INTRODUCTION

Following Napoleon's last hurrah at Waterloo in June 1815, Europe's great monarchies were still standing (some only just), but they now existed in a world that had undergone irreversible change. The ideas and principles of the revolution remained, even if their French standard-bearers had finally been defeated. This meant a simple restoration of the ancien régime was not possible. With historic right and custom undermined, international society would instead be explicitly founded on principles of legitimacy that were defined against the popular doctrines that had emerged from revolutionary France.

If many of the fundamental tenets of the revolution would eventually, in one form or another, succeed the old hierarchical order of the monarchy, aristocracy and church, in the immediate aftermath of French defeat, the forces of reaction were overwhelmingly in the ascent. The course of the revolution seemingly vindicated many of the complaints against popular rule levelled throughout the centuries, with the excesses of the Terror providing clear evidence of the dangers of seeking to establish a democracy in the modern world. John Jay, one of the authors of the Federalist papers, summed up the prevailing sentiment in a letter to William Wilberforce: ‘The French revolution has so discredited democracy … that I doubt its giving you much more trouble’ (quoted in Morantz 1971: 149). In the short term, this was a rather accurate assessment, although the situation slowly changed, spurred by developments in the United States and the 1848 revolutions. Given that democracy's meaning and significance altered during this period in a relatively gradual and piecemeal fashion, the structure and analysis of this chapter focuses more on these longer trends.

Layers upon layers. Much like the concept I have been studying, this work is marked by different periods, experiences and places. It represents my first substantive attempt to come to grips with democracy: a beguiling, ambiguous and slippery idea and reality that I expect to be grappling with for a long time to come. While commencing from international relations (IR), this book is not much concerned with disciplinary questions, except in so far as the artificial line we have drawn between the domestic and international realms has limited our ability to fully understand democracy. Most IR scholars have either ignored democracy or employed a shallow conception of it, devoid of most that marks it as worthy of study. Meanwhile, political theory has– until recently– largely failed to deal with the wider international context, a crucial condition of possibility for state-based democracy. This book seeks to chart a course between these problematic tendencies and in doing so, tends to blur between international relations, political theory and history. In this regard, perhaps I have accidentally been overly influenced by the approach of early English school thinkers, especially Hedley Bull and Martin Wight. Yet the book departs from these scholars in ultimately having a more critical intent. In this regard, the purpose of this study is not to explain or theorise, but to contrast, disrupt and denaturalise. For instance, how can we so easily talk of the Arab Spring– referencing the earlier European experience– but still be dismayed that the outcome of these political transitions remains unclear only a few years later? It took Europe more than a century to arrive at something approaching stable democratic government; why should it be expected that other countries can reach a similar destination in a fraction of the time? This reflects an overwhelming tendency to view democracy as something freestanding, almost devoid of a past.

Strangely enough, in such a situation simply providing a historical contrast becomes a valuable and necessary corrective. This is what the book's cover is meant to convey. The image is hardly how we might depict democracy today; even contemporary critics would portray their scepticism in different terms. Yet we tend to forget that it is the current situation which is the historical anomaly, and not the other way around.

INTRODUCTION

The founding of the United States may seem a somewhat paradoxical place to begin this history. On the one hand, it certainly appears as an obvious starting point, considering the central role the country played in the subsequent rise of democracy in international politics, what Azar Gat terms the ‘United States factor’ (Gat 2009: 6–8). Scholars such as Daniel Deudney, Michael McFaul and Tony Smith have strong grounds to suggest that no country has played a more significant part in the defence and spread of democracy (Cox et al. 2000; Deudney 2007; Kagan 2015; McFaul 2004; T. Smith 1994). The close relationship between the United States and democracy thus encourages one to revisit its founding. On the other hand, if one does return to this point in time, an awkward fact soon appears: the American Revolution was not primarily about democracy, at least understood as a form of government. Democracy was little thought about or discussed during colonial times, and this never changed sufficiently for it to become central to political discourse during the revolution (Kenyon 1962: 158; Lokken 1959: 570–1).

That the United States, a country which now associates itself and its legacy so strongly with democracy, actively denied this label just over 200 years ago offers a stark reminder of how recently the concept has come to signify something positive. Through an examination of the way democracy was understood in the founding period, the historical layers of meaning which shaped the concept can be identified, as can its stubbornly classical nature. While the revolutionaries steadfastly maintained a sceptical view of democracy as a form of government, popular sovereignty was widely extolled.

