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Our response to the commentators covers four general issues: (1) How useful is our proposed conceptualization of the real-life/laboratory controversy in terms of the contrast between the correspondence and storehouse metaphors? (2) What is the relationship between these two metaphors? (3) What are the unique implications of the correspondence metaphor for memory assessment and theory? (4) What are the nature and role of memory metaphors in memory research? We stress that the correspondence metaphor can be usefully exploited independent of the real-life/laboratory controversy, but that a variety of other metaphors, including the storehouse, should also be utilized in order to more fully capture the myriad facets and functions of memory in everyday life.
The study of memory is witnessing a spirited clash between proponents of traditional laboratory research and those advocating a more naturalistic approach to the study of “real-life” or “everyday” memory. The debate has generally centered on the “what” (content), “where” (context), and “how” (methods) of memory research. In this target article, we argue that the controversy discloses a further, more fundamental breach between two underlying memory metaphors, each having distinct implications for memory theory and assessment: Whereas traditional memory research has been dominated by the storehouse metaphor, leading to a focus on the number of items remaining in store and accessible to memory, the recent wave of everyday memory research has shifted toward a correspondence metaphor, focusing on the accuracy of memory in representing past events. The correspondence metaphor calls for a research approach that differs from the traditional one in important respects: in emphasizing the intentional –representational function of memory, in addressing the wholistic and graded aspects of memory correspondence, in taking an output-bound assessment perspective, and in allowing more room for the operation of subject-controlled metamemory processes and motivational factors. This analysis can help tie together soine of the what, where, and how aspects of the “real-life/laboratory” controversy. More important, however, by explicating the unique metatheoretical foundation of the accuracy-oriented approach to memory we aim to promote a more effective exploitation of the correspondence metaphor in both naturalistic and laboratory research contexts.
This chapter traces the development of the problem of consciousness in Western philosophy from the time of the ancient Greeks to the middle of the 20th century. The core problem of consciousness focuses on the nature of subjectivity. The chapter focuses on what has become the central issue in consciousness studies, which is the problem of integrating subjectivity into the scientific view of the world. The mainstream view has not long been mainstream, for the problem of consciousness cannot strike one at all until a fairly advanced scientific understanding of the world permits development of the materialism presupposed by the mainstream view. It was the scientific revolution of the 16th and 17th centuries that forced the problem of the Christian dogma into prominence. In philosophy, the 1950s saw the beginning of a self-conscious effort to understand the mind and, eventually, consciousness as physical through and through in essentially scientific terms.
Smith et al. show that monkeys and dolphins can respond adaptively under conditions of uncertainty, suggesting that they monitor subjective uncertainty and control their behavior accordingly. Drawing on our own work with humans on the strategic regulation of memory reporting, we argue that, so far, the distinction between monitoring and control has not been addressed sufficiently in metacognitive animal research.
Recent years have witnessed a trend toward the establishment of metacognition as a field of investigation in its own right that pulls together researchers from a variety of areas. These areas include memory research, developmental psychology, judgment and decision-making, neuropsychology, reasoning and problem solving, social psychology, forensic psychology, educational testing, and consciousness. The few edited volumes that have appeared in recent years on metacognition illustrate the tendency of researchers from disparate areas of investigation to bring their research under the common umbrella of metacognition. This volume is also a witness to this tendency, which I expect to intensify in the years to come.
In this overview chapter, I will begin by pointing out the basic assumptions that seem to underlie much of the experimental work on metacognition. I will then outline several lines of research on metacognition, and show how the chapters in this volume actually reflect the converging influence of these different lines of research. In the main part of the chapter I will focus on the basic issues in metacognition, pointing out some of the contributions of the research reported in this book to the emerging unified field of metacognition.
Metacognition, narrowly defined, concerns people's cognitions and feelings about their cognitive states and cognitive processes. However, the term metacognition has been also used more broadly to refer to cognitions about cognition in general, as well as self-regulation processes that take cognitive processes as their object (see Schneider and Lockl, this volume).
In response to Cohen, we point out that many of the assessment
difficulties raised by the correspondence metaphor stem from the
assessment of memory in meaningful, real-life contexts rather than
from the assessment of memory accuracy per se; these difficulties are
equally troublesome for the assessment of memory quantity in such
contexts. Moreover, the need to focus on particular aspects of memory
performance – correspondence-oriented or quantity-oriented
– does not preclude the development of useful and general
theoretical models. In response to Shanon, we argue that (1) the
distinction between the correspondence and storehouse metaphors
of memory is metatheoretical, not substantive or methodological,
(2) the correspondence metaphor is compatible with both a
“representationalist” view of memory and a more
“direct” view, and (3) as an epistemological strategy,
metaphorical pluralism is both acceptable and desirable.
Glenberg provides a new and exciting view that is especially
useful for capturing some functional aspects of memory. However,
memory and its functions are too multifarious to be handled by any
one conceptualization. We suggest that Glenberg's proposal be
restricted to its own “focus of convenience.” In addition,
its value will ultimately depend on its success in generating detailed
and testable theories.
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