This article presents a new series of monthly equity returns for the British stock market for the period 1825-1870. In addition to calculating capital appreciation and dividend yields, the article also estimates the effect of survivorship bias on returns. Three notable findings emerge from this study. First, stock market returns in the 1825-1870 period are broadly similar for Britain and the United States, although the British market is less risky. Second, real returns in the 1825-1870 period are higher than in subsequent epochs of British history. Third, unlike the modern era, dividends are the most important component of returns.

The market for company stock in Ireland entered its formative period in the mid 1820s with the incorporation of banks and railways. Using data obtained from stockbroker lists, we estimate market capitalisation and construct weighted and unweighted monthly stock market indices for the period 1825–64. Our findings show that the market appears to have been relatively unaffected by the Famine. We suggest that an efficient-market explanation may better explain this finding than a dual-economy explanation. Our findings also show that the stock market increased significantly in value in the post-Famine period. This finding is consistent with an increase in demand for financial assets as well as the rapid commercialisation of the Irish economy.

Little is known about the size and performance of the Irish stock market in the half-century before 1914. Using data obtained from the Investors' Monthly Manual, we calculate total market capitalisation and construct a stock market index for the period 1865 to 1913. In addition, we also calculate dividend yields, and examine the performance of the market for company debentures. The results show that the Irish stock market grew steadily up until 1897; thereafter it declined markedly. We speculate that this decline may be explained by political developments.

In the mid-1820s, banks became the first businesses in Great Britain and Ireland to be allowed to form freely on an unlimited liability joint-stock basis. Walter Bagehot warned that their shares would ultimately be owned by widows, orphans, and other impecunious individuals. Another hypothesis is that the governing bodies of these banks, constrained by special legal restrictions on share trading, acted effectively to prevent such shares being transferred to the less wealthy. We test both conjectures using the archives of an Irish joint-stock bank. The results do not support Bagehot's hypothesis.

The 1826 Banking Copartnership Act allowed unlimited liability joint stock banks to form freely for the first time. Such banks were criticised by Walter Bagehot because he believed that impecunious individuals would own their shares. As the 1826 Act crucially contained a post-sale-extended liability restriction, Bagehot's view reduces to whether or not this restriction was effective. This article tests the effectiveness of this restriction by using a simple finance model to measure the risk of the shares of limited and unlimited banks, which traded concurrently during our sample period. Using share price data from 1873 to 1888, obtained from the Investor's Monthly Manual, our results indicate that the perceived risk of the unlimited liability banks was greater, and after the general move to limited liability in 1879, perceived risk fell. Furthermore, we also find that, after controlling for size, the unlimited liability banks tended to have a smaller number of shareholders and stickier share prices.

Australia during the second half of the nineteenth century experimented with a free banking system. However, the severe banking crisis experienced in 1893 poses a difficulty for proponents of free banking as they argue that such systems should be free from instability. We suggest that the few regulations that Australian banks faced were either not credible or had minimal impact on bank prudential behaviour. Using data on individual banks and the overall banking system, we go on to suggest that the 1893 banking crisis was the natural outcome of an unregulated environment. We also examine the role played by the colonial governments during the crisis.