The Ganges River and Its Importance

The Ganges River originates on the southern slope of the Himalayan range, and on its way receives supplies from seven major tributaries. Three of them – the Gandak, Karnali (Ghagara) and Kosi – pass through Nepal, and they supply the major portion of the Gangetic flow. After leaving Himalayas, the river flows in the southeasterly direction through India to enter Bangladesh. It forms the boundary between India and Bangladesh for about 112 km and then turns southeast to join the Brahmaputra River in the middle of Bangladesh.

The combined flow of the two rivers runs into the Bay of Bengal where it forms the Ganges Delta. The total basin area of the Ganges- Brahmaputra is approximately 1.66 million sq. km, of which the Ganges River supports more than 1 million sq. km and is densely populated with approximately 600 million people. The Ganges part of the basin is highly agriculture intensive as 71 per cent of it is cultivated. The river suffers from high seasonal fluctuations in its flow. Water availability in the basin is very uneven, both temporal and spatial. Himalayan glaciers, primarily Gangotri and Satopnath, provide an estimated 30– 40 per cent of the water in the Ganges, and the rest comes from melting snow and monsoon rains (Figure 6.1).

The transboundary Ganges River, which is shared among Bangladesh, India and Nepal, is the holiest river for Hindus, and it has been a symbol of Indian culture and civilization for centuries. The diversity in Hinduism has not been able to affect the sanctity of this river. Vaishnavites (followers of Vishnu) believe that the Ganges originated from the big toe of Vishnu's left foot. For the Saivites (followers of Shiva), the river flows from their God's hair. Hindus from all over the world cherish the idea of a holy dip in it, under the belief that doing so will rid them of their sins. As the Indian epic Mahabharata describes, ‘He who bathes in the Ganges purifies seven generations.’ In this ‘sin- eradication’ ritual, a Hindu needs to take three dips in the waters of the Ganges.

Abstract

Water is a fundamental precondition for human life. Yet, much of it transcends state borders via shared river and lake basins or groundwater aquifers. The resulting political, economic, social and environmental interdependencies give water resources the crucial potential either to foster cooperation or exacerbate conflict. Transboundary waters thus constitute a promising entry point for diplomats aiming for high peace dividends, warranting strong interest from foreign policy makers. Yet there is a lack of agency at the international level. As a result, the international community faces huge challenges when it comes to systematically taking early action to both respond to emerging crises and reinforce cooperation. This chapter, therefore, argues that foreign policy makers can and should do more to realize these dividends by exerting political leadership in fostering intrabasin cooperation and integration, connecting and reinforcing appropriate institutional structures for coordinated and cross-sectoral comprehensive engagement and for strengthening the diplomatic track of transboundary cooperation on water. This chapter proposes a number of specific instruments of engagement. Yet, in the end, strengthening the governance of transboundary waters hinges on strengthening and connecting the institutions, national and international, that can channel political will into coherent action.

Introduction

The global water crisis is of such a magnitude that it is growing into an issue of common global concern.1 This perspective puts the focus on water systems shared by two or more countries. Transboundary waters constitute a pivotal but underappreciated issue in global politics. The territories of 148 nations fall within international river basins that include the political boundaries of two or more countries (UN Water 2016). These international river basins cover 46 percent of the Earth's land surface (UN Water 2016), host about 40 percent of the world's population and account for approximately 60 percent of global river flow (Wolf et al. 2003). Shared waters are, therefore, often of critical importance for riparian states, that is, the states that comprise part of a transboundary basin. As a consequence, the use and apportionment of water in these basins is both a source of conflict risks and a chance for institutionalizing cooperative behavior.

Introduction

The main purpose of the study is to investigate how the linkages between some key dimensions of current globalization trends involving advances in aviation and global telecommunication systems have enhanced international travel and facilitated migrations, thereby making it easier for people to stay connected with family and friends all over the world. Diasporas are transnational communities formed when people migrate from their country of origin to live in one or more host countries, but maintain identity with the ancestral homeland. There are various circumstances, such as violent conflicts, natural disasters, poverty at home and economic opportunity abroad, under which people leave their homeland in search of a new place to settle (Hall, Kostić and Swain 2007, 9).

