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Aristotle's <I>Ethics</I> and Medieval Philosophy
  • Aristotle's Ethics and Medieval Philosophy
  • Moral Goodness and Practical Wisdom
  • Anthony Celano
  • Published online: 05 December 2015
  • Print publication: 03 December 2015
  • View description
    Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics had a profound influence on generations of later philosophers, not only in the ancient era but also in the medieval period and beyond. In this book, Anthony Celano explores how medieval authors recast Aristotle's Ethics according to their own moral ideals. He argues that the moral standard for the Ethics is a human one, which is based upon the ethical tradition and the best practices of a given society. In the Middle Ages, this human standard was replaced by one that is universally applicable, since its foundation is eternal immutable divine law. Celano resolves the conflicting accounts of happiness in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, demonstrates the importance of the virtue of phronesis (practical wisdom), and shows how the medieval view of moral reasoning alters Aristotle's concept of moral wisdom.
  • Chapter 7 - The relation of prudence and synderesis to happiness in the medieval commentaries on Aristotle's ethics
  • Edited by Jon Miller, Queen's University, Ontario
  • Book: The Reception of Aristotle's Ethics
  • Published online: 05 February 2013
  • Print publication: 13 December 2012, pp 125-154
  • View extract

    Summary

    Aristotle's two accounts of the nature of happiness in Nicomachean Ethics i and x have caused much disagreement concerning the precise constitution of human goodness, or happiness (eudaimonia). While all may agree that happiness is an activity of the soul, the question remains concerning the exact relation between the moral and intellectual virtues, or the practical and theoretical life. H. G. Gadamer here notes the tension in the two accounts:

    It can be determined that practical wisdom (phronesis) and not only theoretical reason is the supreme virtue of an intellectual being. So the question remains how both these perfections and types of knowledge relate to one another. We therefore return again to the ancient problem of the primacy of theoria over human praxis.

    Even as astute a reader of Aristotle as Gadamer has difficulty in determining the importance of some human accomplishments in relation to others. The assertion that both practical wisdom (phronesis) and intellectual wisdom (sophia) comprise the supreme good, and that both must be considered as the highest virtue, needs careful consideration. The uncertainty concerning the relation between the practical and the theoretical has a firm basis in Aristotle's text, and Gadamer's approach seems close to what Aristotle may have intended.

    In the last chapters of the N.E. Aristotle praises the perfection of the intellect, the purely rational part of the soul, as the highest human achievement. This is the clearest expression of the supremacy of the theoretical life, and its dominant role in the production of happiness. If contemplation is supreme, then all other actions and pursuits must be directed toward the contemplative life. Only contemplative activity would merit the designation ‘supremely good’, since it not only perfects the best part of human beings, but its objects are also knowable in themselves (1177a19–22). Contemplation is the most continuous, independent and self-sufficient of human accomplishments, since it demands nothing outside the intellectual fervor and excellence of the contemplative. Aristotle can think of nothing more desirable than the pleasure of contemplating truth (1177a23).

  • Chapter 7 - The relation of prudence and synderesis to happiness in the medieval commentaries on Aristotle's ethics
  • Edited by Jon Miller, Queen's University, Ontario
  • Book: The Reception of Aristotle's Ethics
  • Published online: 05 February 2013
  • Print publication: 13 December 2012, pp 125-154
  • View extract

    Summary

    Aristotle's two accounts of the nature of happiness in Nicomachean Ethics I and X have caused much disagreement concerning the precise constitution of human goodness, or happiness. In comparing contemplation with practice, Aristotle notes how the former is loved for its own sake, but the latter produces virtues within political and military realms that aim at external ends. The Pseudo-Pecham claims happiness is prior to virtue, and virtue is ordered to happiness as its prize. Virtue can only be a disposition to the supreme good. Happiness, as described by Aristotle, must be that which is most perfect in a human being within the limits of a human life. It contains a combination of all virtues steadfastly practiced over a lengthy period of time. Albert's extensive discussion of the various positions concerning the nature of synderesis summarizes the philosophical-theological deliberations on the topic in the first half of the thirteenth century.
  • Thomas Aquinas on Justice as a Global Virtue in Business
  • Claus Dierksmeier, Anthony Celano
  • Journal: Business Ethics Quarterly / Volume 22 / Issue 2 / April 2012
  • Published online by Cambridge University Press: 23 January 2015, pp. 247-272
  • Print publication: April 2012
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    The moral theory of Thomas Aquinas meets the present need for a business ethics that transcends the legal realm by linking the ideas of justice and virtue in an ingenious way. Thomas's virtue theory coordinates private and public activities through a set of context-invariant, justice-oriented norms with conceptual appeal to contemporary questions of global business ethics. In our article, we first sketch how Aquinas's theory can be also of relevance to a non-confessional audience through its appeal to the ‘natural light of reason.’ Then we explain how his theory of ‘natural law’ aligns his ideas of virtue and justice. From this vantage point, we address the tension between cultural diversity and moral uniformity in the economic sphere in general and in today's globalized business world in particular. Throughout the article, we aim to show how Aquinas's conception of virtuous business conduct gains inter-personal and inter-cultural validity that establishes social justice as the global virtue of business.

  • Robert Kilwardby on the Relation of Virtue to Happiness
  • ANTHONY J. CELANO
  • Journal: Medieval Philosophy and Theology / Volume 8 / Issue 2 / September 1999
  • Published online by Cambridge University Press: 30 July 2001, pp. 149-162
  • Print publication: September 1999
  • View abstract

    The growing sophistication of philosophical speculation together with the increasingly contentious claims of the thirteenth-century masters of Arts and Theology is reflected in the literary career of Robert Kilwardby. As a young Parisian Arts master, Kilwardby devoted much of his energy to explaining the works of Aristotle, recently introduced into the University’s curriculum. Although particularly interested in the logical treatises, Kilwardby most likely commented upon the so-called ‘Ethica vetus et nova’, which were part of the Arts curriculum in the first half of the thirteenth century. Kilwardby’s commentary, while quickly superseded by the more complicated questions on the entire Ethics, represents an extremely important transitional phase in the understanding of Aristotle’s moral philosophy. Kilwardby’s careful reading of Aristotle’s text allowed him to reject the usual religious interpretation of his contemporaries. His awareness of the limitations of moral science marks a decisive step away from the earlier reading of the Nicomachean Ethics (EN), which viewed Aristotle’s doctrine of the human good to be identical with the religious ideal of union with God. As a result, Kilwardby’s commentary on the EN demonstrated how Aristotle’s ethics could no longer be understood as a slight variant of Christian moral theology.

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