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When the question of a “new age” is put to a philosopher there are two quite different ways in which he can define the issue and accordingly respond. On the one hand, he might construe his task as that of a clarifier of some general claim about cultural revolutions. From this perspective he would set about the task of analyzing the concept of a cultural revolution in terms of some loose analogue of necessary and sufficient conditions. These criteria having been laid down, he could then make suggestions as to whether or not those conditions obtain which would justify the claim that we are in the midst of such a cultural revolution. On the other hand, he might construe his charge more specifically as that of assessing the present state of his own field to see if something like a shift in perspective is manifest in this narrower domain. In this paper I am going to take the latter tack. I will, first, briefly survey the contemporary scene in philosophy to illustrate the “changing temper” I am to talk about; secondly, locate these phenomena in a broader historical context; and, thirdly, try to get at the reasons underlying the changes on which I am focusing. The major part of the paper will be devoted to the third point.
Objectives: The objectives were to
ascertain the value of a range of methods—including clinical
features, resting and exercise electrocardiography, and rapid access
chest pain clinics (RACPCs)—used in the diagnosis and early
management of acute coronary syndrome (ACS), suspected acute myocardial
infarction (MI), and exertional angina.
Questions remain about the long-term health impacts of the 1991 Gulf War on its veterans.
To measure psychological disorders in Australian Gulf War veterans and a military comparison group and to explore any association with exposure to Gulf War-related psychological stressors.
Prevalences of DSM–IV psychological disorders were measured using the Composite International Diagnostic Interview. Gulf War-related psychological stressors were measured using a service experience questionnaire.
A total of 31% of male Gulf War veterans and 21% of the comparison group met criteria for a DSM–IVdisorder first present in the post-Gulf War period. The veterans were at greater risk of developing post-Gulf War anxiety disorders including post-traumatic stress disorder, affective disorders and substance use disorders. The prevalence of such disorders remained elevated a decade after deployment. The findings can be explained partly as a ‘war-deployment effect‘. There was a strong dose–response relationship between psychological disorders and number of reported Gulf War-related psychological stressors.
Service in the 1991 Gulf War is associated with increased risk of psychological disorders and these are related to stressful experiences.
It is my conviction that much of the criticism of John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice misses its mark precisely because of a failure to appreciate the distinctive methodological structure of this work. I have three types of criticisms specifically in mind. First, the critic whose ultimate weapon is the counterexample. Secondly, the critic who focuses on one aspect of Rawls’ project without taking into account the whole theory. And thirdly, the critic who attempts to assess the theory absolutely rather than as one member of a set of welldefined alternatives. In this paper I hope to exhibit why these kinds of criticisms miss the mark, and I propose to do this indirectly by focusing on Rawls’ conception of philosophical method. Once this is exhibited, the relevance and irrelevance of certain kinds of criticisms becomes obvious. In my attempt to explicate Rawls’ conception of method, I will begin with his early methodological papers as providing the context within which the methodological structure of A Theory of justice should be viewed.
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