Attempted answers are given to (a) whether nonhuman great apes (apes) also have evolved imitation (answer: no); (b) whether humans can transmit imitation as a gadget to apes (answer: yes, partly); (c) whether human-to-ape transmission can kickstart subsequent and stable ape cultural evolutionary psychology (“CEP”; answer: unlikely); and (d) when CEP evolved in our lineage (answer: relatively late).

Kline's functional categories for the evolution of teaching blur some valuable distinctions. Moreover, her account provides no answer to the question of why direct active teaching seems to be a uniquely human phenomenon.

Contrary to Vaesen, we argue that a small number of key traits are sufficient to explain modern human tool use. Here we outline and defend the cultural intelligence (CI) hypothesis. In doing so, we critically re-examine the role of social transmission in explaining human tool use.

Contrary to Guala, I claim that several mechanisms can explain punishment in humans. Here I focus on reputation-based cooperation – and I explore how it can lead to punishment under situations that may or may not be perceived as being anonymous. Additionally, no particular mechanism stands out in predicting an excess of punishment under constrained lab conditions.