THE MONARCH's RESPONSIBILITIES WERE eloquently symbolised in the two images on the obverse and reverse respectively of the great seal: the sovereign enthroned in majesty bearing the sword of justice; and as a knightly warrior on horseback with shield in one hand and outstretched sword in the other. This image highlights the monarch's constitutional proprieties, which were set out in his coronation oath and embodied his personal obligations to the realm. He undertook to the best of his ability to preserve peace and concord for the sake of God's church, clergy and people, maintain, defend and uphold ‘the just laws and customs which the people shall have chosen’ and ‘in all your judgments see that right and impartial justice is done in mercy and truth’. It was a potent image that accompanied the putting into effect of royal commands and was reflected in illuminated miniatures portraying the opening words of Bracton's De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Regni, which in turn echoed the Roman Emperor Justinian's maxim: ‘Clothed with arms, armed with laws’.

The historiography of late medieval England and in particular the ‘long fourteenth century’ has benefitted considerably from renewed focus on constitutional, legal and administrative history. Through his revisionist work on the fifty-year reign of Edward III and a wider concern to foreground and understand contemporary political culture, Mark Ormrod has done much to restore to the picture the significance of the person (and personality) of the king. He has also sharpened focus on the intricate workings of royal government, especially the judicial and financial institutions (and their personnel) that underpinned its operations. His examination of kingship and what it meant to be king has stimulated a growing body of scholarship reappraising the reigns of monarchs and the role played by royal consorts in maintaining or destabilising the body politic and determining attitudes towards the crown. As Ormrod himself concludes in his influential biography, whatever Edward III's personal shortcomings, he was revered as a model ruler. Even a century after his death he was perceived to have conformed to the ideal of chivalric kingship, balancing valour with upholding the law: ‘this noble prince, this princely knight, this knightly conqueror so loved’, in whose days ‘God [was] obeyed, the course and recourse of merchandise justly kept and the order of the law [was] duly observed’.

The Court of Chivalry enjoyed a high political profile, owing to the military nature of the suits and the high social status of its litigants. Within the context of long periods of warfare during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the Court maintained its reputation on account of nobles and knights wishing to challenge the legitimacy of perceived rights to lucrative ransoms of prisoners or to bear heraldic coats of arms. The procedures employed were predominantly those of the continental ius commune rather than the common law, probably on account of the international body of customs and practices found in the 'law and custom of arms' which underpinned the legal principles applied in the Court. In addition to its eclectic jurisdiction, the networks and connections of the legal personnel helped shape its distinct identity. The Court formed a nexus where highly qualified men from other courts and administrative traditions pooled their considerable intellectual understanding and practical experience. They were often educated in civil and/or canon law, but were probably both respected and well-placed from their involvement in parliament and other diplomatic and judicial business to act as commissioners and advocates in the often highly charged political circumstances of Court of Chivalry cases.

An Evolving Legal System

Gower's works were written during a formative period in the evolution of the judicial system and the legal profession. In particular his poetry was influenced by, and bears witness to, an expansion in the legal system and concomitantly of those staffing its institutions and facilitating the resolution of disputes. This expansion flowed from a heightened intensity in royal governance during the course of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries with the number of judicial commissions and the amount of parliamentary legislation steadily increasing with a corresponding growth in the level of the supervision and regulation of daily life. New laws, notably the labour legislation and a range of economic and criminal offences required strict enforcement at the local level in order to be effective. Unsurprisingly, searching inquiries frequently revealed corruption and injustices on the part of royal and local officials.

Richard II's reign saw fresh expectations about the legal system fuelled by enhanced accessibility of legal mechanisms and the greater availability of legal practitioners. They were expectations that could not wholly be met, however, as the system was already creaking under the weight of the public and private business which was coming before the courts. While royal government attempted to respond to the social and economic challenges of the period with new legislation, it ended up confounding these new expec-tations by confirming stereotypes and prejudices as well as perpetuating injustices. In particular there was much criticism by contemporaries of the outlay necessary for pursuing litigation, of the remuneration required by lawyers for their services and of the profits available for those involved in the administration of justice. Legitimate relationships with patrons and payment for work done led to a focus not only on the processes of law (which were oiled by gifts and fees) but also on their social consequences: an accumulation of wealth evidenced by conspicuous consumption and social mobility. In an adversarial legal system where there were bound to be winners and losers, dissatisfaction inevitably centred on those within the system who gained whatever the outcome: the judges and lawyers. It is not surprising therefore, that the legal system and the legal profession were the subjects of voluble complaint, biting satire and suggestions for reform even before Gower entered the fray.