INTRODUCTION

The French Revolution and the subsequent wars that engulfed Europe represent the intersection of fundamental changes in the nature of international politics with the modern appearance of democracy as a political force. During this quarter-century of violence and upheaval many of the last vestiges of Christendom were swept away and some of the final pieces were added to the modern states system. These changes took place in unison with and in response to the popular doctrines that first emerged from revolutionary France. With the French Revolution a powerful articulation of ideas and principles that directly challenged the foundations of the existing society of states emerged from one of its greatest powers. The fundamental significance of these events for this book is conveyed by François Furet's observation that ‘the central mystery of the French Revolution’ remains ‘the origin of democracy’ (Furet 1981: 204).

The French Revolution has been a constant source of fascination over the past 200 years, and this chapter is strictly limited to exploring the conceptual shifts in democracy and popular sovereignty within France, and how these interacted with wider dynamics in international politics. There are two interrelated movements that are considered. First is the way democracy was employed by the revolutionaries and their opponents, and how this helped to shape its meaning. Compared with the American Revolution, significant contestation and re-evaluation of the concept did occur in France, which resulted in democracy being reactivated in political discourse. As John Dunn observes, ‘with the French Revolution, democracy as a word and an idea acquired a political momentum that it has never since wholly lost’ (Dunn 2005: 17). Second, there was a powerful theoretical and practical elaboration of popular sovereignty, a form of statehood that directly challenged the foundations on which monarchical powers and international society were then established.

THE FOUNDATIONS OF DEMOCRACY IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY

In The Foundations of Modern Political Thought, Quentin Skinner suggests that ‘the clearest sign that a society has entered into the self-conscious possession of a new concept is … that a new vocabulary comes to be generated, in terms of which the concept is then articulated and discussed’ (Skinner 1978: x). An equivalent process has been explored thus far, examining the way the concept of democracy came to be articulated in modern international society. With the peace settlement at Versailles, ‘a new set of words, like democracy, freedom, and self-determination,’ Martin Wight notes, ‘acquired general currency, replacing the older set of words’ (Wight 1972: 27). Popular sovereignty was embedded in international society, and democratic government had come to be recognised as a legitimate form of constitution. It is for these reasons that the Versailles settlement is widely recognised as a foundational moment in the development of democracy in international politics (Armstrong 1993; Clark 2005; Clark 2009; Franck 1992; Hinsley 1982; Mayall 2000a; Mayall 2000b; Navari 2007; Wight 1972). Ian Clark accurately observes the significance of this moment: ‘It is not possible fully to appreciate the Versailles architecture without a clear focus on this cardinal principle of democracy as a proper concern of international society’ (Clark 2005: 116).

Democracy's position after Versailles was both central and ambiguous. James Mayall subtly conveys this point when noting that the settlement did not entrench ‘democracy itself, but democratic values, as the standard of legitimacy within international society’ (Mayall 2000b). The defeat of the Central Powers completed a process that was already well underway in the second half of the nineteenth century: popular sovereignty– democracy as forma imperii– supplanted monarchy as the foundation on which members of international society would be based.

INTRODUCTION

The consequences of the Great War were felt long after the guns fell silent on 11 November 1918. The course of the war and its outcome would decisively shape democracy's emergence in international relations. When hostilities commenced there was certainly little thought about the war being waged for democracy, or any other great idea for that matter. The nature of the conflict would alter dramatically as a result of two events in 1917: the Russian Revolution and the entry of the United States into the war. The manner in which US President Woodrow Wilson defined the war in reference to democracy, followed by the defeat of the Central Powers, would prove pivotal in the normative and political rehabilitation of the concept. One of its most important outcomes was the completion of a process that had commenced with the American Revolution, as popular sovereignty supplanted monarchy as the dominant form of state legitimacy. This also confirmed democracy's remarkable ideational transformation into a normatively acceptable, and for many a desirable, method of government. ‘After 1919 democratic values were increasingly accepted as a kind of ideological equivalent to the coin of the realm,’ James Mayall observes, ‘even if circumstances prevented it from being minted in most parts of component of democracy was heavily contested, and would remain so, the evaluative side of the concept had completed its remarkable shift from negative to positive.

The magnitude of the shift that had taken place in how democracy was perceived can be appreciated through comparing the Versailles peace conference with its predecessor, the Congress of Vienna. When international society was rebuilt in Vienna, it was explicitly constructed against the popular doctrines that had emerged from revolutionary France. Yet little more than a hundred years later, the statesmen in Versailles worked through the consequences of fighting and winning a war meant to make the world ‘safe for democracy’. Carl Schmitt observed the significance of this shift: ‘The development from 1815 until 1918 could be depicted as the development of a concept of legitimacy: from dynastic to democratic legitimacy.

