The Introduction lays out the contextual background to the themes and elements that are brought together to shape the monograph’s arguments. It positions the monograph within the existing literature on the Seven Years’ War and the history of neutrality in order to establish how it builds upon these bodies of work to incorporate law as a necessary element of strategic analysis. The core hypotheses and arguments of the book are also established. First, that neutrality was a dynamic role for maritime nations such as Spain and the Dutch Republic which had as much of an influencing effect on British strategic thinking as did affairs with belligerent nations. Second, that the Court of Prize Appeal played a critical role within the three-pronged maritime strategy of maintaining foreign confidence in British maritime law and its court system; balancing the interests of British privateers and neutral carriers of commerce in the prize court system; and destroying French seaborne trade through commerce predation. Third, that British maritime strategic concerns shaped and created new legal rules, norms, and precedents within the prize court system that would then serve to clarify and cement British, Spanish, and Dutch understandings of neutral rights and international maritime law.

The first part of this chapter focuses on the shift in Anglo-Spanish relations brought on by the death of the British ambassador in Madrid. It delves into the critical role that individuals can play during diplomatic negotiations and the subsequent effects they can have on issues relating to neutrality and sea power. Keene’s relationship with William Pitt and with Ricardo Wall largely kept Anglo-Spanish relations afloat and working toward an eventuality where Spain would remain neutral and willing to compromise on neutral rights. Keene actively worked to persuade Wall to accept the Court of Prize Appeal as the best mechanism to safeguard Spanish neutrality but failed to achieve his goal before he died. Keene’s successor, Lord Bristol, proved much less effective and relations between the two governments deteriorated further. It was under these trying political circumstances that the San Juan Baptista came before the Court of Prize Appeal. Lord Hardwicke’s intent appeared to be to ensure that the first Spanish appellate case be decided in favour of the Spanish in order to win Spanish government support for the Court of Prize Appeal as a fair and viable mechanism to safeguard neutral rights.

The opening chapter provides the necessary context for both the development of British prize law and how law has, or has not, been treated in maritime strategic thinking. It provides a conceptual analysis of how and why law should be incorporated into maritime strategic thought. The conceptual part of the chapter argues that law and sea power cannot be divorced for two principal reasons. First, sea power is the vehicle through which a state is able to transform domestic maritime law into international maritime law. Second, the maritime strategic considerations of a nation drive negotiations over international maritime law in an attempt to either constrain, or expand, the rights of a sea power. The extent to which maritime nations are able to influence those negotiations depends on the relative qualities of their sea power.

This chapter begins Part III of the book which focuses on Anglo-Spanish relations during the Seven Years’ War and focuses particularly on the first two Spanish cases to come before the Court of Prize Appeal. This serves as a contextual chapter for Anglo- Spanish affairs and introduces the specific people and dynamics within the Spanish Court that were critical to negotiations over neutrality. It also introduces the cases of the San Juan Baptista and the Jesús, Maria, y José. The chapter highlights that the political and diplomatic contexts of Anglo-Spanish relations were markedly different from those of Anglo-Dutch relations and that preserving Spanish neutrality was, in many ways, much more fraught and complicated. This was due largely to internal Spanish political events (such as the death of King Ferdinand VI and the death of the British ambassador to Spain) and Anglo-Spanish maritime grievances that went beyond questions of prize-taking but spoke to the core of Spanish fears that British maritime hegemony would drastically alter the power of balance in the Americas and adversely affect neutral nations.

The latter years of Spain’s neutrality during the war (1759–62) saw an even greater deterioration in Anglo-Spanish relations. Ministers from both Courts attempted to preserve and salvage Spanish neutrality, but unresolved diplomatic grievances, as well as the deaths of both the Spanish king, Ferdinand VI, and the British monarch, George II, foiled their efforts and any gains made by the case of the San Juan Baptista. The increasing decay and eventual breakdown of Anglo-Spanish relations during the war demonstrate that the tactics used to ensure Dutch neutrality could not so easily be transferred to maintain Spanish neutrality. This chapter begins with the appellate case of the Jesús, Maria, y José and a close look at the legal arguments presented for both the Spanish shipowners and the British privateers who took the ship as prize. The proceedings of the court are analysed alongside the political developments between the Spanish and British ministries, and illustrate how they influenced one another. The case demonstrates Hardwicke’s continued attempts to make legal arguments that would set the Rule of the War of 1756 as the standard rule for how Britain’s prize court system would judge the legality of enemy goods carried in neutral ships.

