of organisations, including those of states and corporations. This paper explores the managerial rationality underpinning global legal indicators, and the constraints they convey on institutional behaviour. In particular, it argues that indicators are better understood as part of a system of management control and distributed governance, which is steadily eroding state-centred forms of authority, including state law. In this context, legitimacy and reactivity are contingent to their cycle of production and implementation, which is fourfold: data-collecting, benchmarking, auditing and allocating incentives. Each process is meant to generate respectively subjectification, self-knowledge by comparison, accountability and stimulus for action. Indicators with higher degrees of legitimacy become entrenched in institutional practices and legal decision-making processes. The paper concludes that regulatory spaces where indicators unfold need critical and political scrutiny to expose their pernicious effects, undesirable uses and inevitable misuses.