To send content items to your account,
please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies.
If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account.
Find out more about sending content to .
To send content items to your Kindle, first ensure firstname.lastname@example.org
is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings
on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part
of your Kindle email address below.
Find out more about sending to your Kindle.
Note you can select to send to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations.
‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be sent to your device when it is connected to wi-fi.
‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
Given Socratic motivational intellectualism, self-improvement in the ethical domain requires self-improvement in the epistemic domain. Gives the details of Socratic epistemology and indicates the ways in which Socrates supposes we can improve our cognitive conditions. Explains the different sources of ignorance and how these can be controlled. Shows how some etiologies of belief-formation are more reliable than others, and how Socrates thinks we can learn to rely more on the more reliable ones and less on those that are less reliable. Explains how the Socratic “search for definitions” and elenctic refutations are exercises in cognitive self-improvement, which does not simply produce repeated failures, but instead greater comprehension of ethical concepts – even if such comprehension is never complete or perfect for a human being.
Explores Plato's hagiography of Socrates as one who is both an exemplary human being and imperfect in knowledge, virtue, and happiness. The way in which Socrates is an exemplar is not by achieving a standard of perfection, but by living a life dedicated to self-improvement in the most important things. Socrates sincerely acknowledges his own ignorance, but engages in dedicated inquiry in such a way as to mitigate that ignorance. By improving his cognitive condition, Socrates also improves his ethical condition. He becomes more virtuous and happier by both avoiding those errors that are avoidable and practicing the activities that can improve one’s life.
Does Socrates believe that virtue is necessary for happiness? If so, those who lack virtue cannot be happy. But virtue, Socrates also believes, is a kind of knowledge. Yet Socrates himself persistently disclaims having the kind of knowledge that seems to be required. If Plato’s exemplar of a human being lacked knowledge, he must therefore also have lacked virtue. Accordingly, some scholars have concluded that neither Socrates nor any other human being can have any positive happiness – just relative degrees of wretchedness – in life. Provides a much more optimistic account of the Socratic view in which the craft model allows for self-improvement in knowledge and virtue, to such a degree that some positive happiness is possible for even very imperfect human beings. Undertakes detailed analyses of important texts in which Socrates attributes some achievement in craftsmanship and argues that positive achievement does not entail a perfection standard or anything like mastery of a craft – including the most important craft of virtue.
Scholars have debated the various texts in which Socrates seems to indicate an extremely close – perhaps even logical or analytic – connection between virtue and happiness. Is virtue simply identical to happiness? Is virtue all that is needed – is it sufficient – for happiness? Some texts seem to indicate such a logical connection, but attributing the sufficiency thesis to Socrates also commits him to the view that even the worst disasters cannot make a good person unhappy or spoil a virtuous agent’s life. Other texts, however, seem to show that Socrates clearly did recognize our vulnerability to conditions that are beyond human control. Provides an interpretation of the Socratic view on this issue that denies the sufficiency thesis while maintaining a strong nomological connection between virtue and happiness. Greater virtue will always improve a human life, even if such improvement falls short of achieving positive happiness. Success comes in degrees, even in the most important pursuits.
In the Gorgias, Socrates famously declares that he is alone among contemporary Athenians in taking up the “true craft of politics.” But the claim is extremely puzzling, since Socrates also claims to be ignorant and lacking in any significant wisdom of any kind. Crafts, for Socrates, involve cognitive achievement. But Socrates declares that he has accomplished little of such achievement. Shows how the model of craft-knowledge can resolve this paradox by allowing Socrates to regard taking up the craft of politics as an attempt to improve his ability in achieving the goals of that craft: benefiting others. Shows how Plato’s early dialogues give abundant evidence of Socrates’ activities in both of what he characterizes as the branches of politics: legislation and correction.
Provides a philosophical evaluation of the Socratic views discussed in the main body of the book. Is this an ethical philosophy we should admire, or one we should reject? What should we make, from a contemporary philosophical point of view, of Socrates’ commitments to motivational intellectualism, to a craft model of ethical knowledge and achievement, and of his proposals for how we should go about ethical self-improvement? Scholarship aims to understand the thoughts of others. But once we do understand them, it is appropriate also to consider how we should assess the actual philosophical merits of the positions attributed to the focus of scholarly attention. What should we think of Socrates as a philosopher?
