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One of the leading features of colonialism is the imposition on a given territory and people a framework for what constitutes authority that renders pre-existing governing practices and legal orders unrecognizable as features of legitimate law and governance. Understood in this way, colonialism renders Indigenous law and governing practices invisible. As a result, decolonization requires changing how authority is apprehended and not only how it is distributed. This article compares two frameworks of authority in relation to the conflict on Wet'suwet’en territory: liberal postcolonial statism and relational pluralism. It shows how each framework provides a distinct lens through which to understand the pertinent features of political authority but argues that relational pluralism presents a better account of how to reconceive political authority in the context of real-world conflict.
Constitutional commentators who interpret conflicts between individuals and communities in terms of a struggle between individual and collective rights do not accurately capture the jurisprudence developed in the courts regarding such conflicts. Such conflicts are more clearly analyzed when they are framed in terms of identity-related differences. The difference perspective has three advantages over the “individual versus collective rights” perspective. First, the difference perspective accurately retrieves the courts' reasoning by framing it in terms of the values actually at stake. Second, it avoids the traditional dichotomy between individual and collective rights. Third, it provides a means to compare claims of individuals and groups without reducing group interests to individual interests.
Liberal states tolerate some cultural and religious communities even though they adhere to sexist and homophobic values and harmful practices which seem to contradict public laws and values, and to which some of their own members object. Here I explore one factor upon which the tolerance of such values and practices often depends, namely the extent to which the practices or values are seen to be crucial to the identity-related interests of communities and individuals. Arguments for state protection of cultural and religious practices are often advanced by communities on the grounds that the community's identity-related interests and values are at stake and are threatened in the absence of such protection. Moreover, public institutions, such as courts, conventionally attempt to resolve conflicts between cultural and religious communities and their members or between different communities by balancing and assessing the competing identity-related claims at stake. Some of these attempts are objectionable (in the sense that they are unsuccessful or flawed). But objections to them, I want to argue, do not lie with the fact that they were arrived at through the consideration of individual and community identity but rather because courts, or other public institutions, neglect or misread the identity-related interests and values of those involved.
Despite recent concerns about employing the notion of identity in the context of political and legal analysis, the fact remains that identity-related interests and values of individuals and groups are often central to cultural disputes.