Self-blame is an integral part of our lives. We often blame ourselves for our failings, and we experience a familiar set of unpleasant emotions such as guilt, shame, regret, or remorse. Self-blame is also often what we aim for when we blame others – we want the people we blame to recognize their wrongdoings and blame themselves for it. Moreover, self-blame is typically considered to be a necessary condition for forgiveness. If the wrongdoer has not blamed herself/himself for her/his action, say by experiencing guilt or remorse, forgiveness may seem inappropriate. Yet so far, self-blame has not been an integral part of the theoretical debate about the nature of blame and its relation to moral responsibility. This volume seeks to remedy this omission.

The literature on moral responsibility is ripe with accounts of what it takes for an agent to become blameworthy. By contrast, very little has been written about what it takes for an agent’s blameworthiness to cease or diminish. It seems that there are certain things a wrongdoer can feel or do that might make her less blameworthy than she would otherwise have been. She might experience guilt, atone, apologize, and make reparations. In this chapter, I will argue that prominent accounts of blameworthiness are unable to explain how such actions and emotions can influence one’s blameworthiness. I will then present an alternative account. If we understand blameworthiness in terms of deserved guilt rather than fitting resentment, we can give a plausible account of how blameworthiness can change over time. The fact that a wrongdoer has already experienced guilt, atoned, or apologized will make her less deserving of guilt, and therefore less blameworthy.