Socrates was a motivational intellectualist, which means that he believed that all actions follow the agent’s belief about what is best at the time of acting. This intellectualism entails that all human ethical error involves cognitive error. How do people come to have false ethical beliefs, and how can the processes of evaluative belief-formation be made more reliable? Explores the Socratic account of different etiologies of evaluative belief-formation in such a way as to explain human error but also to indicate ways to improve one’s ability to make appropriate ethical judgments. Discusses the role of punishment in improving one’s ethical condition, not just by causing suffering, but by changing the ways in which a wrongdoer generates and sustains evaluative beliefs.
What model of knowledge does Plato's Socrates use? In this book, Nicholas D. Smith argues that it is akin to knowledge of a craft which is acquired by degrees, rather than straightforward knowledge of facts. He contends that a failure to recognize and identify this model, and attempts to ground ethical success in contemporary accounts of propositional or informational knowledge, have led to distortions of Socrates' philosophical mission to improve himself and others in the domain of practical ethics. He shows that the model of craft-knowledge makes sense of a number of issues scholars have struggled to understand, and makes a case for attributing to Socrates a very sophisticated and plausible view of the improvability of the human condition.
We reviewed the sustainability of a multifaceted intervention on catheter-associated urinary tract infection (CAUTI) in 3 intensive care units. During the 4-year postintervention period, we observed reductions in urine culture rates (from 80.9 to 47.5 per 1,000 patient days; P < .01), catheter utilization (from 0.68 to 0.58; P < .01), and CAUTI incidence rates (from 1.7 to 0.8 per 1,000 patient days; P = .16).
In the First-HD pivotal trial, the maximum deutetrabenazine dose evaluated to treat chorea associated with Huntington’s disease (HD chorea) was 48 mg/d, which is the approved maximum dose for this population. In ARC-HD, an open-label extension study evaluating the long-term efficacy and safety of deutetrabenazine to treat HD chorea, dosage ranged from 6 mg/d to 72 mg/d, with doses ≥12 mg/d administered twice daily. Doses in ARC-HD were increased by 6 mg/d per week in a response-driven manner based on efficacy and tolerability until 48 mg/d (Week 8). At the investigator’s discretion, further increases were permitted by 12 mg/d per week to a maximum of 72 mg/d. This post-hoc analysis evaluates the safety and tolerability of deutetrabenazine >48 mg/d compared to ≤48 mg/d to treat HD chorea in ARC-HD.
Patient counts and safety assessments were attributed to patients when they received a dose of either ≤48 mg/d or >48 mg/d. For 9 selected adverse events (AEs), we compared AE rates adjusted for duration of drug exposure (as number of AEs/year) at ≤48 mg/d or >48 mg/d. The AE rates were determined after titration when participants were on stable doses of deutetrabenazine.
All 113 patients were exposed to doses ≤48 mg/d (177.1 patient-years) and 49 patients were ever exposed to doses >48 mg/d (74.1 patient-years). In patients taking deutetrabenazine >48 mg/d compared to ≤48 mg/d after the titration period, there were no apparent differences in exposure-adjusted AE rates.
Based on clinical experience, some patients with HD may benefit from doses higher than 48 mg/d to adequately control chorea. These doses were tolerated without apparent increase in the exposure-adjusted rates of selected AEs after titration. This analysis does not address the occurrence of other AEs or whether adequate efficacy was achieved at lower doses, factors that may have influenced dose increases.
Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd., Petach Tikva, Israel
Chapter 3 introduces an original, multi-item measure of group empathy: the Group Empathy Index (GEI). The GEI modifies the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI), which mainly captures empathy toward close family and friends. The GEI taps empathy for strangers, primarily members of socially distinct groups. The two measures are similar on their face, but they are conceptually and functionally distinct. The chapter also explores the measurement properties of a long and short version of the GEI, employing data from multiple surveys. Both versions of the GEI are reliable and valid indicators of the underlying construct. We also find that the GEI is not reducible to personality dimensions such as authoritarianism or other group-oriented predispositions such as social dominance orientation (SDO), racial resentment, ethnocentrism, linked fate, ideology, and partisanship.