The role of diasporas in peacebuilding or conflict promotion in their homeland has been a subject of debate among scholars. Case studies of the Armenian, Kurdish, Sikh and Tamil diasporas have been presented as clear examples to illustrate their roles in supporting conflicts in their respective homelands (Cochrane, Baser and Swain 2009; Singh 2007; Hoffman et al. 2007). On the contrary, Ghanaian, Jewish and Irish diasporas have been cited as examples diasporas promoting peace in their country of origin. However, diasporas have very complex allegiances and may choose whether to promote peace or conflict in the homeland, depending on the prevailing circumstances. Moreover, there are even disagreements within members of the same diaspora group on whether to promote peace or engage in conflict.

Introduction

Since the early 1990s the international community has been increasingly adopting liberal state-building as part of a wider liberal peacebuilding strategy for addressing the plethora of problems facing post-conflict societies (Chandler 2006; Chesterman 2005; Kostić 2007; MacGinty 2006; Paris 2004). In that sense, liberal state-building is viewed as a peacebuilding measure with the aim to construct or reconstruct the institutions of governance capable of providing citizens with physical and economic security (cf. Paris 2004; Richmond 2006). One of the guiding assumptions has been that the presence of strong state institutions would facilitate macro-economic growth and provide economic and societal security of its citizens (Paris 2004). Such measures, in combinations with strong state institutions and functioning infrastructure, are supposed to bring economic well-being that would in return strengthen the legitimacy of the state among its citizens by means of democratic elections, thus bringing about political moderation and societal integration in previously fragmented societies (Paris 2004).

However, while it has been shown that this type of liberal state- and nation-building fails short of bringing societal integration in multiethnic societies (Kostić 2007, 2008), it does not include in its framework of analysis the environmental problems of post-conflict societies. Economic development projects such as large hydro projects or opencast mining for lignite – as an element of a broader state-building exercise – lead to environmental stress for the communities, and can further exacerbate inter-communal incompatibilities (Swain and Krampe 2011).

Introduction

Following a global flurry of ‘new wars’ and ‘new conflicts’ in the post–Cold War era (Kaldor 2007; Keen 2008), a lot of rethinking has been done (and certainly will be done) on the causes of violent conflict in the global system. After a decade dominated by, inter alia, ‘9/11’, the unstable and violent African development context and the relatively sustainable peace (and very successful development) in East Asia, reflections on the relations between development and security (and vice versa) became unavoidable. In policy documents (e.g., UN 2004; OECD 2007; DFID 2005; European Council 2003, 2008; UNDP 2005), as well as in academic circles (Buur, Jensen and Stepputat 2007; Chandler 2007, 2008; Duffield 2001, 2007; Paris and Sisk 2007), the ‘development-security nexus’ was coined as a concept and emerged as a hotly contested topic. Unsurprisingly, the policy world was jumping to ‘new solutions’, with reductionist conclusions, whereas research remained more sceptical. For instance, irrespective of whether we listen to the ‘new’ United States foreign policy articulated by Colin Powell or by General Petraeus, to the secretary-general of the United Nations and to the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty on ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (UN 2009; ICISS 2001), or the European Union's ‘European Security Strategy’ (European Council 2008), the attention is increasingly on how conflicts of various sorts can be prevented through greater focus on ‘development’. The nexus became a commodity over which intellectual ownership was as unclear as important.

Introduction and Context

In 1974, starting with the arrival of democracy in Portugal, more than 60 countries in Europe, Latin America, Asia, and Africa have made transitions from authoritarianism to some form of democracy. Democracy has now become the dominant form of government in the world. Its appeal and popularity is more widespread than ever before. Many political struggles are increasingly being fought in different parts of the world in the name of democracy. The democratic development in many of these newly democratic countries has often been sluggish, turbulent and marked by regular reversals. Though performance of many of these democracies continues to be disappointing, the cases of complete reversal from democracy to authoritarian rule are very few. In the last century, the per cent of global population living in democratic countries has increased from 12 per cent in 1900 to 63 per cent in 2000. A near consensus has now been achieved among decision-makers and academics alike on the virtues of democracy. Besides freedom and prosperity, successful democratization is argued to bring peace and security to unstable regions of the world.

This global trend relates mainly to developments within individual countries or within a number of countries, i.e., the internal or domestic developments. If ‘democracy’ is interpreted as a particular system of governance, this approach may be adequate.