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37 results

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  • Embodiment and the Philosophy of Mind

  • Edited by Anthony O'Hear, University of Buckingham
  • Foreword by Tim Crane, Central European University, Budapest
  • Book: The Philosophy of Mind
  • Published online: 19 May 2022
  • Print publication: 09 June 2022, pp 53-79

  • Summary

    Cognitive science is in some sense the science of the mind. But an increasingly influential theme, in recent years, has been the role of the physical body, and of the local environment, in promoting adaptive success. No right-minded cognitive scientist, to be sure, ever claimed that body and world were completely irrelevant to the understanding of mind. But there was, nonetheless, an unmistakeable tendency to marginalize such factors: to dwell on inner complexity whilst simplifying or ignoring the complex inner–outer interplays that characterize the bulk of basic biological problem-solving. This tendency was expressed in, for example, the development of planning algorithms that treated real-world action as merely a way of implementing solutions arrived at by pure cognition (more recent work, by contrast, allows such actions to play important computational and problem-solving roles). It also surfaced in David Marr’s depiction of the task of vision as the construction of a detailed three-dimensional image of the visual scene. For possession of such a rich inner model effectively allows the system to ‘throw away’ the world and to focus subsequent computational activity on the inner model alone.

  • Cognitive incrementalism: The big issue

  • Andy Clark
  • Journal: Behavioral and Brain Sciences / Volume 23 / Issue 4 / August 2000
  • Published online by Cambridge University Press: 30 August 2019, pp. 536-537

  • Neural organization raises, in an especially clear way, a major problem confronting contemporary cognitive science. The problem (the “big issue” of my title) is: What is the relation between the strategies used to solve basic problems of perception and action and those used to solve more abstract or “cognitive” problems? Is there a smooth, incremental route from what Arbib et al. call “instinctual schemas” to higher-level kinds of cognitive prowess? I argue that, despite some suggestive comments, Arbib et al. do not resolve this issue.

  • Attention alters predictive processing

  • Andy Clark
  • Journal: Behavioral and Brain Sciences / Volume 39 / 2016
  • Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 January 2017, e234

  • Firestone & Scholl (F&S) bracket many attentional effects as “peripheral,” altering the inputs to a cognitive process without altering the processing itself. By way of contrast, I highlight an emerging class of neurocomputational models that imply profound, pervasive, nonperipheral influences of attention on perception. This transforms the landscape for empirical debates concerning possible top-down effects on perception.

Old English Philology
  • Studies in Honour of R.D. Fulk
  • Edited by Leonard Neidorf, Rafael J. Pascual, Tom Shippey
  • Published by: Boydell & Brewer
  • Published online: 29 May 2021
  • Print publication: 21 July 2016
  • Robert D. Fulk is arguably the greatest Old English philologist to emerge during the twentieth century; his corpus of scholarship has fundamentally shaped contemporary understanding of many aspects of Anglo-Saxon literary history and English historical linguistics.
    This volume, in his honour, brings together essays which engage with his work and advance his research interests. Scholarship onhistorical metrics and the dating, editing, and interpretation of Old English poetry thus forms the core of this book; other topics addressed include syntax, phonology, etymology, lexicology, and paleography. An introductory overview of Professor Fulk's achievements puts these studies in context, alongside essays which assess his contributions to metrical theory and his profound impact on the study of Beowulf. By consolidating and augmenting Fulk's research, this collection takes readers to the cutting edge of Old English philology.

    Leonard Neidorf is a Junior Fellow at theHarvard Society of Fellows; Rafael J. Pascual is a Postdoctoral Research Fellow at Harvard University; Tom Shippey is Professor Emeritus at St Louis University.

    Contributors: Thomas Cable,Christopher M. Cain, George Clark, Dennis Cronan, Daniel Donoghue, Aaron Ecay, Mark Griffith, Megan E. Hartman, Stefan Jurasinski, Anatoly Liberman, Donka Minkova, Haruko Momma, Rory Naismith, LeonardNeidorf, Andy Orchard, Rafael J. Pascual, Susan Pintzuk, Geoffrey Russom, Tom Shippey, Jun Terasawa, Charles D. Wright.

  • Whatever next? Predictive brains, situated agents, and the future of cognitive science

  • Andy Clark
  • Journal: Behavioral and Brain Sciences / Volume 36 / Issue 3 / June 2013
  • Published online by Cambridge University Press: 10 May 2013, pp. 181-204
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  • Brains, it has recently been argued, are essentially prediction machines. They are bundles of cells that support perception and action by constantly attempting to match incoming sensory inputs with top-down expectations or predictions. This is achieved using a hierarchical generative model that aims to minimize prediction error within a bidirectional cascade of cortical processing. Such accounts offer a unifying model of perception and action, illuminate the functional role of attention, and may neatly capture the special contribution of cortical processing to adaptive success. This target article critically examines this “hierarchical prediction machine” approach, concluding that it offers the best clue yet to the shape of a unified science of mind and action. Sections 1 and 2 lay out the key elements and implications of the approach. Section 3 explores a variety of pitfalls and challenges, spanning the evidential, the methodological, and the more properly conceptual. The paper ends (sections 4 and 5) by asking how such approaches might impact our more general vision of mind, experience, and agency.

  • 14 - Embodied, embedded, and extended cognition

  • from Part III - Research programs
  • Edited by Keith Frankish, The Open University, Milton Keynes, William Ramsey, University of Nevada, Las Vegas
  • Book: The Cambridge Handbook of Cognitive Science
  • Published online: 05 August 2012
  • Print publication: 19 July 2012, pp -

  • Summary

    This chapter introduces some recent developments in the areas of human reasoning and decision making. Regarding decision making, the chapter focuses on decision-under-risk, using problems which are explicitly described in linguistic or symbolic terms. Human common-sense reasoning is far more sophisticated than any current artificial intelligence models can capture; yet people's performance on, for example, simple conditional inference, while perhaps explicable in probabilistic terms, is by no means effortless and noise-free. It may be that human reasoning and decision making function best in the context of highly adapted cognitive processes such as basic learning, deploying world knowledge, or perceptuomotor control. Indeed, what is striking about human cognition is the ability to handle, even to a limited extent, reasoning and decision making in novel, hypothetical, verbally stated scenarios, for which our past experience and evolutionary history may have provided us with only minimal preparation.

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