In an introductory way, and in the context of ‘embracing subjectivity,’ the claims of being ‘spiritual but not religious’ (and of its ‘pop-culture pantheism’ version) are examined in relation to their associated rejection of ‘doctrinal religion’. Both the Origenist sense of ‘seeming history’ in scripture and Vladimir Lossky’s sense of the meaning of ‘mystical theology’ are seen as relevant to exploring the importance of this rejection of doctrinal religion, especially in relation to Lossky’s focus on the way in which theology should not be seen as abstract and discursive but as essentially contemplative in nature. The relevance of divine action understandings to the concept of religious pluralism is outlined, and five theses are set out that link a naturalistic perspective on this action with the revelatory experience that is the basis of any religious tradition.

The different but overlapping notions of ‘archetypes’ in the work of Carl Jung and Mircea Eliade are outlined, and new ways of understanding the frameworks set out by them are explored in sociological terms. The relevance of ‘Platonic mysticism’ is noted in this context. Spontaneous mystical experience is also considered in this context, especially in relation to a ‘dual-process’ understanding of human cognition and Alister Hardy’s empirical research into religious experience.

How can we more deeply understand religious pluralism? In this study, Christopher C. Knight suggests that current explorations of religious pluralism may be supplemented by combining new thinking about divine action with the kind of ‘mystical theology’ that sees doctrinal statements as aids to contemplation rather than as philosophical truth claims. While Knight sees the ‘perennialist’ tradition of pluralistic thinking as deeply flawed, he nevertheless proposes that we can adopt a kind of neo-perennialism in which the supposed incompatibilities of different faith traditions may still be seen in the way that perennialists have usually considered them: as relating only to the exoteric dimension of religious faith and practice. In this way, he suggests, the perennialist notion of esoteric ecumenism may still be valid. He cautions, nevertheless, that at a methodological level, there may be defensible reasons to hesitate before adopting a full-blown pluralism of this kind.

The distinction between philosophical theology and philosophy of religion is examined in relation to the role of faith commitments in each, and the notion of doctrinal statements as ‘truth claims’ is examined in terms whether ‘natural theology’ can legitimately be pursued. It is argued that the praeambula fidei version of this pursuit is illegitimate, partly because of the way in which ‘design’ arguments have often been overturned and partly because of the kinds of theological considerations put forward by Thomas Torrance and Alister McGrath. The relevance of Thomas Kuhn’s understanding of the scientific enterprise is also noted, especially in relation to his notion of paradigms.

The relationship between the perspectives of the perennialist tradition of pluralistic thinking and the kind of apophaticism articulated in the patristic era by Gregory of Nyssa and in the modern era by Vladimir Lossky is examined, and parallels in Islamic thinking are noted. The kind of intuitive apprehension of divine realities associated with the ancient Greek concept of the nous is seen as central to this relationship. The perennialist distinction between esoteric and exoteric aspects of any faith tradition is examined in this context, and Lossky’s sense of the importance of antinomy is seen as significant for rejecting the kind of critique of pluralism that is based on the notion that the doctrinal statements of different faith traditions should be seen as philosophical ‘truth claims’.

Philosophical arguments for religious pluralism – including that of John Hick – are outlined. It is noted, however, that the question of ontology, as explored within the philosophy of science, has not been included in these arguments. The views of ontology in scientific description that are associated with the work of Karl Popper and Thomas Kuhn are outlined, but a deeper insight, it is argued, may be developed through the work of Mary Hesse and of Rom which suggests insurmountable limitations to our grasp of the ontology of created things. This understanding may be extended, it is argued, to God (or what Hick calls Reality) so that an attitude of ‘apophatic critical realism’ may be applied both to God (as it is in Eastern Orthodoxy) and to created entities. (In relation to God, something comparable can, it is noted, be found in certain Western Christian scholars such as Yves Congar.) This understanding, in its theological component, may be applied to apparent incompatibilities between different faith traditions, such as that between ‘personal’ and ‘non-personal’ and between ‘monotheistic’ and ‘polytheistic’ understandings.

The considerations outlined in earlier parts of the book are recalled in order to emphasize the importance of unconscious processes in the development of religious cognition. In this context, the importance of mythological aspects of religious texts is stressed, since the archetypal resonances of these texts – especially when reflected in liturgical usage or used in contemplative exercises – are of considerable importance in relation to noetic apprehension of the divine reality. In this context, the five theses set out in in Chapter 1 are discussed in more detail. In addition, problems of elitism and its suppression are discussed, as well as the position of those who claim to be spiritual but not religious. It is suggested that these people may, in fact, need one of the ‘doctrinal religions’ that they shun if they are to make progress on the spiritual path on which they find themselves.