The cases of the Maria Theresa and the America were designed, by Hardwicke, Holderness, and Newcastle, to instil confidence in the Dutch government that the Court of Prize Appeal would safeguard the Dutch neutral rights that had been agreed throughout the first part of the war. They were also designed to instil confidence in British privateers and naval captains and ensure that French colonial trade carried in neutral ships could still largely be stopped and condemned as legal prize. This chapter focuses on the two appellate cases and the legal arguments presented. These are then tied to the legal and strategic maritime thinking of Lord Hardwicke and his creation of the Rule of the War of 1756. This rule became the bedrock for how Britain would understand and negotiate neutral rights over the course of the next major European maritime wars. The basic premise of the rule was that trade that was prohibited to a neutral during times of peace would be considered by the British prize court system to be prohibited in times of war. The chapter, through an analysis of Dutch cases in the Court of Prize Appeal, examines how and why Hardwicke developed this rule.

This chapter provides a contextual overview of the development and operation of the British prize court system. It then introduces the specific legal rules and precedents, specifically the Rule of the War of 1756, that were developed by Britain during the Seven Years’ War in the pursuit of negotiating neutral rights to Britain’s strategic advantage. The chapter critiques the historiography on the Rule of the War of 1756 and makes the argument that the development of the rule and its influence in subsequent wars can only be understood if its strategic drivers are taken into account. The Rule, in other words, was as much a creation of strategic thinking as it was of legal thinking.

This chapter delves into Anglo-Dutch relations and negotiations in the period before the Seven Years’ War and during the war itself. It provides the background for the first two Dutch cases to come before the Court of Prize Appeal, that of the Maria Theresa and the America. The main thrust of the chapter is that, in order to understand Anglo-Dutch relations during the war, it is important to examine the interpersonal relationships between the members of the British government, the government’s relationships with the representatives of the Dutch Republic, the government’s relationships with the privateers who helped carry out commerce predation, and the government’s relationship with the Court of Prize Appeal. Through an examination of these interpersonal relations, the chapter argues that they were critical to the successes and failures of Anglo-Dutch negotiations over neutrality and critical to being able to influence decisions taken by the Court of Prize Appeal.

The Conclusion delves into the strategic and legal legacies of the Seven Years’ War. It ties the Seven Years’ War and the unresolved tensions around maritime neutrality to the outbreak of Anglo-Dutch and Anglo-Spanish hostilities during the American War of Independence. It does so by examining the peace treaty of 1763 wherein no new significant arrangements were made about neutral rights between the Spanish and the British. The argument is made that the ambiguity of existing treaties left both governments room to continue negotiations whilst the Rule of the War of 1756 would provide an understanding of how British prize courts would treat neutral ships in future conflicts. The chapter examines the legacy of the Court of Prize Appeal and the thinking behind the rule. It discusses how the court and the rule were used in subsequent conflicts through the Napoleonic Wars and the role that individual judges took in making the rule a critical or underplayed element of British maritime strategic thinking. The rule loomed large in British maritime law for many wars after Hardwicke created it and it is, perhaps, one of the best illustrations of the link between law, sea power, and strategic thinking.

This chapter focuses on the court cases of the Dutch ships the Maria Theresa and the America. It analyses the legal arguments behind the condemnation of each ship as legal prize and how these arguments are connected to, and differ from, Anglo-Dutch negotiations over neutral rights and the Anglo-Dutch treaty of 1674. The chapter demonstrates that the Anglo-Dutch negotiations at the governmental level were led by four key British figures: William Pitt, Lord Holdernesse, the Duke of Newcastle, and Lord Hardwicke. Their connections with their Dutch counterparts were largely managed through Joseph Yorke who was the British representative to the Dutch Republic. These negotiations were driven by maritime strategic considerations. In contrast, early decisions taken in the High Court of Admiralty created friction between the Dutch and British governments. The Dutch believed that the condemnation of their ships was arbitrary and an abuse of Dutch neutral rights. The chapter reveals that in order to resolve this tension, the British government determined to encourage the Dutch to appeal the decisions from the High Court of Admiralty and promised that the cases would be fairly determined in the Court of Prize Appeal where decisions could be influenced and shaped by Lord Hardwicke.

As the cases of the Jesús, Maria, y José and the San Juan Baptista made their way through the High Court of Admiralty, the arguments that would eventually be laid before the Court of Prize Appeal took shape. This chapter examines the arguments made in each case and how they affected Anglo-Spanish negotiations over neutrality. The chapter also focuses on the debates between British and Spanish ministers about the meaning and interpretation of the Anglo-Spanish Treaty of 1667 which governed Spanish neutral rights. It introduces two key people in Anglo-Spanish negotiations, Felix D’Abreu (Spanish representative in London) and Sir Benjamin Keene (British ambassador to Spain). Both men would be instrumental in shaping the debates on Spanish neutral rights and whether those rights could be protected through decisions handed down by the Court of Prize Appeal.