Introduction

In his recently published book Praxis, Friedrich Kratochwil argues that action should be at the centre of our investigations in International Relations (IR). In making that claim, he positions himself against two theoretical starting points: (1) the agent is simply a vessel for structural factors, so ‘causes’ matter more than ‘reasons’; and (2) there is no real agency because of the instability of the subject. One might argue that he is locating a middle ground between positivism (position 1) and post-structuralism (position 2). He does this through an overview of a wide range of themes at the intersection of international politics and international law.

In any work that seeks to recover a praxis-based approach, Aristotle is an obvious figure; indeed, Kratochwil’s subtitle to the book (On Acting and Knowing) comes directly from Aristotle’s two categories of virtues, the practical and the theoretical (Aristotle, 1941: 952). Aristotle has long been in the background and sometimes foreground of Kratochwil’s work. In Praxis, Kratochwil invokes Aristotle a number of times. At the same time, he critiques Aristotle for what Kratochwil argues is the former’s overly theoretical focus at the expense of practical politics. Instead, in Praxis, Kratochwil finds more benefit in the work of David Hume, about whom he has written previously (Kratochwil, 2011a [1981]).

In this chapter, I argue that Aristotle is more beneficial than Kratochwil makes him out to be for understanding the practical dimensions of international law and politics. In particular, I argue that Aristotle provides an alternative understanding of the rule of law and how it relates to the wider international political order, one that differs both from Kratochwil and from contemporary international law. As Kratochwil notes, Aristotle became a reference point for many in the early modern and modern periods in support of a law-governed polity. In recent years, this invocation of the rule of law has become a mantra for advocates of global governance, one that has lost any connection to the political context within which the rule of law might function.

Introduction

What rules govern the conduct of warfare? Do state and non-state actors conduct themselves in accordance with rules? These are long-standing questions in the study and practice of war. There are, however, some underlying questions that may also be worthy of investigation. How stable are those rules? What foundations do they have? Even more provocatively, are rules the best way to govern the conduct of warfare? Many areas of public life are conducted in terms of rules, yet rules and rule following can become fetishized. Judith Skhlar’s famous critique of law and international criminal law introduced the idea of ‘legalism’, or the use of rules and laws to cover over ideological or political conflicts. Rules guide us through complex situations; at the same time, rules can constrain and limit our ability to respond when those situations change or when a rule simply does not work. In fact, rules can even generate their own forms of violence, especially when yoked to ideas like the national interest.

Nicholas Rengger did not address rules directly in his scholarship. Instead, the idea of rules and law formed a backdrop to many of his critical interventions in world politics. From his studies of order to just war, Rengger engaged with and contested the idea that law and rules alone could structure our political lives. At the same time, as I will argue in this chapter, Rengger did not set aside rules in their entirety, for he understood the necessity of rules in both domestic and international political order more broadly. Instead, Rengger argued for a more casuistic approach to political life. Drawn from ancient and medieval moral and political theory, this idea highlights the importance of the contexts within which rules operate. Rules and laws still play a role, but they cannot be seen as the only way to approach political conflict. As such, the focus of this chapter will be on Rengger as a reluctant rule follower.

The chapter will use Rengger’s writing on just war and violence to orient the argument. The first section sets out his understanding of rules and their relation to political order. Following this, and building upon it, the next section explores his reading of the Just War tradition as found in his book Just War and International Order.

The international legal and institutional structure around climate change ascertains that the responsibility to react to the phenomena lies predominantly with states. Although states play a vital part in addressing climate change, these structural constrains leaves limited room for alternative actors to take action to react to the problem. This chapter proposes looking at responsibility in world affairs as a political concept; a political concept that reconstitutes norms, practices, and actions in a manner that advances new ways to mitigate climate change. Drawing on Hannah Arendt’s conceptualisation of political responsibility, and the activism of non-state and substate within the UNFCCC, we suggest that political responsibility gives agency and space for different actors within the international community to engage in practices that help advance the climate change agenda. This, we further suggest, constructs a common community in which various actors undertake political action in order to influence policymaking.

Movement disorders can present a diagnostic challenge, particularly those with onset at an early age as one component of a complex neurodevelopmental disorder. With advances in next-generation sequencing technologies, the number of genes associated with movement disorders has been rapidly increasing over the last few years. Some of these genes encode transport proteins or enzymes within well-characterized metabolic pathways and their abnormal function results in disorders defined as inborn errors of metabolism (IEMs). Although individually rare, IEMs have a collective estimated incidence of 1:800 to 1:2,500 live births [1]. Movement disorders are a common symptom in IEMs affecting the central nervous system [2]. In general, movement disorders are not the sole symptom of these disorders, but are more often part of complex phenotypes that include other neurological and systemic signs and symptoms. The ability to recognize IEMs is crucial for clinicians evaluating patients presenting with movement disorders, as some IEMs are amenable to therapy, including specific dietary therapies or supplementation with vitamins, minerals, or cofactors that can prevent intoxication or treat deficiencies [3].