On June 11, 2020, President Donald J. Trump issued Executive Order 13928 Blocking Property of Certain Persons Associated with the International Criminal Court under the authority vested in him by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) and other federal statutes. Although the Trump Administration had earlier threatened aggressive action against the International Criminal Court (ICC), the issuance of the E.O. followed a ruling by the ICC Appeals Chamber authorizing the Prosecutor to commence an investigation into the situation in Afghanistan, which might implicate U.S. persons. The E.O. declared the ICC's “illegitimate assertion of jurisdiction” over U.S. personnel and the personnel of “certain of its allies” to be “an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States” within the meaning of IEEPA. It is a sweeping measure, blocking all property within the United States owned by designated natural or legal person (section 1); barring any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services to, or for the benefit of, designated persons (section 3), including even the donation of food, clothing, or medicine (section 2). The E.O. also authorized the imposition of certain immigration restrictions, including suspension of entry into the United States of ICC officials and their immediate family members (Section 4).

The phenomenon of human shields challenges core tenets of international humanitarian law (IHL), including its careful dialectic between the imperatives of humanity and military necessity. Although the principles of distinction, precaution, and proportionality are well established in the abstract, consensus remains elusive when these concepts are applied to situations involving human shields, who blur the boundary between civilians and combatants. And while the prohibition against using human shields is absolute, it is too often honored in its breach in today's asymmetrical conflicts. Indeed, resort to human shields has become attractive precisely because it exploits protective legal rules to the detriment of those principled armed actors who value—and thus strive for—IHL compliance. These parties, in turn, are struggling to adapt their operations to a practice that has become “endemic” in the modern battlefield.

The killing of Osama bin Laden in Pakistan in May 2011 and Anwar al-Aulaqi in Yemen in September 2011 both raise the question of when the killing of an identified individual posing a threat to a nation-state is lawful. Although it has not yet been forced to publicly defend either killing in any great detail, the Obama Administration has insisted on the legality of both operations by deploying an amalgam of legal and rhetorical arguments that explicitly or implicitly invoke multiple bodies of law. As an administration spokesperson stated in connection with the Bin Laden operation: