This chapter deals with a number of problems for pragmatic encroachment that arise because we are social beings whose lives are shaped by various inequalities. In section 8.1, I introduce the problem of wealth and explain how my account of pragmatic encroachment at least avoids certain instances of it. In section 8.2, I introduce the problem of joint deliberation, which my account cannot easily avoid. In section 8.3, I offer a view which I call Epistemic Communism to complement my account of pragmatic encroachment in order to deal with the problem of joint deliberation. In section 8.4, I address how my account deals with the phenomenon of epistemic injustice.

Here, I argue that knowledge-level justification for p suffices to make it rationally permissible to treat p as a reason for action. I will arrive at this conclusion indirectly, by first defending the sufficiency direction of the knowledge norm for practical reasoning (KRS) in sections 4.1–4.4 against popular counterexamples. In section 4.5, I consider why our intuitions about the counterexamples are misleading. In section 4.6, by running the subtraction argument presented in Chapter 2, I argue that knowledge-level justification for believing p suffices in all contexts for rational permissibility and I point out how this view still vindicates part of the knowledge-first project.

In this chapter, I argue that principles from Chapters 3 and 4 imply that there is pragmatic encroachment in epistemology. In section 5.1 and 5.2, I introduce and argue for a specific form of pragmatic encroachment in epistemology – pragmatic encroachment on knowledge. In section 5.3 and 5.4, I explain how my argument differs from similar ones in the literature, and how it avoids certain arguments against pragmatic encroachment that criticize the notion of stakes. In section 5.5, I set the scene for later chapters by introducing several competing explanations of pragmatic encroachment.

In this chapter, I argue that my preferred version of total pragmatic encroachment compares favorably to alternative explanations of pragmatic encroachment. In section 7.1, I raise the problem of forced choice against the genuine constituent explanation and the practical adequacy threshold explanation. In sections 7.2 to 7.4, I suggest a number of problems for the shifting thresholds view and argue that total pragmatic encroachment avoids them. In section 7.5, I deal with an objection to total pragmatic encroachment that concerns the (in)stability of rational belief and rational credences. In section 7.6, I turn to three more general objections to demonstrate that my account of total pragmatic encroachment can handle them and I explain how the sum of views I argue for coheres.

In this chapter, I argue for a contextualist approach to epistemic norms for practical reasoning, according to which the degree of justification required for it to be permissible to treat p as a reason for action varies with context. In section 3.1, I introduce how these proposals are motivated and three questions that will shape the following discussion. In sections 3.2 to 3.4, I discuss the proposals of Brown, Gerken, and Locke in turn. The most pressing issue for current contextualist accounts is what I call the incompleteness problem, which is how context determines what degree of justification a context calls for. In section 3.5, I develop a solution to the incompleteness problem that involves a comparison of two opposing costs, the costs of error and the costs of further inquiry. Finally, I point out a context-invariant principle that will become significant in Chapter 5.

In this chapter, I argue for epistemic encroachment, the thesis that, in an important sense, practical rationality depends on epistemic rationality. I argue for this thesis by engaging with several challenges to it. The first one is due to Derek Parfit, who questions that, generally, epistemic failings translate into a failure of practical rationality. Sections 1.1 to 1.4 concern this general challenge to epistemic encroachment on practical rationality. In section 1.5, I argue that we can infer from epistemic encroachment that there is an epistemic norm on practical reasoning. In section 1.6 and 1.7, I turn to the second challenge due to Davide Fassio, who tries to resist a specific form of epistemic encroachment, namely, that there is a genuine epistemic norm for practical reasoning.

In the Epilogue, I briefly deal with some topics that, given the current debate in the literature, might be seen as glaring omissions. First, I explain how my account of pragmatic encroachment seems unaffected by epistemic contextualism. Second, I explain how my account could incorporate a form of moral encroachment, but I also explain why I do not endorse this extension of my account. Finally, I explain how my account is compatible with the closure principle.

Epistemic norms for practical reasoning usually concern the question which epistemic condition must be met for it to be rationally permissible to treat p as a reason for action. I call this the classical question. In this chapter, I broaden the debate about epistemic norms, going beyond the classical question by focusing on ends. In section 2.1, I argue that we can approach the question of which ends one can rationally pursue by answering the question what one may hope for. In section 2.2, I argue that the standard condition on rational hope is too weak to properly constrain what one can rationally hope for. In section 2.3, I give my own account of what one may epistemically hope for, to which knowledge is central. In section 2.4, I point out that this suggests a novel angle on the knowledge-first program. In section 2.5, I relate my account of hope back to pursuing ends. Finally, in section 2.6, I argue that the wide variety of ends one can rationally pursue shows that many of the suggested epistemic norms that concern the classical question are overly demanding.

I develop a novel account of pragmatic encroachment in this chapter. According to this account, there is pragmatic encroachment on the strength of one's reasons for belief, which results in pragmatic encroachment on all notions sensitive to the strength of one's reasons for belief. In section 6.1, I introduce some motivation for the kind of account that I will develop. In section 6.2, I give an informal theory of the strength of reasons for belief. In section 6.3, I explain how this theory plus assumptions about the function of belief lead to pragmatic encroachment on the strength of reasons for belief, which makes it that the practical has primacy over the epistemic. In section 6.4, I deal with objections and in section 6.5, I suggest how to handle cases of ignorant and apparent high stakes.