We surveyed clinicians to evaluate the perceived usefulness of a mnemonic, STORY, to improve penicillin allergy evaluation. Survey responses indicated that the perceived usefulness of STORY was high, and support for nurses’ involvement in penicillin allergy assessment was high. Future research may evaluate the feasibility of STORY implementation in clinical care.

Political borders profoundly influence outcomes central to international politics. Accordingly, a growing literature shows that historical boundaries affect important macro-outcomes such as patterns of interstate disputes and trade. To explain these findings, existing theories posit that borders have persistent effects on individual-level behavior, but the literature lacks empirical evidence of such effects. Combining spatial data on centuries of border changes in Europe with a wide range of contemporary survey evidence, we show that historical border changes have persistent effects on two of the most politically significant aspects of behavior: individuals’ political and social trust. We demonstrate that in areas where borders frequently changed, individuals are, on average, less trusting of others as well as their governments. We argue that this occurs because border changes disrupt historical state-building processes and limit the formation of interpersonal social networks, which leads to lower levels of trust.

Although evidence shows that territorial disputes fundamentally shape relations among states, we know surprisingly little about when territorial claims are made. We argue that revisionist states have incentives to make territorial claims when the great powers that manage the system are in crisis. We identify five main sources of systemic instability and develop measures of each of them, demonstrating that the majority of territorial claims in Europe are drawn at times when regional great powers are embroiled in crisis, for example, 1848 or 1870 during the nineteenth century. The claims that emerge at these times are not necessarily among states involved in the crises that generated turmoil (e.g., Prussia and France in 1870). We use a newly developed spatial measure of historical boundary precedents in Europe from 1650 to 1790 to demonstrate that the effect of this known spatial correlate of where claims are drawn matters only when the European system is in crisis. We further demonstrate that this claim-timing pattern is general to the global system of states. In the appendix we corroborate our explanation of our findings with a detailed case study of the territorial claims that led to the contemporary Italian state's formation.

A field study was conducted in 2017 and 2018 to determine foliar efficacy of halauxifen-methyl, 2,4-D, or dicamba applied alone and in combination with glyphosate at preplant burndown timing. Experiments were conducted near Painter, VA; Rocky Mount, NC; Jackson, NC; and Gates, NC. Control of horseweed, henbit, purple deadnettle, cutleaf evening primrose, curly dock, purple cudweed, and common chickweed were evaluated. Halauxifen-methyl applied at 5 g ae ha−1 controlled small and large horseweed 89% and 79%, respectively, and was similar to control by dicamba applied at 280 g ae ha−1. Both rates of 2,4-D—533 g ae ha−1(low rate [LR]) or 1,066 g ae ha−1 (high rate [HR])—were less effective than halauxifen-methyl and dicamba for controlling horseweed. Halauxifen-methyl was the only auxin herbicide to control henbit (90%) and purple deadnettle (99%). Cutleaf evening primrose was controlled 74% to 85%, 51%, and 4% by 2,4-D, dicamba, and halauxifen-methyl, respectively. Dicamba and 2,4-D controlled curly dock 59% to 70% and were more effective than halauxifen-methyl (5%). Auxin herbicides applied alone controlled purple cudweed and common chickweed 21% or less. With the exception of cutleaf evening primrose (35%) and curly dock (37%), glyphosate alone provided 95% or greater control of all weeds evaluated. These experiments demonstrate halauxifen-methyl effectively (≥79%) controls horseweed, henbit, and purple deadnettle, whereas common chickweed, curly dock, cutleaf evening primrose, and purple cudweed control by the herbicide is inadequate (≤7%).

Since trade must cross borders, to what extent do border walls affect trade flows? We argue that border walls can reduce trade flows. Even if the objective is to only stem illicit flows, border walls heighten “border effects” that can also inhibit legal cross-border flows. Using a gravity model of trade that reflects recent developments in both economic theory and econometrics, we find that the creation of a wall is associated with a reduction in legal trade flows between neighboring countries. We provide a battery of evidence that suggests this reduction is not simply a function of worsening bilateral relations. Our findings have implications for understanding how governments have taken measures to assert sovereign control of their borders in an age of increasing economic globalization.