INTRODUCTION

The discipline of International Relations (IR) has often mirrored major real-world trends, and this has certainly been the case with democracy. There was a considerable growth in work on democracy after the end of the Cold War, as part of a more general resurgence of liberal ideas, policies and scholarship (Jahn 2013: 1–12). A further surge in interest followed the central role accorded to democracy and its promotion during America's ‘Global War on Terror’. For Tony Smith, these trends have been closely linked: the development of liberal internationalism between 1989 and 2001 would defend the position ‘empirically, theoretically, and philosophically that the promotion of democracy was not only feasible, but that it would serve American security concerns’ (T. Smith 2007: 49). This expansion in scholarship on democracy appears to be a significant change from the longstanding practice of regarding it as the preserve of political scientists and comparativists. As Ian Clark observes, ‘in general, IR theory has not been much exercised by concerns with democracy’ (Clark 1999: 146). This situation has only been partially rectified: a majority of the studies undertaken have been by liberal scholars, with other traditions continuing to display limited interest.

Despite this notable increase in the volume of work on democracy in IR, it has not resulted in a comparable development in our understanding of the way democracy is influenced by, and interacts with, the international realm. The nature, shape and possibilities of democracy have long been regarded as determined exclusively within the confines of the state (Walker 1993: 141–58). Alexander Wendt expresses this point well:

The most influential example of this tendency is structural realism's separation of systemic and unit level phenomena, whereby democracy is consigned to the unit level, and thus beyond the purview of IR (Waltz 1979). Against Waltz, democratic peace scholars have argued that the internal (democratic) nature of states does have a consequential impact on their international behaviour.

The start– and end– for this study is the somewhat contradictory position democracy finds itself in early in the twenty-first century. A quarter-century after the collapse of communism, which signalled the end of the ‘long war’, democracy still remains without peer. Yet the rise of China, combined with Russia's bullish behaviour and the problems of established democracies following the 2008 financial crisis, all point towards the weakening of the West's ideational hegemony. If indeed the post-Cold War era is coming to an end, as some have suggested (Haas 2014), one sign of this might be democracy increasingly playing a less central role as a marker of state legitimacy. The latest Freedom House report ominously warns that ‘acceptance of democracy as the world's dominant form of government– and of an international system built on democratic ideals– is under greater threat than at any point in the last 25 years’ (Freedom House 2015: 1). The liberal interregnum following the end of the Cold War may have come to an end, and the geopolitical environment has certainly become less hospitable for democracy, but this in itself does not portend crisis. On this point, Philippe Schmitter cautions against inflated claims about democracy's decline, suggesting that ‘there is simply no plausible alternative in sight, save for a few models (for example, Chinese meritocracy, Russian neo-Czarism, Arab monarchy, or Islamic theocracy) that are unlikely to appeal far beyond their borders’ (Schmitter 2015: 32). Democracy's standing in the international order has undoubtedly weakened, but it still remains without a clear rival or alternative.

The greater danger to democracy might instead be one of default dominance slowly leading to death by a thousand cuts. One does not need to look very hard to identify serious political, economic and social problems that democracies, new and old, are struggling with. Reflecting on these trends, The Economist recently published an essay entitled ‘What's gone wrong with democracy’ (note the lack of question mark) (Economist 2014b).

INTRODUCTION

Little over 200 years ago, a quarter of a century of war fundamentally reshaped the European international order. That conflict was triggered by the advent of popular doctrines in revolutionary France, and fears that it might seek to export ‘all the wretchedness and horrors of a wild democracy’, as the British ambassador Lord Auckland described it at the time (quoted in MacLeod 1999: 44). In stark contrast, today ‘rogue regimes’ are defined by the fact that they are not democratic. In the intervening period a remarkable series of revisions took place in the way democracy was understood and valued in international society. In a relatively short space of time, popular sovereignty went from being a revolutionary and radical doctrine to becoming the foundation on which almost all states are based, while democratic government, long dismissed as archaic, unstable and completely inappropriate for modern times, came to be seen as a legitimate and desirable method of rule. This book examines these changes in the concept of democracy, and considers how these processes have interacted with the structure and functioning of international society. Put differently, this study is structured around the historical contrast between, on the one hand, the high degree of acceptance and legitimacy that democracy now holds, and on the other, the strongly negative perceptions that defined democracy when it reappeared in the late eighteenth century, which should have seemingly limited the possibilities of it becoming understood so positively.

The book seeks to throw new light on a central feature of the current international order, in which– according to Nobel Laureate Amartya Sen– democracy has become a ‘universal value’, having ‘achieved the status of being taken to be generally right’ (Sen 1999: 5). It explores the remarkable reversal that took place, accounting for democracy's rise from obscurity to its position as a central component of state legitimacy.