In the science–theology dialogue, a ‘causal joint’ understanding of ‘special’ divine action has until recently been predominant. However, the distinction between ‘general’ and ‘special’ modes of divine action has recently been questioned in what Sarah Lane Ritchie has called a ‘theological turn’ in understandings of divine action. In the author’s own contribution to this turn, criticism of causal joint theorists’ implicit (and sometimes explicit) assumption of a temporal God is criticized, as is the failure to apply apophatic perspectives to the notion of God’s ‘personal’ nature. In addition, an argument from human providential action is seen as significant for developing a ‘fixed instructions’ model of divine action, in which teleology is regarded as important (though not in a way that challenges scientific perspectives). What is effectively a ‘single act’ model of divine action is thus defended, but of a different kind to that which is usually understood when this term is used.

‘Strong’ theistic naturalism is advocated, so that the notion of ‘special’ divine action is rendered redundant while scientism and a ‘God of the gaps’ notion of God’s action are avoided. A version of this kind of naturalism can affirm miraculous events in the way that Augustine of Hippo seems to have envisaged, which may now be interpreted as analogous to the scientist’s notion of regime change. In this context, some of the insights of evolutionary psychology become important, especially in relation to the evolution of human religiosity, which has significant implications for developing religious pluralism.

The notion of noetic perception may be expanded in relation to the role of the imagination in revelatory experience. Here, the expansion of neo-Platonic perspectives in the understanding of Samuel Taylor Coleridge is significant, as are the notion of the imaginal developed by Henry Corbin and the understanding of the role of the human imaginative faculty in religious visionary experience, as explored by Karl Rahner and Hans Urs von Balthasar. This kind of analysis has implications for solving certain puzzles inherent in the New Testament accounts of visions of the risen Christ. However, questions arise in relation to this understanding, and these may be tackled in part through recent Christian thinking about the notion of revelation, in which the focus is no longer on ‘information about God’ but on what Yves Congar has called an orientation towards salvation. This suggests an understanding akin to the perennialist separation of exoteric and esoteric aspects of religious traditions in the sense of suggesting a two-component, psychological-referential model of revelatory experience.

The distortions of Augustinian and Calvinist approaches to natural theology are noted, and the different approach of Eastern Orthodoxy is examined, especially in relation to the notion of noetic perception in the approach of Gregory of Nyssa and to its application to the contemplation of nature as understood by Maximus the Confessor. More purely ‘philosophical’ considerations are also examined, especially in relation to the ‘weight’ that is assigned to competing arguments. In this context, the concept of noetic perception is applied to the notion of ‘baptized reason’. It is suggested that in relation to the praeambula fidei approach of Thomas Aquinas, even scholastic versions of natural theology may need revision because of nuances in that work that are often unrecognized.

It is suggested that current religious studies are distorted by what sociologists sometimes call recipe knowledge, especially in relation to the common assumption – still partially valid – that religion should no longer be seen in essentialist or perennialist terms. The possibility of neo-perennialism is explored. Widespread assumptions about projecting onto faith traditions ‘essentialist’ understandings are critiqued, particularly in relation to Buddhism, and common assumptions about the inapplicability of terms such as religion and myth are questioned. In this context, evolutionary perspectives are important because ‘dual process’ notions of human cognition may be applied to the historical development of human religiosity. This means that a revived recognition of a universal aspect of human religiosity is necessary, based not on very questionable anthropological speculations of the kind that became common in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries but on current exploration of brain functioning and of its evolutionary development.

It is suggested that there is an aspect of perennialist thinking that might cause hesitation before adopting religious pluralism. This is the fact that, in the perennialist perspective, it is not possible to interrogate the contemplative capacities of faith traditions other than one’s own because these are not expressible in propositional terms. Because of this, religious pluralism can only be verified eschatologically. For this reason, Philip Sherrard’s kind of pluralism becomes questionable since a kind of inclusivism may be necessary: not of the usual kind that assumes the superiority of one’s own faith tradition but the kind that acknowledges that other traditions’ ways of viewing one’s own tradition in an inclusivist way may be as valid as one’s own tradition’s way of looking at other traditions in an inclusivist way. This attitude will be what we can call ‘reciprocal inclusivism’. The methodology associated with this stance will avoid syncretism and involve using other traditions primarily to deepen appreciation of one’s own tradition.