Rapeseed is a popular cover crop choice due to its deep-growing taproot, which creates soil macropores and increases water infiltration. Brassicaceae spp. that are mature or at later growth stages can be troublesome to control. Experiments were conducted in Delaware and Virginia to evaluate herbicides for terminating rapeseed cover crops. Two separate experiments, adjacent to each other, were established to evaluate rapeseed termination by 14 herbicide treatments at two timings. Termination timings included an early and late termination to simulate rapeseed termination prior to planting corn and soybean, respectively, for the region. At three locations where rapeseed height averaged 12 cm at early termination and 52 cm at late termination, glyphosate + 2,4-D was most effective, controlling rapeseed 96% 28 d after early termination (DAET). Paraquat + atrazine + mesotrione (92%), glyphosate + saflufenacil (91%), glyphosate + dicamba (91%), and glyphosate (86%) all provided at least 80% control 28 DAET. Rapeseed biomass followed a similar trend. Paraquat + 2,4-D (85%), glyphosate + 2,4-D (82%), and paraquat + atrazine + mesotrione (81%) were the only treatments that provided at least 80% control 28 d after late termination (DALT). Herbicide efficacy was less at Painter in 2017, where rapeseed height was 41 cm at early termination, and 107 cm at late termination. No herbicide treatments controlled rapeseed >80% 28 DAET or 28 DALT at this location. Herbicide termination of rapeseed is best when the plant is small; termination of large rapeseed plants may require mechanical of other methods beyond herbicides.

Residual herbicides are routinely applied to control troublesome weeds in pumpkin production. Fluridone and acetochlor, Groups 12 and 15 herbicides, respectively, provide broad-spectrum PRE weed control. Field research was conducted in Virginia and New Jersey to evaluate pumpkin tolerance and weed control to PRE herbicides. Treatments consisted of fomesafen at two rates, ethalfluralin, clomazone, halosulfuron, fluridone, S-metolachlor, acetochlor emulsifiable concentrate (EC), acetochlor microencapsulated (ME), and no herbicide. At one site, fluridone, acetochlor EC, acetochlor ME, and halosulfuron injured pumpkin 81%, 39%, 34%, and 35%, respectively, at 14 d after planting (DAP); crop injury at the second site was 40%, 8%, 19%, and 33%, respectively. Differences in injury between the two sites may have been due to the amount and timing of rainfall after herbicides were applied. Fluridone provided 91% control of ivyleaf morningglory and 100% control of common ragweed at 28 DAP. Acetochlor EC controlled redroot pigweed 100%. Pumpkin treated with S-metolachlor produced the most yield (10,764 fruits ha–1) despite broadcasting over the planted row; labeling requires a directed application to row-middles. A separate study specifically evaluated fluridone applied PRE at 42, 84, 126, 168, 252, 336, and 672 g ai ha–1. Fluridone resulted in pumpkin injury ≥95% when applied at rates of ≥168 g ai ha–1; significant yield loss was noted when the herbicide was applied at rates >42 g ai ha–1. We concluded that fluridone and acetochlor formulations are unacceptable candidates for pumpkin production.

Auxin herbicides are used in combinations to control glyphosate-resistant horseweed preplant burndown. Herbicide labels for 2,4-D–containing products require a 30-d rotation interval for planting cotton cultivars not resistant to 2,4-D. Dicamba labels require an accumulation of 2.5 cm of rain plus 21 d per 280 g ae ha–1 rotation interval for planting cotton cultivars not resistant to dicamba. Previous research has shown that cotton injury caused by dicamba applied 14 d before planting was transient with little effect on cotton yield, whereas 2,4-D has little effect on cotton when applied 7 d prior to planting. Injury caused by dicamba and 2,4-D is inversely related to rainfall received between herbicide application and cotton planting. Experiments were conducted to evaluate cotton tolerance to halauxifen-methyl, a new Group 4 herbicide, applied at intervals shorter than labeled requirements. Experiments were established near Painter and Suffolk, VA, and Belvidere, Clayton, Eure, Lewiston, and Rocky Mount, NC, during the 2017 and 2018 growing seasons. Herbicide treatments included halauxifen, dicamba, and 2,4-D applied 4, 3, 2, 1, and 0 wk before planting (WBP). Visible estimates of cotton growth reduction and total injury were collected 1, 2, and 4 wk after cotton emergence (WAE). Cotton stand and percentage of plants with distorted leaves were recorded 2 and 4 WAE. Cotton plant heights were recorded 4 and 8 WAE. Halauxifen was less injurious (9%) than dicamba (26%) or 2,4-D (21%) 2 WAE when herbicides were applied 0 WBP. Cotton stand reduction 2 WAE by halauxifen was less than 2,4-D and dicamba when applied 0 WBP. Injury observed from herbicides applied 1, 2, 3, and 4 WBP was minor, and no significant differences in cotton stand were observed. Early-season cotton injury was transient, and seed cotton yield was unaffected by any treatment.