Traditionally the impetus for legislation came from the sovereign. The law-codes attributed to Anglo-Saxon and Anglo-Norman kings exemplified the monarch’s apparent lead in promulgating laws for the good of his subjects. Royal confirmation of the laws of the realm (especially the laws of St Edward the Confessor) was expected of a monarch at his coronation. The experience during the thirteenth century of calling extraordinary assemblies of representatives to discuss the affairs of the realm and approve royal edicts was reflected in Edward II’s coronation oath (1308), which included an obligation on the king to uphold ‘the laws and rightful customs which the community of your realm shall have chosen’. The consensual element to royal legislation developed further during the fourteenth century with the frequent summoning of parliaments and general recognition that this was where adjustments to the law of the land should be deliberated and enunciated. The commons’ request for remedy of specific matters deemed to be for the welfare to the realm in return for their assent to taxation became an established part of parliamentary procedure. The common petitions in which the knights and burgesses attending parliament articulated their demands were frequently used as a basis for legislation. By Richard II’s reign it could be declared that ‘the law of the land was made in parliament by the king and the lords spiritual and temporal and all the commons of the kingdom’. As Bishop Alcock expressed in his sermon at the opening of parliament in 1485, it was a cooperative enterprise uniting the sovereign and his people in pursuit of ‘good governance’.

Petitioning the crown as an individual involved seeking to gain the attention of the king either through an oral supplication recorded by the parliamentary clerks or via a document containing the request for grace submitted to the clerks in the petitioner's absence. Unless the petition was ‘fast-tracked’ and read out to the king and his council during a parliamentary session, it was delegated to a committee of ‘auditors and triers’ comprising members of the nobility, senior churchmen and legal experts. Some were responded to immediately, others were diverted to officials in particular branches of government (including the exchequer, chancery and the courts of king's bench and common pleas). While it appears from the instructions and comments endorsed on surviving petitions that it was a somewhat administrative means of achieving justice, it was not a purely bureaucratic process. Applications were read out to the panel, who, upon hearing it, discussed the merits and made their decision accordingly or sought advice from other departments.

The supplicant made his or her submission trusting that a favourable response would be achieved. Much depended, however, upon the way the petition was framed and the language used in formulating it. In order to present the subject matter of the complaint and concomitant request for remedy in a suitably persuasive manner, the petitioner needed to employ not only an overarching narrative but also convincing legal arguments and a range of rhetorical devices. Petitions were thus inevitably ‘artful constructs designed to get something done’. This is an area in which ‘a good deal of work remains to be done’, as Mark Ormrod acknowledged, notably ‘on the way in which words, phrase and forms were chosen by the writers of petitions to create effect and impact’. Answering the call, this paper assesses changing patterns of supplication and corresponding litigation strategies adopted by medieval petitioners, exploring especially their discourses and linguistic approaches. In order to analyse and contextualise this multipurpose form, I will draw upon petitions presented to the king by a variety of supplicants, though with special focus on manorial tenants and litigants in the court of Chivalry. In particular, I will examine the mentalities and logistics involved, the advantages in terms of procedure and the concerns of litigants (the matters at stake and the corresponding legal issues raised), as well as the tactics and manoeuvres employed in pursuit of strategic aims.

This volume of papers arises from a two-day symposium entitled ‘Heraldry and Piracy in an Age of Chivalry: The Jurisdiction of the Constable and Marshal(s) and of the Admiralty in Later Medieval England and France’ which was held in Exeter's Royal Albert Memorial Museum and Gallery on 4–5 June 2015. It forms part of a project specifically on the medieval English Court of Chivalry undertaken by the editors, which was funded by the Leverhulme Trust. We are most grateful to the College of Social Sciences and International Studies, University of Exeter, and to the Royal Albert Memorial Museum and Gallery for enabling us to hold the symposium, and to the Leverhulme Trust for its contribution towards the production of this book.

The wars waged by the English in France during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries led to the need for judicial agencies that could deal with disputes that arose on land or sea, beyond the reach of indigenous laws. While much has been written on the culture of chivalry, to date the jurisdictional development of these Courts has attracted comparatively little scholarly attention. The court of the English Admiral in the medieval period has received significantly less. This volume explores the Courts of Chivalry and Admiralty, their officers and the wider cultural and political context in which they had jurisdiction and operated in later medieval Western Europe. Combining law with military and maritime history, and discussing the art and material culture of chivalric disputes as well as their associated heraldry, each chapter builds on recent work in the field and provides a valuable multidisciplinary outlook on an important area of medieval life and culture.

Established during Edward III's reign under the presidency of the Constable and Marshal of England, the Court of Chivalry heard cases that arose out of acts of war, including disputes over rights in prisoners and their ransoms as well as about rights to particular coats of arms. It also took cognisance of appeals of treason, in which battle was offered by the appellant. Around the same period, the Court of the Admiralty, under the titular presidency of the Admiral of England, claimed jurisdiction over the waters surrounding the English king's territories and heard cases under maritime law involving a broad remit of issues, including naval discipline and administration, coastal defence, threats to shipping, disputes over prizes, wrecks and the depredations of pirates. Both courts were distinct from the other central courts in employing the civil law procedures of the Continental ius commune system rather than the English common law.

The developing European cult of chivalry gave greater prominence to the Prince's position as head of an apparatus that would resolve disputes between members of the noble and knightly ranks, particularly over coats of arms, as well as over military discipline and military and maritime perquisites such as ransoms and prizes.