The concept of ‘agency’ and its role in capturing the dynamics between Africa and external actors feature increasingly in the African IR scholarship. Over the past decade, Turkey has become an increasingly prominent actor in Africa, strengthening political, cultural and economic ties with African states and providing humanitarian aid and development assistance. In this paper, we examine Turkey's relationship with Africa from the point of view of African agency and ask ‘How much and what kind of agency can we identify by examining the way in which Turkey approaches African states?’ The conventional understanding of the concept of African agency defines it in materialist terms and emphasises its transactional nature; it does not adequately explain incidents of enhanced outcomes for Africans in their relationship with Turkey. We argue that an under-examined aspect and a vital source of African agency lies within the discourses of Turkish policy which provide an enabling source of policy space for negotiation for Africans. We demonstrate that the notion of Muslim kinship in Turkish discourses not only distinguishes Turkey from most of the other external powers engaging with the continent but also enables African interlocutors to negotiate enhanced outcomes.

This article explores China's engagement with the development of norms on security in Africa, with particular attention to its changing post-conflict engagement. Applying the gradualism characteristic of its approach to policy formulation and implementation, the Chinese policymaking community is playing a key role in seeking to redefine the contemporary international approach to managing African security dilemmas. By reinterpreting concepts such as liberal peacebuilding, Chinese policymakers have begun a process of reframing established norms on security and development that are more in line with its principles and core interests. This agenda in the making has enabled the Chinese government to move beyond the constraints of a rhetoric rooted in non-interference in domestic affairs that prohibited involvement in African security issues to a set of practices that allows China to play a more substantive role in security on the continent.

This article examines the challenges faced by Beijing in managing this increasingly complex relationship, reflecting upon the structural factors that encourage harmony and introduce discord in China–Africa ties. It examines how various policy solutions being considered by China, ranging from increasing participants in the policy-making process to tentative engagement with international development regimes, may still not address the most difficult issues involving adverse reactions to the Chinese presence from African civil societies and political opposition groups. In particular the lack of a strong civil society inside China inhibits the ability of its policy makers to draw on the expertise of the kind of independent pressure groups and NGOs that are available to traditional donor/investor states. The article concludes by asking how the Chinese system can make up for these weaknesses without moving further towards the existing models and practices of the developed countries.

South Africa's growing economic presence across the African continent has sparked a debate in public and scholarly circles as to its intentions. While some have been quick to see South African business and parastatals as part of a larger hegemonic project pursued by Pretoria, the authors’ more structured analysis of economic ties with Africa reveals a more complex picture. Institutionalised forms of regional cooperation, such as SACU and SADC, must be contrasted with the activities of South African multinationals and parastatals on the wider African stage to understand the possibilities and limitations of hegemonic practice open to South Africa. Beyond its own region, a key determinant will be its relations with the other leading African power, Nigeria, as well as its ability to compete with other external actors. Finally, the role of ideology is a crucial measure of South African hegemony, and while certainly its ‘soft power’ is evident at the societal level, some African elites actively resist the pull of South Africa-based ideas.

The signing of the General Peace Agreement in Rome in October 1992 marked the formal cessation of 17 years of intermittent warfare in the former Portuguese colony of Mozambique.1 The bitter struggle by the guerrilla movement known as the Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (Renamo) to topple the avowedly Marxist–Leninist régime established by the leaders of the Frente de Libertção de Moçambique (Frelimo) was in many respects a regional expression of the cold war politics which dominated the international environment. The transformations in the Soviet Union and South Africa, blunting the ideological and logistical support which had fuelled the conflict, provoked a crisis for the protagonists. With over a million casualties, a greater number of refugees in neighbouring countries, and an economy devastated by war and mismanagement, the Government and Renamo at last sued for peace.2

The pace of conflict-resolution in the Third World has been nothing short of astounding since 1990. A whole array of low-intensity wars have been terminated. Some, such as in Nicaragua and El Salvador, had occupied pride of place in the reinvigorated test of wills between Moscow and Washington during the 1980s. Others, as in Kampuchea, were fuelled by the parallel rivalry between Moscow and Beijing, which both fed off and had an impact on the key dispute between the United States and the Soviet Union. A few, such as the ‘bush war’ in Namibia and the fighting in the Western Sahara, never became serious testing-grounds for the superpowers.