This article examines how the institutional design of borders affects international trade. The authors explore variation in the effects of borders by comparing new international borders that follow precedent and thus have a prior institutional history with new international borders that lack such an institutional history. The former minimally disrupt—or restore—previous economic networks, while the latter fundamentally disrupt existing economic networks. A variety of empirical tests show that, consistent with this institutional perspective on borders, new international boundaries that follow precedent are associated with significantly faster recovery and greater increase in subsequent trade flows. By contrast, when new international borders are truly new, they disrupt local economic networks, introduce new transaction costs, and impose higher adjustment costs on states, which the authors show to have long-term deleterious effects on trade.

We thank Neal Beck for his comments. In general, there is little difference in our theoretical and practical positions. We all agree that in some applications, time dummies can be problematic; controlling for temporal dependence is important for less-biased estimation of the coefficients on our substantive regressors; a smoothed function of time (whether via a cubic polynomial or spline) is a useful way to model temporal dependence in grouped binary data; and viewing the graph of the hazard can be informative.

Since Beck, Katz, and Tucker (1998), the standard method for modeling time dependence in binary data has been to incorporate time dummies or splined time in logistic regressions. Although we agree with the need for modeling time dependence, we demonstrate that time dummies can induce estimation problems due to separation. Splines do not suffer from these problems. However, the complexity of splines has led substantive researchers (1) to use knot values that may be inappropriate for their data and (2) to ignore any substantive discussion concerning temporal dependence. We propose a relatively simple alternative: including t, t2, and t3 in the regression. This cubic polynomial approximation is trivial to implement—and, therefore, interpret—and it avoids problems such as quasi-complete separation. Monte Carlo analysis demonstrates that, for the types of hazards one often sees in substantive research, the polynomial approximation always outperforms time dummies and generally performs as well as splines or even more flexible autosmoothing procedures. Due to its simplicity, this method also accommodates nonproportional hazards in a straightforward way. We reanalyze Crowley and Skocpol (2001) using nonproportional hazards and find new empirical support for the historical-institutionalist perspective.

Given the abundance of evidence that disputed territory matters, we know remarkably little about the origins of territorial claims. We argue that the presence of competing historical border precedents is central to the emergence of territorial claims. We outline why precedents provide opportunity to make claims and provide two possible explanations for why leaders have incentive to claim along precedents. One possibility is consistent with the conventional wisdom that incentive derives from territorial characteristics such as natural resources or strategic significance. A second and more novel explanation is that the persistent coordination effects of historical boundaries provide the incentive to draw claims along them. We use new data on the location of historical boundaries from the peace of Westphalia until the start of the French Revolution to show that historical border precedents drive the emergence of territorial claims after the Congress of Vienna and that persistent coordination effects provide incentive to dispute historical precedents.

Violent nonstate groups are usually weaker than the states they target. Theory suggests that groups carefully condition their choice of tactics on anticipated state response. Yet scholars know very little about whether and how groups strategically plan attacks in anticipation of state response. Scholars do not know if and under what conditions groups employ violent tactics to provoke or avoid a forceful state response, although extant theory is consistent with both possibilities. Relatedly, there is little systematic evidence about why groups choose terrorist or guerrilla tactics and how this choice relates to anticipated state response. I develop a theoretical and empirical model of the interaction between groups and states that generates unique evidence on all three fronts. Using data on attacks in Western Europe from 1950 to 2004, I show that guerrilla attacks are sometimes associated with provoking forceful state response, whereas terrorist attacks are generally associated with avoiding forceful response. Groups effectively choose their tactics to avoid forceful state responses that are too damaging for themselves but provoke forceful responses that disproportionately harm civilians. These findings survive several robustness and model specification tests.

The authors study the influence of domestic political dissent and violence on incumbent dictators and their regimes. They argue that elite with an interest in preserving the regime hold dictators accountable when there is a significant increase in terrorism. To pinpoint the accountability of dictators to elite who are strongly invested in the current regime, the authors make a novel theoretical distinction between reshuffling coups that change the leader but leave the regime intact and regime-change coups that completely change the set of elites atop the regime. Using a new data set that distinguishes between these two coup types, the authors provide robust evidence that terrorism is a consistent predictor of reshuffling coups, whereas forms of dissent that require broader public participation and support, such as protests and insurgencies, are associated with regime-change coup attempts. This article is the first to show that incumbent dictators are held accountable for terrorist campaigns that occur on their watch.