The mammalian assemblage and archaeological finds from the Lower Palaeolithic hominid site of Evron Quarry, situated on the northern coastal plain of Israel, are described and discussed. In their lithic and faunal composition, the sites of Latamne (QfIII) (Latamne Formation, Orontes, Syria) and Sitt Markho (Nahr elKebir, Syria) resemble Evron and are probably contemporaneous. It is suggested here, based on their lithic and faunal composition, that these sites may be chronologically closer to the site of Ubeidiya ('Ubeidiya Formation, Jordan Valley, Israel; 1.4 myr) than to the sites of Gesher Benot Ya'akov (dated as <800,000 yr B.P.), which differs in both aspects from Evron. The mammalian faunule from Evron comprises a biogeographical mixture, a result of biotic exchanges with Africa, the Oriental region, and the Palaearctic. This exchange may have been associated with a post-'Ubeidiya hominid dispersal, either from Africa or south Asia via the Levantine "corridor."

Reevaluation of geological and archaeological evidence from western Mount Carmel constrains its maximal tectonic uplift since the Middle Pleistocene. Tabun Cave, presently 45 m above sea level (asl), revealed human occupation from about 600 ka to 90 ka before present. The 25 m thick archaeological strata at Tabun are composed of laminated fine sand, silt and clays. Moreover, no marine deposits were found in Tabun or nearby caves. Since sea level in the last 600 ka reached a maximal of 5 to 10 m asl, Tabun Cave could not have been uplifted since then by more than 35 to 40 m, that is a maximal average rate of 58 to 67 mm/ka.

Adam and Eve have the same record yet receive different punishments. Adam receives the punishment that they both deserve, whereas Eve receives a more lenient punishment. In this article, we explore whether a deserved-but-unequal punishment, such as what Adam receives, can be just. We do this by explicating the conceptions of retributive justice that underlie both sides of the debate. We argue that inequality in punishment is disturbing mainly because of the disrespect it often expresses towards the offender receiving the harsher treatment, and also because it casts doubt on whether Adam got what he deserved. We suggest that when no disrespect is involved and when it is clear that the criminal got what he deserved, inequality is not worrisome.

The healthcare system is sick. The players are incentivized to maximize their own benefit and externalize their costs onto the other parties. This paper examines the warped incentives that underlie the system. The tort system, lacking expertise and slow to adapt, is unable to overcome cognitive biases to adequately solve the problems. Clinical practice guidelines could pose a solution, but not as they are currently developed. Guidelines promulgated by healthcare associations are infected by a web of conflicts of interest with every player in the industry. Government agencies, and their revolving doors, are underfunded and also subject to the industry's web of conflicts. Even if adequate guidelines could consistently be produced, state legislatures and courts have been unwilling and unable to substantially incorporate guidelines into the legal landscape. Lastly, this article proposes a private regulation regime that could be a solution which would align all of the players' incentives to society's interests.

This paper questions the fairness of our current tort-law regime and the philosophical underpinnings advanced in its defense, a theory known as corrective justice. Fairness requires that the moral equality and responsibility of persons be respected in social interactions and institutions. The concept of luck has been used by many egalitarians as a way of giving content to fairness by differentiating between those benefits and burdens that result from informed choice and those that result from fate or fortune. We argue that the theory of corrective justice, along with its institutional embodiment of tort law, is at odds with an egalitarian commitment to fairness because it allows luck an unjustifiable role in determining dissimilar liability for similar wrongs and dissimilar compensation for similar losses to bodily integrity. Many egalitarian political theorists have also recognized, if not defended, the notion of distinct forms of justice, namely corrective, retributive, and distributive. Although theorists of these different forms of justice have been concerned with negating unfair luck inside the operations of each form of justice, there has been little attention to the way in which luck operates to sort cases into each form of justice. We claim that there is a significant way in which luck operates to subject different people to principles of corrective, retributive, and distributive justice—thereby assessing dissimilar liability for similar wrongs and disparate compensation for similar losses—which flies in the face of the egalitarian value of fairness. After surveying the arguments put forward by theorists defending a categorical distinction between corrective justice and retributive and distributive principles, we argue that although analytical distinctions can be made between different forms of justice (although, we also suggest that the distinctions are not as sharp as some commentators suggest), there is no good reason to defend an acoustic separation between these forms of justice when doing so creates unfair outcomes.