For many, to speak of Nietzsche's virtue ethics is an oxymoron. Even now, Nietzsche is seen as an egoist in the worst sense, indeed an immoralist. Furthermore, even if he can be understood as having some sort of ethics it cannot be understood as an ethics within an objectivist tradition, where virtue ethics is characteristically seen as belonging. Yet not only are Nietzsche's texts replete with virtue and vice concepts, but he seems to be a moral reformer, arguing that traditional conceptions of virtue legitimized by the “slave revolt” in morals should be overturned. In that (Christian) revolt not only, for example, is cowardly fear transformed into the virtue of humility, the understanding of humility as a virtue is itself skewed. It is now a form of self-abasement as opposed to a sense of one's place in the world that is not tainted by forms of overweening pride.1 For Nietzsche there should be a “revaluation of values” where genuine virtue expresses life affirmation and strength as opposed to weakness and life denial.

There are two ways of reconciling this apparent tension. The first is to say that the “revaluation of values” is indeed a revaluation, but one that constitutes a deeply unattractive immoralist egoism. The second is to argue that Nietzsche's new way of thinking about ethics should be taken seriously, because his self-styled “egoism” is a virtuous form of egoism.

Introduction

I understand the problem of satisficing to be that of whether it is morally permitted (at least sometimes) for agents to choose an action that is less than the best when better actions are in their power and known by them to be so. The primary motivation for accepting the moral permissibility of satisficing is to reduce the demandingness of ethics. The “demandingness objection” has traditionally been directed at consequentialism, but I shall relate the discussion to the demandingness of virtue ethics.

The demandingness objection to certain moral theories is the objection that these theories contain requirements that are too demanding on agents. There are a number of possible strategies for overcoming the objection. A vulnerable theory may allow that it is morally permitted to satisfice, or given that it is not morally permitted to satisfice, it may propose a criterion of best action that is not itself too demanding. A weaker reading of the demandingness objection suggests a third strategy: It is possible that a theory may possess a demanding criterion of rightness or requirement in that sense, but a less demanding conception of conditions under which agents can be blamed for failing to perform right acts, even when those acts are in their power and known by them to be so. Let me briefly elaborate on those three strategies.

The first strategy replaces maximizing or optimizing criteria of rightness with satisficing criteria.