This paper develops a monetary R&D-driven endogenous growth model featuring endogenous innovation scales and the price-marginal cost markup. To endogenize the step size of quality improvement, we propose a tradeoff mechanism between the risk of innovation failure and the benefit of innovation success in R&D firms. Several findings emerge from the analysis. First, a rise in the nominal interest rate decreases economic growth; however, its relationship with social welfare is ambiguous. Second, either strengthening patent protection or raising the professional knowledge of R&D firms leads to an ambiguous effect on economic growth. Third, the Friedman rule of a zero nominal interest rate fails to be optimal in view of the social welfare maximum. Finally, our numerical analysis indicates that the extent of patent protection and the level of an R&D firm’s professional knowledge play a crucial role in determining the optimal interest rate.

We endogenize the R&D financial structure and investigate the effects of tax policy (dividend, corporate, and bond income taxes). Agency costs exist between the supply of and demand for funding, which enable the financial market to reshuffle loanable funds out of less productive firms toward others with greater productivity. We show that the financial structure-growth relationship is not monotonic, depending on the relative productivity between the existing and new firms and the allocation of loanable funds between them. The allocation of loanable funds, rather than their market amount, plays a key role in determining the effects of policy.

This paper investigates optimal capital taxation in an innovation-driven growth model. We examine how the optimal capital tax rate varies with externalities associated with R&D and innovation. Our results show that the optimal capital tax rate is higher when (i) the “stepping on toes effect” is smaller, (ii) the “standing on shoulders effect” is stronger, or (iii) the extent of creative destruction is smaller. The optimal capital tax rate is more likely to be positive when there is underinvestment in R&D. Moreover, the optimal capital tax rate and the monopolistic markup exhibit an inverted-U relationship. By calibrating our model to the US economy, we find that the optimal capital tax rate is positive, at a rate of around 6.6%. Finally, we consider a number of extensions and find that the result of a positive optimal capital tax is robust.

This paper examines the effect of a tariff on long-run growth and welfare in a two-country innovation-led growth model. We show that although raising the home country’s tariff reduces the growth and GDP of the foreign country, it will backfire by depressing R&D and growth of the home country. The Nash equilibrium tariffs can be positive, and they are larger when the government expenditure is more beneficial to private production and/or when the productivity of innovation is higher. The presence of positive Nash equilibrium tariffs provides a theoretical explanation for why countries have incentives to implement a tariff policy regardless of its negative effect on growth. Finally, the Nash equilibrium tariffs are higher than the globally optimal tariffs, that is, the levels that maximize the joint welfare of both countries.

This paper extends the Chamley–Judd framework by introducing preference externalities in a neoclassical growth model, and finds that the optimal capital tax increases with the extent of social-status seeking or negative leisure externalities. Furthermore, this paper finds that differences in leisure externalities lead to a distinct impact on optimal factor income taxes, and hence may serve as a plausible vehicle to explain the empirical differences in factor income taxation in the United States and Europe.

The existing literature dealing with mutual interactions between the extent of oil dependence and the possibility of belief-driven fluctuations unanimously ignores international loans. This simplified assumption disregards the fact that the relative magnitude of the financial account and the trade account exhibits an increasing trend. Faced with this deficiency in the literature, this paper develops a real business cycle model featuring oil dependence in domestic production and international loans, and examines whether both the presence of international borrowings and the dependence on imported energy will govern the emergence of belief-driven fluctuations.

In this paper we investigate the growth effect of environmental taxes when time preference is endogenously determined by environmental quality. We find that if people become more patient because of a cleaner environment, raising the environmental tax may reduce pollution and stimulate growth. Moreover, the Pigouvian principle may be inefficient in the presence of endogenous time preference.

This note analytically examines the interrelations between macroeconomic (in)stability and investment adjustment costs in a one-sector endogenously growing small–open economy representative-agent model. We show that under costly capital accumulation, the economy exhibits indeterminacy and sunspots if and only if the equilibrium wage–hours locus slopes upward and is steeper than the household's labor supply curve. By contrast, the economy without adjustment costs for capital investment always displays saddlepath stability and equilibrium uniqueness, regardless of the degree of increasing returns inaggregate production.

This paper develops a monetary endogenous growth model for an open economy. The salient feature of the model is that it is able to deal with various monetary policy rules, including money growth rate targeting, inflation rate targeting, and nominal income growth rate targeting. It is found that a rise in the pegged rate may either increase or decrease the balanced-growth rate under regimes of both money growth rate targeting and nominal income growth targeting. However, a rise in the pegged rate is sure to depress the balanced-growth rate under the regime of inflation rate targeting. It is also found that money growth rate targeting is fundamentally equivalent to nominal income growth rate targeting if a specific restriction is imposed, and inflation rate targeting is not qualitatively equivalent to either money growth rate targeting or nominal income growth rate targeting.